Curtis Morgan
Analyst · Morgan Stanley. Please go ahead
Thank you, Molly, and good morning everybody. We appreciate your interest in this call. Today, this morning, I would like to start out with the elephant in the room. We had a rough week last week, to say the least and for our investors who are listening to this call, I want to say on behalf of everybody at Vistra that we are disappointed and our inability to deal with this unprecedented event in a way that was favorable for the company. But I can assure you that we did everything we could to try to count come out on top. And I would like to take you through a little bit and Jim Burke will to the events that ensued. And what we tried to do to deal with those events, what happens, and also just to tell you on the front end, that it has taken us until middle of this week, to really sought out what really ultimately ended-up happening. And, and so therefore, we felt it was imperative that we have this discussion, even though we have not sorted out everything, that we have this discussion today, and started the process, have a conversation about, what actually happened, and then we will get to the final numbers. I can assure you that there isn't anybody more disappointed than us. And it is disappointing to me, that we let you down, because we pride ourselves in execution. And I think we have done a darn good job of it over the five years I have been here. And within literally an hour or two, our worlds kind of turned upside down. First of all, it was for Texas, maybe for those of us who lived in the northeast or the North know that, may not have looked as a big deal. But in Texas, it was an unprecedented event, the infrastructure, and I don't mean just the electric infrastructure. But I'm talking about housing and other things are built really for the heat. You don't see this kind of event. And I think history tells us that this was one of these, so called one in 100 years now, it did happen. And the reality is, even if it is one in 100, it can happen. So, there is no excuse. But it tells you the depth of what happens is, as I understand it, the coldest three days stretch that they can that they have on record in Texas, the 14th through to 16th. So, what did that mean? Well, that meant that we had unprecedented demand. So, - to take you back, and I think it is important to lay this out. I think it was the ninth of February. Steve Moscato, who is on this call, came to me and said our meteorologists that we have on staff came to him and said, we have got an unprecedented event from a we ran the numbers, and we were seeing load in 72,000 to 74,000 megawatts. Now, let's put that in perspective. The worst case scenario or the or the one of the - I guess you call it that, that that overcrowded perform was about 67,000 megawatts or so maybe 67 or 68. And Steve was concerned, not just because of the load. But we also were looking at wind forecasts. And we were concerned about solar. And the fact of the matter was that we didn't have enough steel on the ground to cover that load. So, and I have been testifying to this in Texas, I'm still here in Austin. Last couple days, and I will be talking more again today. But we did vote to Orca. And because they had I think it was about 65,000 megawatts for Monday. And this is by the way for Monday, Tuesday, 15th and 16th. Just to give you a timeline. So we were out in front of it. I have testified to this, I believe, and now that I have been lifting the other testimony that I believe, or Pat thought to say that they had it under control, and I will tell you in a minute what happened. And I think they weren't even prepare it for what ends up happening. But the bottom line is the company positioned itself relative to that to be long or flat. And in some instances we were short going into that, but then we went out and bought power at very high prices, because we believe that power was going to go to the cap, that it was not if it was wind. And so we were prepared, we also spent, and we have been open about this, about $10 million in preparation. We brought on about 200 additional contractors on site. We essentially did our whole winter readiness in Texas all over again, which we normally do in the fall. - And we felt very well prepared going into that. And then Monday came and I was on the phone with Steve and it was 1:00 AM, and Steve like he always does, we talk about, okay, here it comes. We think load shreds going to begin. And of course, we were supposed to be rolling blackouts, and then it started. I mean, we all saw it because, we were 30 minutes on, 15 off, and that went on for a relatively short period of time. And then Steve told me that we almost lost the entire grid. Frequencies were erratic, it tripped a couple of our units, and then shortly after that, everything locked down. And for what we find out on testimony, now, the transmission distribution entities, not ERCOT, essentially locked down each of their systems at wherever they were, because they were afraid they were going to lose the system. Now we have a book, and then all of a sudden that book of business changed. Loads, we are down to about some 40,000. And the reason they locked it down is because we were losing generation on the grid left and right. And the reason we were losing generation on the grid was predominantly because gas pressures, but also there were outages. Unfortunately for NRG, and this is public South Texas project Fripp. And I think this was a component of events for ERCOT. And for the two years, that all of a sudden they were managing a very different risk profile with a about 30,000 megawatts of generation, and they could not run a system on rolling blackouts with that level of generation. And so they just had to preserve the system. So that was the first event that changed our books. How did it change? It, locked whatever loads you had in your area based on what was on at that time. So if you were rolling blackouts and you were on, North Texas was on which we were that throws that at a particular level. And then we started getting our gas Trek because of pressures. So all of a sudden our book went from a flat, so long books into a, a book that was long, short, mixed, and we were scrambling at that point. And then upon our right on that, we had gas contracts, people declared force measure. So we had gas and then we didn't have gas. All that happened within a very short period of time. And we were managing a different reality at that point in time. And so frankly, we had millions of people without power in the state of Texas. We were scrambling to get gas. Gas prices shot through the roof. And we said this is a survival mode we turned our attention to preserving the Texas market and the grid and putting every megawatt we could. We said to ourselves we have to put everything on it and we will count this up at the end, But the one thing we know we need to do is serve customers, stabilize the grid, and then we will sort it out later. And that is what we did. And I look back on that every day and over the nights when I can't sleep. And I say to myself, "What could we have done different, Curt? How could we have played this differently?" And I think those decisions, as I play them over and over again were right. Now we had some things. And by the way, I know it doesn't matter in life. You know what, it doesn't matter if you lose the Super Bowl. No one goes and says, "Oh, that is just because you know you had a mistake or the rep had a call." You lost. And so I get that. I'm just trying to explain to you what we were trying to do to manage this situation that was unprecedented to us, and we were trying to do the best that we could. And it took us frankly until the middle of this week, in fact all the way up to last night, we were having a Board meeting to really get a sense of what that range would be and so we still don't know exactly what all these numbers are because we are still getting in - because ERCOT shut down for a while, it wasn't providing voices. We didn't know what the load looked like, and we are beginning to get that picture. So if you think about what happened, there was a confluence of events. But the biggest which - that we have not seen it is all the way from the wellhead, we were having freeze ups. So there wasn't enough gas to inject into the pipelines. We had gas processing facilities that were having winter issues. And one of the biggest things that happened is that the TDUs didn't have an updated list of critical infrastructure. And so all of a sudden, they couldn't help it. They just shut down what they didn't think was critical. And all of a sudden, we had gas compressors that are run on electricity that pack the pipes, they were shut off. They weren't listed as critical infrastructure. We had gas processing facilities that were shut off because they weren't listed as critical infrastructure. And we had wells, producing wells that were shut off for the same reason. So then we had to triage. We had to go upstream, looking for people and saying and finding out what was wrong, why we weren't getting gas. And we were helping people with the TDUs turn back on critical infrastructure. And in order to get that to happen, it took a couple of days then for those to get on, and then you have to - in order to repressurize the pipe, it takes a good day to do that. So it took the balance of the week to get gas restored. So we had a significant amount of curtailments, and we are buying gas at a very high price. Now, one on us is we had some problems with our coal fleet. We had just some toll issues at Martin Lake, which were derates. We didn't come off-line. We just didn't produce at a maximum. And then we had you guys may know this, but Okra, we ship coal. We mine lignite and we ship it, and we had the rails froze up, and then we had plugging, and that took us down for about a day and a half. Now why does that matter? Well, it matters a lot because Oak Grove has about $5 a megawatt hour cost structure as opposed to having to essentially replace it with gas at hundreds of dollars in MMBTU. So the margin that we were getting for that days and a half was less. Now we got it back. That was a good thing, but we lost for about days and a half days. That was a lot of money that we lost, and Jim is going to go through these numbers. The other thing I heard is that there was a pricing glitch on Monday. So we are in what we call an EEA3, which is the highest alert at ERCOT. That means you have really no reserves. In fact, we had 30,000 megawatts of negative reserves. Where was the price? Price was trading at LNPs, in some instances $1,000 below our cost. And so we are calling ERCOT. What is going on? Well, we determined there was a pricing, let's call it anomaly. We went to the PUC the next day. And they came out with an order and said, "We are going to reprice that at the cap, and then we are going to have it stay at the cap until we come out of EEA3." Frankly, the right decision, and that was a big deal for us. Inexplicably, 18-hours later they reversed the decision, and they decide to do it prospectively, but not retroactively. And they claim that during the wee hours of the morning on Monday, that people relied on that price. Ridiculous. And so Monday was a big day for us because we were long that day. Because the gas infrastructure was just beginning to come off, and so we lost that value. Now that is something that we could - are still take a hard look at, but that was tough. Again, "Curt, what does it matter? It still happened to you." Yes, it did, but we didn't expect it. Nobody expected when we are in EEA3, that the price would be anything but at the cap. How could it be when you have negative reserves? It absolutely is preposterous, and yet that is what happened. So all of those things happened. We didn't know what the book was. We went through that week. We performed actually relatively well. We put on 25% to 30% of all megawatts on the grid relative to our 18% market share. Good. Again, no good deed goes unpunished. The problem was we had a mismatch when they locked the system down between megawatts and load. And the other thing is we were producing from higher-cost assets than we expected. So our cost of goods sold mix was not helpful. So I have taken you really through the two first slides. I will say a little bit about the market because I think the other very fair question is, "Okay, well, what's this mean for the Texas market?" And frankly, I thought it was the best market in the country. And this event has made me think. Not just me, but a lot of people think about it. But I still believe the basic tenets of a very good market are here. But I think the one thing that we are going to have to work on with the policy makers, the regulators, and I think we have good momentum on this, is that the grid in Texas today when we put in the all energy market and the price caps, is a grid that is different than the one that existed when we went competitive. So when we were competitive, it was a very different grid house where we have a lot less dispatchable resources. In fact, we have less dispatchable resources than our peak loads. So we rely much more heavily on renewables. Renewables are good. Nothing wrong with that. But it changes the risk profile. Renewables during this event were at capacity factors from 5% to sort of 15%. They didn't really contribute a lot during this event. And that is why I said when we were at 74,000 peak load, we didn't have enough megawatts in the system. Again, it wasn't a matter of if, it was a matter of when. And we were telling people that. So on the market design, reserves has to be, in my mind, the number one - emphasis. And so there is a number of ways to get more reserves on the system. But I also think that we have to take a hard look at the balance between market and the competitive markets and reliability. And I think that puts a lot of things on the table. That puts could be potentially greater reserves that ERCOT has to acquire in order to maintain the system. It could be a capacity market. I know that that may be blast for me to some in Texas, but I think it has to be on the table. But what I think comes out of this is still a very good competitive market that still has opportunities for people to do well, but moves on the spectrum of competitiveness to reliability, move that a little more toward the middle. But we are going to sort through that and more will come out of that, but I'm confident that Texas will rise to the occasion. This economy mandates it, and the policymakers in the governor and others know that this economic engine is powered by electricity. And with electrification coming, we have got to get it right. And we are a big player. We have a big seat at the table. We have a lot of good ideas, and I think the market actually advances to a good point. Now the weather event, I mean we are believers in climate change. We don't know this type of event becomes more frequent. But I think if you just let history tell you something, that this is not a frequent event, but it could happen. And so we have to adapt. We have to. And it is not huge numbers, but we are going to have to batten down the hatch, so to speak, and to harden our assets. The one thing I'm going to be on a say about is making sure that the gas and electric systems work seamlessly, that the TDUs upgrade their critical infrastructure, and that the gas system puts the money in, just like we, do to harden the system. It cannot be acceptable to not deliver gas at the maximum pressures in the middle of a natural disaster. And you can't say, "Well, my hands are clean on this. I don't regulate that." Well, let's change the regulations then. So we have work to do, but I still have confidence, very much so, in the market. Now, this has been difficult. We hope that we hope to maintain your trust in us. But at the very least, we hope to earn it back. I'm disappointed. And it hurts, but it is what it is. And it is easy to lead when things are going well, and I think it is time to lead going forward. And I believe that the franchise is in place, the financial strength that we worked so hard to build, thank goodness, has helped us through this. And our better days are still ahead of us. And the integrated model still works, and we just have to do some things, some tweaks. We have to work on the market design, but I still have faith in this business and in these markets because they are too important. Electricity is the lifeblood of the economy. We have to get this right. there is no choice when you say, "Well, how do I trust that?" Texas can never go through this again, and they know that. So that is what I trust. And we are a big player here. And so what comes out the back end of this, I believe, is going to be good for Texas, good for the market and good for Vistra. So with that, I'm going to move into, and I just hate this, but I will move into 2020. Not that I hate 2020, or maybe I do. But I will moved into 2020 because we had such a great year, and this event has overshadowed it. And the men and women have worked so hard at Vistra in 2020 in the face of COVID, in the face of social issues and everything that is been thrown at us, performed as about as good as anybody could have expected. It enabled us to pay down a significant amount of debt. Our retail business was exceptional, getting close to almost $1 billion of EBITDA. We continue on the cost savings front. And by the way, I'm not going to throw a number out there today and say that we are going to save a bunch of hundreds of millions of dollars. We have a lean business, and I'm not going to starve this business. You cannot starve power plants for maintenance costs. It will bite you in 2022 and 2023. But we will as we always do, and we will double down. We will look for opportunities to optimize earnings going forward once we determine what the full effect of this is. And I'm convinced that we do every year, we will find opportunities and we will let you know what those are. But I'm not going to throw a big number out there that I don't think is good for the company in the long run, and we are playing this for the long run. 2021 and this event are a onetime event, and we are going to move this company forward in a way where it can compete and be even better into the future. In 2020, I'm now on delivering the financial results slide. Just a phenomenal year, $3.77 billion of EBITDA and almost $2.6 billion in free cash flow before growth, almost a 70% conversion ratio. I remember when I was talking to you guys in the Dynegy acquisition, and we put out the - I think it is S-4 and we had a set of projection numbers. And just looking at what we were able to do in 2020 relative to what we had in that is, in my opinion, truly remarkable. And I think we did that with very disciplined investment into the business, and I'm proud of what we were able to do and what the numbers we were able to put up. I think since I took over, we have got I think almost $600 million above midpoint of guidance over those years. What just kills me is we gave it all back and more, but we have been through that story already this morning. I won't take you through it again, but that is tough. You don't want to get back what you have created, and that is a difficult thing for us. The OP initiative continues, and it will continue. We baked that now. That is just a part of who we are. And we like to give this to you just because we want you to know when we tell you we are doing something, that we do it. But it is really embedded in our EBITDA. And then we are on track on our synergies for the - and namely the Crius and Ambit because Dynegy is pretty much done Even on the system side, the technology side, that is pretty much done at this point in time. And the last thing I will say and I will hand it over to Jim. Through all this, we still have - and I'm on the last slide here, prioritizing all stakeholders. Just briefly to touch base, this has been who we are since I have been here. We have been about all stakeholders. We continue to do it. We have made huge advancements on the environmental side with our employees and contractors and customers and suppliers in our communities. We are proud of that, and we expect to continue to do that. And I know we did announce that we had $5 million to help customers. And some people may say, "Well, there is a cost savings right there, Curt, why did you do that?" And it is because of what I said earlier, two things. One is we are about helping people. As a company, not just about making money. We do care about that, but we have a bunch of people down here that are in need. This became a survival game. This became a human's needs effort, and we took that seriously, just like we take seriously being the guardians of your investments, we do care also about people. And it is very important to the franchise of our retail businesses that we are out there, and we are helping others. We have not lost those franchises. This weather couldn't take the franchises away from us, and they have extreme value. And we have to keep investing in those franchises, but helping people is also a very important thing. And so we made that hard call in the face of adversity and uncertainty because that is who we are. That is what we are about. So with that, I'm going to give it to Jim. Jim is going to quickly go through financial results. And then I know you guys have Q&A, and we will try to answer everything we can as completely as possible. And so I will turn it over to Jim. Thank you.