Timothy Boswell
Analyst · Oppenheimer
Thank you, Brad, and good morning. Turning to Slide 16, given the macroeconomic backdrop, we wanted to revisit some of the pages we provided back when we went public, give our perspective on how WillScot performed in the last recession. It also highlights some fundamental differences that we think work to our advantage looking ahead. The bar chart in the middle of the page shows our leasing, delivery and sale revenue for the last 16 years. So a couple of observations. First, due to our long lease durations, unit on rent volume slowly declined post-GFC, bottoming in 2011. We can forecast pretty easily the churn of our installed base, which did not change following the GFC. There simply weren't enough new projects starting to replace those that naturally ended due to the prolonged drop in nonres construction starts. Secondly, during the post-GFC period, we harvested cash from the business for almost 7 years. Total fleet size contracted as we increased rental unit sales with no major fleet reinvestment until 2015. So we clearly lagged the nonres recovery due to our captive ownership structure. As a stand-alone public company today, we will be aggressive in leading the recovery. Third, at the bottom of the page, you see our revenue mix has changed dramatically. Over 90% of revenue today comes from our leasing operations versus only 64% in 2007. As we've discussed, sales revenue is more volatile, and we've deemphasized it strategically. So we have greater forward visibility into our revenue streams. I'll also point out that we had a high concentration in the education market, which accounted for roughly half of the volume decline post-GFC, as state and local budgets tightened. We have no such outsized end market exposures in the portfolio today. Lastly, heading into the remainder of 2020 and 2021, we've transformed the scale of the business and have a much more rational industry structure, which we believe results in a healthier balance of supply and demand. Turning to Page 17. This chart illustrates how our capital investments are almost entirely discretionary, even over extended periods of time, given the longevity of our assets, which gives us significant flexibility to manage free cash flow depending on market conditions. The green bars show our unlevered operating free cash flow, and the gray line shows our net CapEx, exclusive of acquisitions. Both due to the sharp drop in non-res as well as our former parent company strategy, you see that net CapEx actually went negative for 2 years, meaning that we sold more fleet than we reinvested, and net CapEx was a source of cash to the company. There was no material reinvestment in the U.S. fleet until 2015, which is possible given that Modular units have 20- to 30-year useful lives and have no real technological or mechanical elements to maintain. The business generated approximately $900 million of unlevered operating free cash flow in the 7 years following the GFC, and our leasing and services revenues today are roughly double what they were back in 2007. Obviously, this extreme example shows the business focused primarily on cash generation for an extended period, and at the expense of market opportunity, which is not how we would operate today. Instead, we would have the flexibility to delever rapidly, reinvest in organic growth earlier in the cycle, further consolidate our markets and return capital to shareholders, with a great deal of flexibility and opportunism. Since 2017, investors are familiar with our approach, allocating capital to value-added products, fleet refurbishment, strategic acquisitions and deleveraging, while expanding our overall value proposition to the market. History illustrates how a lower-demand environment will allow us to redeploy capital and drive shareholder value. Turning to Slide 18. Let's spend a few minutes on the mechanics of portfolio churn and the implications for average rental rate, as this is instructive in thinking about where our portfolio KPIs go from here. Based on the current spread between prices on our most recent contracts versus the portfolio average in the U.S., we see average rental rate growth well into 2021, irrespective of current market conditions, and we've seen this play out historically. The left-hand chart shows our average rental rate in dotted gray, and our spot rate on new deliveries in dark green. During the GFC, delivered spot rates peaked at the end of 2007, and were about 10% above the average rental rate across the whole portfolio. Spot rates then plateaued for 12 months before declining approximately 20% to trough levels in 2011. Importantly, due to our long lease durations, average rental rates take a long time to catch up to spot rates, and average rental rate peaked in Q4 2009, roughly 15 months after the spot rate peak. Lease duration also moderates the amplitude of the average rental rate cycle, which only dropped 7% from the peak to trough. So the mechanics of portfolio churn are fundamentally important, and we've made some improvements to them. We've put in place our centrally managed algorithm-based pricing tools in 2015, whereas pricing was manual and decentralized previously. We manage pricing on units beyond their contractual term today strategically, whereas there were only inflationary adjustments historically. And we have a much more rational industry structure today, each of these factors improve our ability to manage spot rates and average rental rates relative to 2007. Furthermore, average lease duration across our portfolio of 34 months is 17% longer than it was back in 2007, which extends the lag you see between changes in spot rates and changes in the portfolio average. As of Q1 2020, our spot rates were still increasing. And when you include value-added products, our combined spot rate is over 30% higher than the average rate across our U.S. portfolio. So that's more than triple the spread we saw back in 2007. These are the mechanics that allow us to look into the portfolio with some confidence, and believe we have embedded average rental rate growth well into 2021, irrespective of current market conditions. And as the market leader, we will be laser-focused on realizing rate performance in this market. Now let's briefly turn to Slide 20 and the more recent past of Q1, although it does feel like a long time ago. Year-over-year revenue growth was basically flat, but with another strong mix shift favoring leasing over sales. Core leasing and service revenue increased by 5.4%, offsetting the decline in sales revenue. Q1 of 2019 was really the last quarter when we saw any meaningful contribution from the runoff of the ModSpace sales business, and you can see this mix improvements clearly in the left-hand chart. Adjusted EBITDA increased by $6.1 million on flat revenues, and margins were up 210 basis points year-over-year as a result of cost reductions. I'll note in Q1, our cost reductions were partly offset by approximately $3 million of expense related to our biannual sales meeting, which is onetime and nonrecurring for purposes of our SG&A run rate heading into Q2. In the top right chart, as we saw in Q4, free cash flow continues to inflect positively, up $34 million on a year-over-year basis. I'll note, we did have roughly $5 million of real estate sales slipped from Q1, and we did accelerate payments to many of our smaller vendors in late March, so there was approximately a $15 million headwind to free cash flow on Q1 that is simply timing related. Jumping ahead to Slide 25, and a bit more on the free cash flow inflection that we started back in Q4. You will recall that net cash provided by operating activities more than tripled year-over-year in Q4, and Q1 was up about 2.5x versus prior year. Starting in Q4, we had multiple levers aligned to drive cash from operating activities. Top line leasing revenues have been growing with EBITDA margins expanding, another 210 basis points in Q1. Interest expense was down 9.2% in Q1, and working capital, which had been a headwind in the first half of 2019, has stabilized. We expect these trends to continue into Q2, although we will start to incur some cash costs related to integration work in the Mobile Mini transaction as we progress towards closing. At the bottom of the page, you are seeing a similar favorable trend in net cash from our investing activities. Net cash used in investing was down in Q4 of 2019 and Q1 of this year by 29% and 27%, respectively, on a year-over-year basis. These reductions resulted from our ability to manage the combined fleet more efficiently following completion of the ModSpace integration. Heading into Q2, as brad mentioned, we expect delivery volumes to be down 20% versus prior year, which means that delivery volumes will be similar to our Q4 and Q1 seasonal lows. So I expect net CapEx to be comparable to those levels and down approximately 20% from Q2 last year. With this volume trend, we will have invested below maintenance levels since Q4 of 2019, but with incremental growth capital allocated to value-added products. Given how dynamic the market environment has been, we have shifted to approximately a 2-week allocation cycle for fleet CapEx, so we will reevaluate capital allocations for Q3 based on the data that we see in June. Given the dynamic environment, on Slide 26, we provided a framework to try and help think about potential different financial outcomes in 2020. This is obviously an unprecedented economic disruption, but our business is such that we do have enough visibility to revise our financial outlook for the year, albeit down and with wider ranges than normal. Nevertheless, the punchline here is that, in pretty much every scenario, 2020 should be a year of modest EBITDA growth, and margins should be comparable and free cash flow is stronger than we assumed in our original outlook. Sitting here right now, we're planning for a 20% reduction of demand for unit deliveries in Q2 versus prior year. As Brad mentioned, total pending orders are up year-over-year, but due to market uncertainty, we expect many delivery and initial billing dates to slip into Q3. On the other hand, we don't see any near-term adverse impact on pricing, value-added products or lease duration, so this is primarily a sensitivity of delivery volumes and of variable costs. Brad already touched on the fixed versus variable cost structure, which gives us great flexibility to maintain margins in a declining volume environment. The sensitivity chart suggests a 60% decremental margin if we only flex our variable costs, and we believe decrementals dropped to at least 50% if we consider more structural cost reductions that we would implement if the demand outlook remains depressed in the second half of the year. So those structural reductions would support our run rate into 2021, if and when they are implemented, and we'll do it in a way that insurers were still in a position to lead the recovery. At the midpoint of our revised guidance range, we see revenues basically flat to prior year due to pricing and value-added products, offsetting the volume headwind. And adjusted EBITDA growth of approximately 5%, driven primarily by cost reductions and margins up modestly as a result. Most importantly, in the bottom right chart, EBITDA less net CapEx, which are the 2 biggest building blocks of unlevered free cash flow, is in line or above our original guidance for the year. This highlights the resilience of our business model and the value of long lease duration, coupled with flexibility in the cost and CapEx structure. And I'm proud of and grateful for the execution by our team in these unprecedented circumstances. With that, I'll hand it back to Brad for a quick update on the Mobile Mini merger, any closing comments and Q&A.