Curtis Morgan
Analyst · Guggenheim Partners. Please go ahead. Your line is now open
Thank you, Molly, and good morning to everyone on the call. As always, we appreciate your interest in Vistra Energy. We expect this call to be lengthier than usual. We have a lot to cover including Q3 results, 2019 guidance, 2020 guidance with a glimpse of 2021, an operations performance initiative update and a 10-year view based on our detailed fundamental analysis. So let's get started. Turning to Slide 6, Vistra finished the third quarter of 2019 reported strong adjusted EBITDA from its ongoing operations of $1.064 billion, results that are once again in line with the management's expectations for the quarter and results I am pleased to see relative to guidance that's already incorporated, high ERCOT wholesale power prices, especially for the summer of 2019. The quarter began with an unseasonably mild July following one of the mildest Junes in over 10 years. In fact, there was a very, very, sentiment out there and our stock had sold off. On our second quarter call we outlined why we remain bullish on the markets, especially ERCOT and our company. Of course, we know that August turned out to be a different story than July, as the tight supply/demand dynamic in ERCOT resulted in sustained scarcity pricing. We saw 12 15-minute intervals clear at the price cap of $9000 per megawatt hour during the month. To give you some perspective of the magnitude of the difference between July and August pricing at ERCOT, the average 7 x 24 price in August was $131 a megawatt hour, more than four times higher than the average July sell price of approximately $30 a megawatt hour. Our fleet performed well during the summer peak period, resulting in August favorability in our ERCOT Generation segment offsetting the headwinds from July and importantly bringing realized prices for the quarter back in line with management expectations for the year. This is a key point and one I want to emphasize. In ERCOT, an order for peak hour forward curve that is well above $100 per megawatt hour to be realized. The market has to see some level of scarcity pricing materialize. In fact, for peak forward curves to trade at these levels a certain number of scarcity pricing intervals are assumed. In order to achieve financial projection as they are based on the forward curve going into the year, we need to see some of these high priced intervals occur. In short, each high priced interval is not necessarily additive to financial results on a standalone basis and some of this volatility is required to achieve the expected outcome. Scarcity pricing did materialize in August in ERCOT in September of this year and Vistra's integrated model performed well. Our net length in ERCOT was able to cap the scarcity pricing in the market while also covering swings in our retail load including the incremental Crius load we acquired on July 15. Crius came to us like many other standalone retailers, under-hedged for the ERCOT summer and right in the thick of it. As a result, the Crius book was more exposed to summer volatility in 2019 than it would have been under our ownership. In fact, the scenario that materialized this summer is exactly why we prefer to be net long in ERCOT. Our incremental length is first available for risk mitigation to ensure we have the appropriate amount of generation available to cover the forward sales from our generation asset and our retail load requirements. Incremental generation is then available to capture any scarcity pricing in the market providing upside opportunity. Of course, the overwhelming majority of our generation position is used to hedge retail and much of the excess generation is hedged before we arrive at the prompt [ph] periods creating a lower risk, more stable earnings profile. We believe this is the right way to run out business, especially in a market like ERCOT that exhibits such extreme volatility in energy pricing. In fact, we expect we will see even more volatility in ERCOT in the coming summers as the market relies more heavily on intermittent and renewable assets. As a result, the types of volatility products that have historically been available for retailers are becoming more expensive and difficult to find. Given the change in composition of the generation mix in ERCOT and the expectation for increased volatility, we will likely want to go into future summers carrying at least as much length as we have historically, a topic I will discuss in more detail momentarily. Turning now to year-to-date results, Vistra's adjusted EBITDA from ongoing operations for the first nine months of the year is $2.586 billon, which is in line with management expectations that already incorporated robust summer wholesale power prices in ERCOT as I've previously discussed. With our strong performance for the first nine months of the year combined with the addition of the Crius business as of July 15, and the Ambit business which we just closed last Friday, November 1, we are both narrowing and raising the midpoint of our full year 2019 ongoing operations guidance range. We expect we will finish the year delivering adjusted EBITDA in the range of $3.32 billion to $3.42 billion in the top half of our prior 2019 guidance range. In effect, our base business is generally tracking as originally projected for the year with Crius and Ambit providing EBITDA upside to our prior guidance range. We are similarly narrowing and raising our adjusted free cash flow before growth guidance range to the top end of our prior guidance range of $2.2 billion to $2.3 billion. Our improved outlook for adjusted free cash flow before growth is a result of the expected increase in adjusted EBITDA for the year. You will also see in the guidance table on Slide 6 a column highlighting illustrative guidance for 2019. This illustrative guidance is $40 million higher than our updated 2019 guidance range as it backs out the negative impact of ERCOT's retail backwardation we expect to realize in the year. When we talk about retail backwardation, we are referring to the near-term impact of long-dated contracts executed with retail customers supplied by our native generation. For example, if we can execute a new three-year contract with a retail customer, often the pricing under that contract is flat for the entire three-year term. Given the backwardation that exists in current ERCOT market curves, that usually means the contract is out of the money compared to the market in the earlier period of the contract, but meaningfully in the money thereafter, such that the net present value of executing the transaction is favorable. While we have historically realized some level of retail backwardation in our results, the total impact has typically been minor. However, for 2019 and 2020, we are projecting a much larger impact as a result of the greater curve backwardation entering into both years coupled with increased interest by market participants to enter into long-dated contracts in ERCOT. For 2019 we are estimating the impact of the ERCOT retail backwardation to be approximately $40 million. If we were to exclude this negative end year financial impact, our adjusted EBITDA guidance range would have increased to $3.36 billion to $3.46 billion reflecting a midpoint that would have been at the high end of our guidance range. We wanted to provide this illustrative range to give you a sense for exactly how well our integrated operations are executing in 2019. In fact we believe, excluding the adverse backwardation impact from 2019 adjusted EBITDA is the proper way to look at our 2019 results as we did not plan for the volume or the impact of long-dated contracts in our initial 2019 guidance and moreover, the future of favorable impacts from these retail transactions will be included in our prospective guidance range. Our core business demonstrated stability in a volatile summer market. And with the additions of Ambit and Crius we are expecting incremental upside to our base results. Turning now to Slide 7, we're also announcing today our guidance ranges for 2020. We have been reiterating for the past year our belief that 2020 results could be relatively flat to 2019, in part because we were confident the historical 2020 forward curves remained dislocated from fundamentals and would improve after we got past the 2019 summer, a phenomenon we have witnessed in recent years as depicted on the next slide and one we expect to continue for the foreseeable future. We have forecast summer reserve margin of 10.5%. Summer 2020 is expected to remain tight and in March of next year, the loss of load probability in ERCOT operating reserve demand curve shifts by another quarter of a standard deviation, which should further increase the probability of scarcity pricing intervals during the summer. The recent uplift in the 2020 forward curve, as well as the addition of the Crius and Ambit businesses, has raised our prior expectation of relatively flat to a projected increase of adjusted EBITDA year-over-year. Specifically for 2020 we are projecting adjusted EBITDA in the range of $3.285 billion to $3.585 billion and adjusted free cash flow before growth of $2.16 billion to $2.46 billion. Summer of 2019 we have provided on this slide an illustrative guidance range excluding the projected negative impacts of our ERCOT retail backwardation. For 2020 we expect these impacts to be approximately $70 million higher than what we expect to realize in 2019 partially due to the addition of Ambit, whose portfolio will also be impacted by contracts with retail backwardation in ERCOT. Excluding these impacts, our 2020 guidance midpoint will be approximately $3.5 billion, a significant increase over our expected 2019 results. In fact, many of you will recall, the five-year financial projections we've published in our joint proxy statement and prospectus in connection with the Dynegy merger announcement in the first quarter of 2018. At that time, our Board of Directors evaluated the merits of the Dynegy transaction assuming the 2020 adjusted EBITDA of the combined business would be $2.81 billion which included an estimated $350 million of value levers announced in connection with the merger. The midpoint of our 2020 guidance is more than $600 million higher than that previous estimate. In only two years we have improved that 2020 financial outlook by more than 20% with the vast majority of this improvement being driven by items entirely within our control and largely unaffected by commodity prices. Specifically, approximately $425 million of the improvement in adjusted EBITDA is attributable to the hard work our teams have done to increase the expected merger value levers by nearly 70% while also adding incremental EBITDA through growth investments. Two years ago, when we announced the Dynegy merger, the market was concerned about the long-term viability of this business, pointing to a $200 million decline in capacity revenues that would materialized in 2020. The 2020 guidance we are providing today is just one example of the resiliency of this business model. Our teams continue to identify efficiencies to maximize the value of our operations and we've been successful at identifying tuck-in growth opportunities that are both EBITDA and free cash flow accretive with very attractive returns while requiring modest levels of our free cash flow to pursue. We are confident that this business model will continue to create value for our stakeholders, a topic we will discuss in more detail shortly. And I must say, in our view, this stock price does not reflect the resiliency, stability and level of EBITDA and free cash flow of this business. A final note on this slide, you might notice that these guidance ranges are slightly wider than our prior guidance ranges, reflecting bands of a $150 million as compared to our prior bands of $100 million. We believe our guidance range based on a percentage of EBITDA is most appropriate and a range of plus or minus approximately 5% is reasonable and in line with peers. We believe a wider guidance range also better reflects the potential range of outcomes for our business, particularly, in ERCOT, with its tight reserve margins and increasing reliance on intermittent renewable resources. This market dynamic is increasing the volatility in ERCOT as well as the potential to capture value if managed properly with the right assets. In fact, it is now more important than ever that we have length on the days where there is volatility in the market, especially when taking into consideration the size of the load reserve. As a result, we might find it prudent to carry more length into December 2020 and beyond than we have in years past. Given this past summer and the likely influx of more intermittent resources, the cost of managing risk in ERCOT has gone up especially for short retailers. While the range of potential outcomes may be wider for us in ERCOT, we are well positioned to take advantage of the increased volatility given our high quality long asset position, integrated business and commercial capabilities. Furthermore, as I will discuss in connection with our 10-year outlook, our fundamental analysis continues to forecast a high probability of scarcity events occurring in ERCOT in future years. The ERCOT market is changing. Increasing intermittent resources will inevitably increase the appropriate level on reserve margins. A cost to run the power system with significant intermittent renewable that is yet to be fully understood and recognized by stakeholders. This increased volatility suits our integrated business position and capabilities quite well. So we remain bullish on the ERCOT market and are building to capitalize on opportunities likely to arise in the future. Turning now to our thoughts on 2021, though actually we still believe 2021 adjusted EBITDA could be relatively flat to or higher than 2019 and 2020. If you take a view based solely on the forward curves, 2021 adjusted EBITDA would look slightly down compared to prior years. However, as we have discussed, and as we depict on the next slide forward curves that are more than a year out tend to understate the tight supply and demand dynamic and increase likelihood of volatility in ERCOT in particular. The graph on Slide 8 is a helpful visual of this phenomenon, where there was a significant uplift in forward pricing in 2018, 2019, and 2020 as each delivery year approached. This uplift was especially prominent for 2019 and 2020, appropriately reflecting updated scarcity pricing expectations including the modifications to the ORDC and the tight market conditions. As you know, we develop our own point of view of where we believe forward pricing is likely to materialize based on rigorous analysis of market fundamentals. As it did for 2020, our point of view for 2021 would suggest that current market curves are not representative likely pricing outcomes. As a result, when looking forward to 2021, in the context of our internal point of view, we believe 2021 adjusted EBITDA would exceed 2019 and 2020 results. Recognizing that there are a range of potential outcomes for 2021, we are comfortable given our fundamental analysis that 2021 has a very good chance of being relatively flat to 2020 if not higher. A relatively flat outcome would reflect a nearly $700 million improvement in the adjusted EBITDA that was forecast for the business at the time we announced the Dynegy merger two years ago. The outlook for our business continues to improve and we remain believers in our business model. Turning now to Slide 9, I'm excited to announce today that we have identified $50 million of incremental EBITDA enhancement opportunities from our ongoing Operations Performance Initiative under the leadership of Jim Burke. Our teams on the ground know that in order to remain viable as the generation landscape evolves, we must ensure our assets are operating at the highest levels of efficiency and at the lowest cost while first and foremost prioritizing safety. The OP process is critical to our success in this regard and it continues to deliver results. Incrementally, within the fleet rationalization bucket of our OP process we have also improved our financial forecast with the retirements of four coal plants in downstate Illinois. As you know, this year it was required to retire 2000 megawatts of nameplate capacity in MISO zone IV in connection with an amendment to the Multi-Pollutant Standard which was finalized this summer. Three of the plants, Coffeen, Havana and Hennepin were retired effective November 1. The fourth plant Duck Creek, is scheduled to retire on December 15, of this year. As a result of these retirements, Vistra has improved its 2021 adjusted EBITDA forecast by an incremental $100 million which is net of the previously identified OP opportunity at these sites. Taken together, these updates improve our OP target to a total of $425 million per year, up from the $125 million we announced in connection with the Dynegy merger. Including synergies in OP the EBITDA value level of target we have identified from the Dynegy merger have increased from $350 million annually to $750 million which includes $290 million of traditional merger synergies, $345 million of OP value leverage identified, and a net $100 million of EBITDA improvement in 2021 from the retirement of the four MISO plants. It has been two years since we first announced the acquisition of Dynegy and the financial benefits of the transaction continued to improve. Financial synergies however, were not the sole reason we made a decision to acquire Dynegy. Another important factor was the opportunity to transition Vistra's generation fleet from one that was heavily weighted toward coal to one that is now approximately 64% natural gas by capacity. We believe we are relatively young, low heat rate generation fleet will be able to create value for our stakeholders over the next decade and beyond which leads me to the discussion of our 10-year fundamental outlook. Before I get into the discussion, I would like to explain why we believe it is essential for us to present a longer-term view of our company and the key power markets where we operate. First, at a minimum, we believe it is important to frame the potential impact of our recently announced greenhouse gas emissions reductions targets on the business. Furthermore, we believe it is imperative to our company's valuation that we explain the long-term prospects for the business, even our perspective on technological and climate change impacts on the sector. Simply put, there is a terminal value question for energy companies and we believe it is necessary to address it head on. The good news is that the power sector stands to grow over time as a result of electrification across all sectors of the economy in response to climate change and we are well positioned. Slide 11 summarizes our 10-year view. As most of you are aware last week Vistra announced for the first time our long term greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets which include to achieve a more than 50% reduction in CO2 equivalent emissions by 2030 compared to a 2010 baseline. Notably, Vistra has already retired or announced plans to retire 14 coal plants and 3 gas plants since 2010 resulting in a reduction of CO2 equivalent emission of approximately 42%. As a result, in reflecting marginal profitability at some of our coal units in particular, we expect we can achieve our 2030 emissions reduction target to an incremental retirement actions representing only 2.5% of our projected 2020 adjusted EBITDA. While any such retirements will advance our progress toward our long term emissions reductions target our fundamental analysis would suggest that future retirements of this magnitude will be warranted based on economics alone. In fact, we estimate generation assets representing approximately 5% to 8% of our projected 2020 adjusted EBITDA could be at risk of retirement in the next decade, predominantly from new build and particularly renewable and expected infrastructure [ph] expenditures. Importantly, this small percentage of our total EBITDA can be replaced on relatively minor growth investments over the same time period. At Vistra's targeted return levels we could replace 2.5% EBITDA reduction projected to achieve our 2030 greenhouse gas reduction target with less than $500 million of investment. The incremental at risk EBITDA would require only $500 million to $1 billion of additional investment. To put this side of investment into perspective, we have already more than replaced the equivalent of the EBITDA risk through our recent retail and battery investment, not to mention our incremental EBITDA improvement initiatives such as OP. In addition, this level of investment represents only about 2.5% to 7.5% of our anticipated free cash flow over the next 10 years assuming we generate $2 billion of free cash flow each year on average. The bulk of business current adjusted EBITDA is derived from its relatively young, low cost, highly flexibility gas fuel generation fleet with two of the lowest cost nuclear and coal plants in the country in Comanche Peak and Moss Landing. We believe these assets are well positioned for success in markets with increasing reliance on intermittent [ph] resources, in particular, we expect our flexible natural gas assets will run more and remain critical to the reliability of the regional power markets in which we operate. We are seeing this phenomenon play out in California now as a percentage of solar assets in the state increases. For example, resource adequacy contracts for gas assets in California are being transacted at $7 to $7.50 per KW a month right now, which as a frame of reference is almost double the revenues awarded in ISO New England's latest capacity auction. We also saw this play out in ERCOT during the summer peak as our gas fuelled peaking and steamer assets played a key role on low wind days. Our fleet, which is approximately 64% natural gas by capacity is well positioned to capture value and support market reliability as renewables are built out across the U.S. Similarly, we believe our retail business will remain a stable and growing contributor of our performance over the next decade and we project fundamentals in both ERCOT and PJM our core markets will remain strong. Turning to Slide 12. Let's start our fundamentals discussion with ERCOT. Getting right to the punch line, our fundamental analysis projects that ERCOT prices are likely to remain in the mid '30s or higher per megawatt hour through 2030 with scarcity pricing events remaining consistent feature in the market over this time period. In reaching this conclusion, our team factored in an estimated 1.5% to 2% annual loan growth through 2030, and the scenarios that we evaluated included the addition of up to 50 gigawatts of new renewable assets including approximately six gigawatt of battery storage with no sustained transmission capacity constraints, although we do expect there will be price differential zone. We similarly modeled potential retirements in the market based on economic factors or plant obsolescence assuming only 3.5 gigawatt of retirements over the next decade. While we believe our analysis is conservative if it proves to be too bullish, we believe there are more than 15 gigawatts of generation in ERCOT supply stack potentially at risk of retirement which should further mitigate any downside scenarios. In arriving at our conclusion on expected market price outcomes, we ran a bottoms up, hour by hour simulation model with explicit assumptions around new build, retired and low growth and we calibrated our model relative to ERCOT's history. What market observers perhaps do not appreciate is how markets will evolve with the rising intermittency from increased reliance on renewable assets. The greater the percentage of renewable assets in the market, the higher the levels of volatility, we expect to see. This is true, even if the market has increasing reserve margins as the expansion of reserve margins is driven by renewable assets, which tend to rise and fall together. Renewable penetration effectively lowers the overall median price observed in a year as renewable assets with a zero marginal cost shipped to generation stack further to the right. However, and most important, the higher percentage of renewables in the market will significantly increase the probability of scarcity events in pricing volatility, resulting in a significantly higher average annual price relative to the median price. If you think about it, renewable assets of a lifetime in the same geographic area will generally be available or offline as a class. In many instances the renewable assets will not be able to capture price back because in large part, they will be the cause of the scarcity event during the correlated nature of their failure to perform. For example, all solar will be offline at 9:00 PM and all wind drops when front stall over a geographic area. And increasingly important metric to pay attention to in ERCOT will be net load defined as load less renewable, as that is ultimately what the ISO has to manage on a delivered basis. Net loan peaks rather than overall demand peaks are expected to be more highly correlated with scarcity events in the future. This was the case in ERCOT this August when price by us were driven primarily by lower availability of wind generation on days with strong, though not extreme demand as we depict on the next slide. Slide 13 shows that on August 15 of this year, power prices in ERCOT spiked to the market cap of $9,000 per megawatt hour. However, peak load was less than 71,000 megawatts, approximately 5% lower than ERCOT's 2019 peak summer demand. The real driver for the price hike was the low level of wind output, which was approximately 2,500 megawatts or less than 15% of nameplate capacity during the intervals at the cap, compared to an average output of 6,000 to 7,000 megawatts per peak summer wind. Renewable resources by definition are unpredictable, with renewable assets forecast to make up a greater percentage of the ERCOT supply base over the next decade, market participants should expect sustained volatility, as well as increased reliance on flexible and efficient natural gas assets of which we have many. Ensure renewable penetration in ERCOT should not meaningfully depress market pricing, rather our fundamental analysis which suggests average market price will remain stable to rising over the next decade. Our ERCOT fleet which is comprised of low cost base fuel of coal, solar and nuclear assets, highly flexible and low heat rate CCGTs and gas peaking and steam units is well positioned to capture value as the market evolves. Before we leave ERCOT and move on to PJM, let's turn to Slide 14 where we back half 2019 actuals to prior years in order to further demonstrate our view that 2019 is representative of ERCOT's new normal. As you can see in the chart on the top half of the slide, despite the scarcity pricing we observed in August and September of this year, 2019 was not an outlier of extreme temperature days in Texas. As I just discussed, the scarcity pricing was driven more by a combination of strong load and low renewables, a phenomenon we can expect to see more of in ERCOT over the next decade, particularly as a greater percentage of the supply base is comprised of renewable assets. The bottom half of Slide 14 shows the result of recasting 2011 through 2019, based on our fundamental point of view of the 2020 supply stack. The results reinforce our expectation of persistent scarcity events going forward. For example, 2018 modeling to 2020 supply stack, we would have expected to see 14 hours in north of pricing above $1000 per megawatt hour compared to the poor hours, we actually observe in the year. This back cast highlights that a small number of incremental renewable assets in the supply stack can have a noticeable difference in pricing outcomes. Last, let's not forget that beginning in March of next year, ORDC pricing will kick in even earlier than it did in 2019, further increasing the probability of scarcity pricing outcomes. We remain steadfast in our view, that the long-term forward power curves do not reflect the underlying fundamentals of the ERCOT market. As we have discussed in the past, the backwardation of the forward curves were not reflective of fundamentals so exert a certain level of discipline on the market, especially related to merchant thermal new build. It will also impact future renewable development as we reach a saturation point for renewable PPAs. Let's not forget that merchant investments require the ability to hedge five to seven years out to secure capital. In addition, the market must support sufficient revenues to justify merchant investments. There are some that believe around the clock pricing in ERCOT will decline to a sustained low 20s per megawatt hour. But this ignores the likelihood of incremental retirement at those price levels as well as the need to have long-term pricing that supports adequate returns for the lowest cost merchant investment, likely renewables. In fact, this low price draconian view is neither supported by any reasonable analysis, nor can it sustain the market in the long run. Our analysis indicates that the current market rules in ERCOT can and will provide adequate revenues, but they will be more volatile and less predictable. We will see if this market construct will support the level of investment, especially merchants that will be needed to maintain a minimally acceptable reserve margin as we have assumed in our fundamental analysis. We believe our existing ERCOT generation fleet, with assets that are low cost, flexible, and well positioned on the supply stack, will remain valid and critical to ensuring a reliable cost effective risk. Turning now to PJM, I am on Slide 15. Unlike ERCOT, PJM has delivered relatively stable energy and capacity revenues over the last several years. From 2010 to 2018, the average PJM CCGT earned approximately $9 to $12 per KW month from the combination of capacity and energy. In fact, capacity and energy revenues has historically moved in opposite directions, resulting in a relatively stable earnings profile in total, and over time. The graphs we depict on Slide 15 demonstrate this phenomenon. For example, in 2016, you can see that gross capacity prices for RTO [ph] zone were offset by on peak spark spreads that were at a four-year high. Similarly, in 2017, on peak spark spreads in EMAAC were relatively low when capacity prices in the zone were at a peak in the second half of the year. We have seen this dynamic play out in PJM over the years and in a similar fashion, our fundamental analysis results in expectations of flat to gradually rising overall energy and capacity pricing through 2030. Our fundamental analysis is driven by the expectation of gradually tightening reserve margins, the possibility of slightly rising natural gas prices, and prospects were ongoing retirement of older, less efficient coal, oil and gas steam units. We also assume that the results in the capacity market will not change materially from recent clears with expected highs and lows. While we expect renewables will be added to the supply stack over the next decade, PJM is the least favorable market for renewables with largely low onshore wind intensity and low sun irradiance. As a result, we expect renewable development will be driven by state RPS [ph] standards rather than economics. As reflected by the consistent band and the historical returns in PJM with over 180,000 megawatts of installed capacity, it is difficult for either incremental new supply or retirements to meaningfully move the market in one direction or the other. Just as we have seen in recent periods, we expect total revenues to vary year-to-year, though it will remain consistent with historical levels overall. As it relates to Vistra specifically, we believe our large fleet of efficient CCGT units and PJM will continue to generate a significant amount of EBITDA for our consolidated operations as they collect significant revenue streams from both capacity and energy markets. However, our PJM coal units could be at risk of retirement, just as other high costs coal, oil and gas units will be over the next decade. We have factored any potential future retirements into our EBITDA at risk analysis, which takes us to our last slide on our 10-year fundamental outlook. Slide 16, our analysis supports our view that Vistra can generate relatively stable to growing EBITDA in a wide range of scenarios, including generating approximately $2 billion per year on average of adjusted free cash flow before growth to either return to shareholders or to invest in growth opportunities. If we invest on average $500 million a year on growth opportunities, roughly a quarter of our projected adjusted free cash flow on an annual basis and achieve our targeted returns, we could deliver an incremental $90 million to $100 million dollars a year of EBITDA. Our track record today with the acquisition of the Odessa CCGT plant in West Texas, the development of the Upton 2 [indiscernible] solar and battery project and the acquisition of Crius and Ambit on the retail side has demonstrated that we can be successful in finding high return tuck-in growth opportunities on a regular basis. In fact, those projects have exceeded or expected to exceed our targeted return levels. Continuing this history of executing on opportunistic growth projects, likely in retail, renewables and battery storage, would not only require only a small portion of our overall anticipated cash flows, but it is expected to result in a growing business that would more than offset the impact of potential plant retirements over the next decade. In fact, even after allocating capital to growth projects and paying in annual dividends, district could still have a significant amount of cash available to return to shareholders. We expect we'll have meaningful cash to deploy beginning in 2021 after we achieve our long-term leverage target. As we always mentioned with any discussion of growth, if we do not find opportunities to invest at attractive returns, we will return capital to shareholders. This is always our litmus test. In summary, our assessment of the 10-year prospect for our business reinforces confidence that our business model is resilient and compelling, taking advantage of the way we have positioned our company as a low cost, low leverage integrated business within the money assets and attractive markets. We have covered a lot today. I hope that it has been a worthwhile discussion for you and I hope you walk away from this call with a better understanding of a few key points. First, renewable penetration is not an insurmountable threat to our business, rather a higher percentage of renewables in the market will merely change the distribution of price outcomes, placing more importance on unit performance during high priced intervals, and increasing the reliance of efficient CCGT assets and peaking units of which we have many. And we will have the opportunity to invest in the technological changes impacting our business, but in a disciplined manner. Second, well, certain of our units specifically our coal plants in MISO and PJM could be at risk of retirement over the next decade. These assets are not meaningful contributors of EBITDA today. Our modeling suggests that given the favorable position of our generation assets on the supply stacks in the markets where they operate, only 2.5% of our estimated 2020 adjusted EBITDA will be lost in order to achieve our 2030 greenhouse gas emissions reduction target. And a modest 5% to 8% could be at risk through 2030, from new build penetration and environmental expenditures. The assets that are most exposed to a higher penetration of renewables are the older, high heat rate assets, of which we own very few. And third, we expect to generate a significant amount of free cash flow on an annual basis. Using only a small percentage of this free cash flow, we can make attractive growth investments to not only offset any EBITDA loss from future asset retirement, but to grow our business. With our strong free cash flow and market leading position in the core competitive electric markets in the U.S., we can participate in the evolving power markets where it makes sense, while also returning capital to shareholders. We do not believe our business is a melting ice cube. Rather, through cost management and efficiencies, financial discipline and execution, we believe we can continue to create value for our shareholders over the long-term. We continue to believe our stock is undervalued, and the math tells us that the market must be discounting our future value. We believe this analysis is one piece of compelling evidence, suggesting that we can produce strong results on a consistent basis over a long period of time, and we have demonstrated our ability to execute. I will now turn the call over to David Campbell.