Curtis Morgan
Analyst · Evercore. Your line is open
Thank you, Molly, and good morning to everyone on the call. As always, we appreciate your interest in Vistra Energy. Before we get into the materials, I would like to comment on what has been happening to our stock price the last three months, seemingly started by the ERCOT CDR report and then exacerbated by a series of various events such as weather, prospect for PJM, capacity auction, potential new CCGTs and PJM and nuclear subsidies, clearly not a good stretch. It is important to note that we are grounded in today's reality and recognize where forward curves are today. However, that does not mean that we have to agree with the forwards, and we certainly do not have to transact at the current price levels especially in 2021 and beyond. It is as if some investors in the competitive power sector were conditioned to sell off at the first whisper of any potential bad news. Yet we are a vastly different company than the IPPs of the past with lower debt, integrated operations with strong retail brands and a much lower cost structure. We have continued to execute, return capital, make sound investments, lower costs, strengthen our balance sheet and diversify our earnings stream from a substantially expanded and improved asset base and retail businesses, all things we committed to and delivered. We have clearly differentiated ourselves from the failed IPPs of the past, and we have strength and staying power. We have inexplicably, to us anyway, lost approximately $3 billion of equity value, yet we expect our EBITDA for 2019 and 2020 will be over $3 billion with free cash flow expected to be in excess of $2 billion. Sure, the curves have fallen off, but we believe we have a concrete pipeline of future revenue streams on the way requiring minimal investment. In our view, the question is, can we put up sustained strong numbers year in and year out in various market price environments while producing very strong free cash flow with the opportunity to return value to shareholders and/or invest in our business? To us, the answer is an unequivocal yes. As we have tried to emphasize, our view is that we are a value play, and we are executing accordingly with strong free cash flow to show for it. We have seen the volatility in commodity prices, yet our company continues to put up numbers given the stability of earnings from retail, cleared capacity auctions and hedging. Yet now the market is being led to believe that we should apparently be valued off of forward power curves in 2021 or beyond as if these forward curves will exist into perpetuity with no competitive response, no ability to manage the volatility and hedge and no opportunity to further enhance EBITDA through efficiency and/or growth. As evidence of our resiliency, when we acquired Dynegy, the company came with an expected steep decline in EBITDA from 2019 to 2020, and the market valued Dynegy off of the lower 2020 expectation. We not only expect we will cover that decline but have also grown the overall pie. Our current stock price implies over a 20% free cash flow yield or some extraordinarily low EBITDA and free cash flow assumption. Nevertheless, the market has spoken. But that does not mean we have to agree and we certainly do not. As you know, we have been repurchasing our stock and, needless to say, we are eager to continue our current buyback program. As difficult as this current environment is to accept, we have not lost faith in our long-term value proposition, our strategic direction and our commitment to our shareholders who are committed to us. Today's earnings presentation is the beginning of framing why we remain confident in our company's ability to succeed long term. As I mentioned earlier, we know where the power markets are today. We get it so we have a view that in some cases can help shed additional light on a complicated and somewhat volatile business and the competitive position of our company. It is not a denial, but perspective. We believe you expect us to have a view. We also expect to continue this discussion on the third quarter call, when we further lay out our view of the long-term prospects for our company. Now finally I will move to the presentation beginning on Slide 6. Vistra finished the second quarter of 2019 reporting adjusted EBITDA from its ongoing operations of $707 million, results that are in line with both consensus and management's expectations for the quarter. Compared to the second quarter of 2018, Vistra's results were approximately $44 million favorable, driven by higher retail gross margin reflecting the seasonality of power cost quarter-over-quarter. Vistra has been able to deliver these strong results despite some recent headwinds, including a June that was the mildest Texas has recorded in the past 15 years, with average temperatures approximately 20% below normal. Our diversified, integrated energy company model centered on low cost and market-leading operations continues to prove out its ability to weather these types of externalities and produce relatively stable EBITDA and free cash flow. Importantly, we believe our commitment to achieving our merger synergy and operations performance improvement targets also support this relatively stable earnings profile. I am happy to say we remain on track to realizing $430 million of EBITDA value leverage in 2019 with the full run rate of $565 million expected to be realized in 2021. We are also increasing the after-tax free cash flow benefit expected to be derived from the merger to $320 million following our recent financing transactions. Our team continues to show proficiency in identifying and capturing savings opportunities, which ultimately drives value to the bottom line. In total, through cost cutting and OP initiatives, combined with merger synergy opportunities, Vistra has meaningfully reduced the cost and enhanced the value of its operations, adding more than $1.25 billion of value since our predecessor entity emerged from bankruptcy in October 2016. And that value creation does not include the nearly $1 billion of value we expect to realize from the net operating losses acquired in the Dynegy merger. Year-to-date, Vistra's adjusted EBITDA from ongoing operations is $1.522 billion, right in line with management expectations and approximately $276 million higher than the estimated adjusted EBITDA for the pro forma merged company for the 6 months of 2018. We believe our performance in the first half of the year sets a solid foundation for 2019. We are reaffirming our full year 2019 ongoing operations guidance today, reiterating our adjusted EBITDA guidance range of $3.22 billion to $3.42 billion and our adjusted free cash flow before growth guidance range of $2.1 billion to $2.3 billion. After receiving FERC approval, we closed the acquisition of Crius Energy Trust on July 15. Our teams are actively integrating the Crius and Vistra portfolios and working to capture the approximately $15 million in annual EBITDA synergies and additional approximately $12 million of annual free cash flow synergies anticipated from the Crius transaction. We expect the acquisition of Crius will contribute approximately $50 million to Vistra's 2019 financial results. We are not increasing 2019 guidance ranges to reflect the addition of Crius at this time given that we have key months ahead for our business. To be clear, we continue to expect the Crius acquisition to be EBITDA and free cash flow accretive on a per-share basis on day 1. Given the overall size of Crius relative to the overall company, we believe it is most prudent to maintain our 2019 guidance ranges at this time. Beyond 2019, we still expect we will be able to deliver 2020 adjusted EBITDA that will be relatively flat to or within the range of 2019 results. Clearly, the recent decline in ERCOT and PJM forward curves have put some pressure on potential 2020 outcomes. But with seeming clarity on the MPS and Dynegy merger value lever realization, we have a reasonable path at holding 2020 EBITDA in the range of 2019. Including Crius would put us in a strong position to possibly exceed 2019. Importantly, we still have nearly half a year before the start of 2020, leaving plenty of time for incremental volatility in forward prices. In fact, it was the fall of 2018 when 2019 forward curves in ERCOT started to meaningfully move up as retailers more aggressively procured power for the 2019 summer. We expect we'll be able to provide an update on the anticipated MISO plant retirement as well as an OP update on the third quarter call, along with guidance for 2020 adjusted EBITDA and adjusted free cash flow before growth. In general, we believe the recent pullback in our stock, which appears to be in direct response to ERCOT and PJM forward curves, has been overdone. Unfortunately, in our view, it seems as though we are currently suffering from the sins of the over-levered IPPs of the past. So I as I noted earlier, we believe Vistra is very different from these predecessors. Turning now to Slide 7. Vistra's retail segment has delivered an average of $800 million of adjusted EBITDA for the past 10 years in periods of both rising and declining wholesale power prices. Importantly, this relatively stable EBITDA profile contributes to lower earnings volatility for Vistra's consolidated operations and is generally achievable year-over-year as a result of our proven ability to lock in term margin through forward power purchases combined with the flexibility we maintain in pricing our month-to-month portfolio. Of course, we expect the overall contribution to EBITDA from our retail business to increase with the addition of Crius. Our sizable retail portfolio also supports our ability to weather near-term volatility in the wholesale power market as we typically observe a delayed competitive market response decline in wholesale power prices. As a result, when power prices are on the decline, our retail business can capture relatively higher margins in the near term. Ultimately, however, in a competitive market experiencing sustained wholesale price declines, you will eventually see retail competition put downward pressure on market retail prices as well. This will result in long-term margins and EBITDA in the retail business that are relatively stable. While retail providers can attempt to hold revenues constant and increase margins during periods of sustained year-over-year wholesale price declines, this is a risky approach as customers will naturally look for more competitively priced retail electricity plans. As a result, even integrated companies are exposed to long-term commodity price volatility as relatively stable retail margins are not an automatic offset for the impact of sustained or multiyear wholesale price declines on wholesale margins. Typically, retail pricing action to expand margin in any price environment must be driven by competitive dynamics. A more balanced or short retail wholesale portfolio player will also have more difficulty in expanding margin through longer-term hedging as the trigger to lock in margin is driven in the first instance by the retail side of the transaction with the desire to tandem hedge, not to optimize the generation position through forward curve volatility. A more balanced or short player can always take a position by only hedging one side of the transaction, but that is a very risky proposition. On the other hand, a net long generator has the opportunity to capture significant wholesale margin on the net long position by taking advantage of wholesale volatility. A more balanced or short retailer is more exposed to the wholesale piece and corresponding volume risk. Which brings us to Slide 8. Our retail and wholesale businesses are supported by a sophisticated commercial team that has and we expect will continue to create value for the enterprise by taking advantage of volatility in the market. Vistra takes an opportunistic approach to hedging our net link. We developed a fundamental point of view of where we believe prices will settle in the future, and we hedge our link only when the forward curves are at or above this fundamental point of view. In periods of trough pricing, where we believe the forwards are disconnected from fundamentals, we can remain patient or even procure power at these low prices to further optimize our future earnings opportunity. To reiterate, we see this volatility not as a risk, but rather an opportunity. And we have a demonstrated track record of creating value through this approach. It is important to recognize that this commercial approach to hedging or net link is only possible due to the in-the-money nature of Vistra's generation fleet. Our assets are largely newer, highly efficient generation assets that are well-positioned on the supply stacks in the markets where we operate. As a result, these assets are in the money more frequently than older, higher heat rate generation assets that would require more meaningful price spikes before a forward hedge would become economic. In very low wholesale price environments, these higher heat rate assets sit on the sidelines with no opportunity to earn an energy margin. Importantly, following the merger with Dynegy, Vistra generation assets increased to approximately 60% gas-fueled, comprised primarily of highly efficiency CCGTs and earning diversified revenues from both capacity and energy. Nearly half of Vistra's gross margin is derived from 3 year forward capacity revenues and the contribution from a relatively stable retail portfolio. We believe this revenue diversification and our integrated business model reduced Vistra's earnings exposure to single-year impacts from mild weather in any one region, capacity auction outcomes or regulatory and political changes. It is our view that our portfolio enables Vistra to generate more stable earnings and cash flows over time and in varying commodity price environments. And as you know, there are hundreds of trading days between now and 2021, giving Vistra plenty of time to capitalize on future volatility in the forward curves. A lot can change between now and then. We continue to believe the forward curve backwardation is not reflective of longer-term fundamentals, and our analysis suggest forward curves should move higher than where they currently trade. The key for our commercial model is volatility, and we fully expect there will be volatility in power and gas curves on a sustained basis. Turning to Slide 9. Let's start our fundamentals discussion with ERCOT. While recent months have resulted in a decline in summer 2019 forward curves, we believe these price declines are an overreaction to a wet spring and a relatively mild start to the summer. ERCOT remains a very tight market on a supply/demand dynamics. In fact, on a Sunday in June, the ERCOT market saw several 15-minute intervals where real-time prices settled in the hundreds of dollars per megawatt hour and a couple of 15-minute intervals where real-time prices settled in the low thousands per megawatt hour. This was on a day where the high temperature was only 93 degrees in DFW and in Houston, reflecting the tight market conditions. Similarly, in both June and July, we saw days where peak pricing averaged anywhere from approximately $70 per megawatt hour to approximately $135 per megawatt hour, even though temperatures were relatively mild, in the mid-90s, and peak low was negatively normal. On Tuesday this week, DFW hit 100 degrees for the first time this summer. Real-time prices were approximately $156 per megawatt hour, which included on ORDC at or approximately $106 per megawatt hour. These outcomes support the thesis that if we do see a string of hot weather days in August with low wind and normal outages, the real-time prices could be meaningfully higher. Notably, we have gone into a relatively dry period in Texas, and temperatures are beginning to rise. As a reminder, it only takes a week in ERCOT in the summer to have a significant impact. In our view, the risk of high peak pricing could persist for several years as we believe ERCOT will continue to have a relatively tight supply/demand dynamic for the next 3 to 5 years. At a high level, this view is based on three key factors: First, the CDR does not evaluate economics when including new supply in the report. It merely reports development projects that have met certain milestones. And the CDR does not take into account competitive dynamics, such as retirements in response to new supply. As a result, the CDR consistently overestimates new build in the market, and many ERCOT experts have been reserved, if not skeptical, regarding the level of planned capacity in the CDR. ERCOT itself regularly clarifies that historically, only some of the new capacity represented in the CDR actually gets built. Second, reserve margins are still projected to be very tight. These results fundamental point of view would estimate a range of reserve margins in the high single digits to low double digits with levels remaining below the 13.75% ERCOT target through at least 2023. Yet forward prices in 2021 and 2022 would be more consistent with reserve margins in the range of 13% to 15%, respectively. Our analytics suggest achieving reserve margins this high will be quite a tall order, especially given the likely competitive response. To this end and thirdly, we believe there are more than 15,000 megawatts at risk of retirement in ERCOT over the next 10 years as renewables enter the market. This generation capacity is likely to act as a long-term supply and demand calibration feature in the market with the market reaction and calibration quicker and less volatile given the new build is forecast to come in lower megawatt increments via renewable development. That being said, we also believe incremental renewables are necessary in the ERCOT market to merely compensate for projected annual load growth of approximately 2% or in the range of 1,500 megawatts per year. In fact, ERCOT is estimating more than 2.25% load growth per year. As the market begins to rely more and more on incremental renewable generation to meet demand, we expect volatility in the market will increase. Any such volatility should benefit our efficient, flexible CCGT fleet. If you follow the California market, you can see this playing out in real time. We continue to believe the backwardation in the current ERCOT forward curves is, to some extent, driven by the lack of liquidity in the out-years. In 2021 and beyond, for example, a few long data power purchase agreements are currently setting the price of power. This is a relatively small slice of transaction activity and does not represent the fundamentals of the market. It is typical in ERCOT for power prices to rise as there is more liquidity in the market. We saw a similar phenomenon for 2019, as the graph on the right side of Slide 9 depicts. As we entered the summer and fall of 2018, many market participants locked in volumes and prices for the upcoming year, and we saw 2019 forward prices steadily rise to reflect the tight supply dynamics in the market. Given that the fundamentals are forecast to remain relatively tight over the next 3 to 5 years, we would expect this backwardation to once again reverse over time. Ironically, it is the backwardated nature of the forward curves that could keep new thermal generation on the sidelines in ERCOT and, to some extent, renewables. Unfortunately, the development model remains broken with developers earning some large fees on the front end while taking no risks on the underlying project economics. However, the recent financial losses from revenue puts in PJM, which I will discuss shortly, and the absence of a capacity market in ERCOT with prospects for significant congestion in the West, should bring caution to the forefront for capital markets players looking to invest in renewables in ERCOT. Our analysis continues to suggest that renewables, even with the tax credits, are borderline economic while CCGTs and peakers are uneconomic in ERCOT especially with the steep forward curve backwardation. In recent months, we have seen new asset owners enter the game, mainly large corporations who have decided they want to invest in green technologies to, in many instances, fulfill their ESG targets and for marketing purposes. In our view, many of these ill-equipped new entrants are wading into treacherous waters as not all have a proper understanding of the risk they're assuming. Over time, as the economics of these investments play out, we might see more reluctance on the part of large corporations to step into the merchant power space in this manner. Or at a minimum, we should start to see future pricing terms better aligned with actual project economics. Over time, we believe our expertise will bode well for us to partner with many of these large corporations to help them achieve their objectives without exposure to a complicated business where they have no expertise. In the near term, we have not yet given up on the ERCOT summer. Market conditions are very tight, and the recent shift in the ORDC has been effective at providing incremental revenues in the market. We remain steadfast in our view that long-term forward power curves do not reflect the underlying fundamentals in the ERCOT market, and we will be ready when favorable market conditions do materialize. Moving on to Slide 10. Let's turn our focus to PJM. As you can see on the graph on the left side of the slide, beginning in about mid-May, PJM forward curves started to decline as certain generators began to sell less, driven by an overall bearish view of the market and their own desire to take risk off the table. This decline in forward prices triggered additional selling by various market participants, who as I mentioned earlier had previously sold revenue puts to help finance new CCGT development in the region. As forward prices fell, these market participants effectively became longer and longer generation, forcing them to sell into the bearish curves to mitigate their risk in a period when they would normally be buying on a dislocation. As a result, what would've otherwise been a relatively minor move in the forward curves was exacerbated. Only recently have the forwards started to recover as the market sentiment has settled and the parties to the revenue put transactions have seemingly covered their positions. Despite this recent near-term volatility, I think it is important to remember that from 2010 to 2018, the average PJM CCGT earned approximately $9 to $12 per KW a month from the combination of capacity and energy, representing a relatively stable earnings profile. The market itself is competitive and generally efficient, meaning that energy prices will respond to both high and low capacity clears and vice versa. In a market with over 180,000 megawatts of installed capacity, it takes a meaningful amount of incremental new supply or retirements to move the market in one direction or the other, as we show in the chart on the right side of the slide. From 2014 to 2019, PJM has seen cumulative net additions of nearly 5,000 megawatts capacity while the average CCGT has still earned between approximately $9 to $13 per KW a month from energy and capacity revenues, a very stable revenue profile year-over-year on a relative basis. It is also important to note that new development of CCGT requires approximately $15 per KW a month for what most would consider a compensatory return. Speaking of new development. I know there has been a lot of discussion on this matter as we move towards the next PJM capacity auction. We believe it is likely new build will clear, but we also expect there will be incremental retirements in the coming auctions as has been the case in PJM. There are approximately 55,000 gigawatts of coal and approximately 10 gigs of other less-efficient, vulnerable generation in the supply stack in PJM. We also believe the pace of new development in PJM should slow, as it is our view that the asset owners are unlikely to earn a compensatory return from new development in PJM of any asset type, whether it be a wind, solar or a thermal resource. It is important to note that PJM is the least favorable market for renewables, with largely low onshore wind intensity in ideal locations and sun irradiance and limited access to offshore wind. Even with lower natural gas prices, CCGTs do not appear economic, especially with the backwardation in the forward curves. Moreover, market participants might now be less inclined to enter into forward transactions guaranteeing a floor on revenues for new development, which could make it more difficult for developers to obtain financing. Before we move on from PJM, I do want to address the recent FERC action ordering PJM not to conduct the 2022, 2023 capacity auction in August. We view this action as a potential positive as FERC should be able to resolve its apparent deadlock now that it will have an odd number of commissioners following Commissioner Lafleur's retirement, for whom we have the utmost respect. Consistent with past practice, we expect FERC will issue an order revising the capacity auction rules to ensure the market does not further erode given the aggressive and price-suppressive effects of out-of-market activity by state. Both FERC and PJM have been focused on maintaining the viability of the competitive market, and we believe that focus will continue with FERC's final order on this matter. We continue to believe that the outcome will be modestly positive or neutral at worst. In addition, we believe that FERC may issue an order in the near term on the PJM reserve pricing reforms. Let's not lose sight, however, on the more holistic view that the sheer size and balance sheet strength of our company and the diversified revenue streams should make the impact of any one external factor much less meaningful to our overall business as compared to the smaller, over-levered and less diversified IPPs of the past. We spent a lot of time talking about forward curves and capacity auctions, all topics that have been front of mind for investors as the market considers Vistra's future earnings power. Before I hand the call off to David, I want to highlight once again existing opportunities that we expect will be additive to EBITDA in 2020 and beyond. First as you know, we just closed the Crius acquisition on July 15 of this year. As a result, our 2019 financial results will only include a partial year of contribution from the Crius portfolio, with the full year benefit beginning in 2020. In MISO, we are currently awaiting a decision from the Illinois Joint Commission on Administrative Rules on the proposed amendment to the Multi-Pollutant Standard, which we are optimistic will be issued by late summer. If the amendment is approved as drafted, Vistra would be required to file with MISO to retire 2 gigawatts of nameplate capacity in MISO Zone 4 within 30 days. Our preliminary analysis suggest that these retirements could be approximately $50 million to $100 million accretive to Vistra's long-term EBITDA profile as some of our existing MISO assets are EBITDA and free cash flow negative in the current market environment. On the growth side. Our Moss Landing battery storage project should be completed by the fourth quarter of 2020 with the projected full year adjusted EBITDA contribution of approximately $50 million per year beginning to be realized in 2021. In addition, we are very close to completing a deal to build a 20-megawatt battery storage project at our Oakland site in California that should kick in, in 2022. We will also continue to evaluate tuck-in growth opportunities given our attractive sites, substantial presence and scale in our core markets. To the extent we are successful in identifying attractive opportunities that meet or exceed our investment threshold of 500 to 600 basis points above cost of equity, we could see incremental upside from growth-related projects in 2021 and beyond. As you know, we expect to have significant cash flow to allocate to attractive growth projects or return to shareholders over the next several years. And last, we expect we'll be at our full run rate of $565 million of merger value lever targets by 2021, and this does not include any potential upsizing of our current OP target, which I expect could be addressed as soon as our third quarter call later this year. Even without OP upside and new investments, we have line of sight to approximately $300 million to $350 million per year improvement to EBITDA, independent of commodity price impacts, which can move EBITDA in either direction. Importantly, however, all of the items listed on this slide are positive offsets that could help to absorb any headwinds that could come our way in the future. We expect that through execution of these EBITDA-enhancement initiatives combined with a relentless focus on business execution and the advancement of our integrated business model, we will be able to continue to generate relatively stable EBITDA and free cash flow in the years ahead. I will now turn the call over to David Campbell. As many of you know, David joined our company recently to be the CFO. This is his inaugural earnings call, and we wish David the best of luck. And with that, I'll turn it over to you.