Barry S. Sternlicht
Analyst · FBR
Thanks, Stew. I guess I would say good morning, everyone. I guess it's the day after, and those of you who were looking for change, my condolences. I guess I think -- I'm thinking about the implications on the credit market of the election and the rally in the treasury this morning and implications for growth for the country because it is going to affect credit spreads and interest rate over the near term and maybe over the whole term of the next 4 years. So in the aftermath of the day after, I would say that the company had a pretty good quarter, I mean, very solid quarter. We've started out in the business saying we'd predicable, consistent and transparent, and we remain predicable, consistent and transparent. We try not to surprise our shareholder base and quote me on how things are going. I mean, you saw huge rally in the credit market from the heels of Bernanke's re-election campaign for Obama, which was QE3 and the rise in the equity markets and then a rally across the whole credit complex and RMBS and CMBS. And obviously, our book should have increased in value consistent with that. We don't really market like that. So where we market our fair market value is really the public bonds we own, which are actively traded and hit near par executions or hit par this quarter after the credit rally. I think on a standalone basis, as STWD is now the largest real estate lenders in the nation. I look at the loan originations of banks and companies like CapSource that are out there and some investments we have in the banking sector. And originating $500 million or $600 million a quarter makes you a pretty material lender in today's real estate market. And I think what we've been able to do consistently is utilize all the skills of our team, and that's the team that's dedicated to the REIT, as well as the 40-odd acquisition executive at Starwood Capital Group. In fact, the Times Square loan was originated by a Starwood Capital executive who is digging through the market of New York and uncovered that opportunity for us. The markets are extremely competitive. They've been -- we've been doing this over 3 years now. And they go in cycles of being very tight and people back up, get nervous, bank management will call back. But this rally, which has been sustained, is really required to sharpen our pencils on how tight the seniors are going to get priced. Today, with CMBS more or less collapsing, they still remain where they were pre-crisis and significantly wide at the similar rated corporate credit. So my gut is that real estate credit, given there's no yield in the world, will continue to be priced, contract. Spreads will continue to narrow, and pricing will remain competitive, which is fine as long as we can originate the whole loan, as Stew has talked about, because buying mezzanines prepackaged from the street is fine, but they're not going to achieve the double-digit yield we've grown accustomed to, especially as less sophisticated investors wander into these offerings on the street and buy very thin B-notes or 2-notes, meaning that they go from 72% to 78% of the capital at 10%. Whereas if you look at the note we'll cut out of the Times Square deal, it will be from 40% to 70-something percent plus of the capital stack. Again, from the investments we made in the quarter on 2 office buildings, both done with Blackstone, actually, will be fairly wide B-note and have a totally different risk profile than buying a very thin B-note at a thin, meaning 72% to 73%, 78% to 79% of the capital stack at a lower yield. So the benefit and the most important thing for us is to be big in terms of -- to be able to write big notes. And I would say at the moment, that's probably the biggest hole in the market, is the size of the loans. There are just not that many lenders willing to do single originations on large, large deals. They want to spread the risk. I'm going to come to why that is structurally in 1 second. I will comment quickly on Europe opening up. Europe is beginning to loosen. The banks are beginning to try to move around their balance sheets. You see it more and more. What we're finding is our equity desk is bidding on deals and losing and turning around and offering finance sellers or the buyers, and that opportunity is so big that we're thinking of raising Europe-only funds because and -- co-invest with the REIT for a number of reasons. One is the scale of what has to happen in Europe. But more importantly, the hedging issue. We historically hedged all currency and coupon principal maturity exposures through and swapped it back into dollars. We don't want to take currency risk in the REIT accrued enormous volatility and confuse us and you. But that puts us at a competitive disadvantage to local lenders and people lending in the local currency. And it could be as much as 150 basis points off on IRR, depending upon the duration of the hedge. But both for the pound and the euro, it isn't a terrible thing to have a local currency product. Having said that, we're going to continue in the meantime, which isn't available at the moment, to look at these investments as we did in the quarter making a mezzanine loan in the Starman portfolio. We'll continue to look at them. But we are concerned also that the scale of those investments and how it changes the risk profile of what really traditionally has been the mostly domestic REIT. I also think we have, in the last quarter and this quarter and this quarter to date, the battle between the quality assets we're lending on in the spread. And at the moment, what I've told Boyd and the team is that we prefer quality to spread. So we don't want toxic assets at 14s. We like good assets at 10s or 11s if we can get them, and we'll sacrifice that for quality and spread. That goes to our goal of being predictable, consistent, offering compelling risk-adjusted yields and compelling dividend value to our shareholder base, which is extraordinary, actually, and I'll get to the dividend shortly, too. You actually have seen, I'd say, a capitulation of buyers. Buyers are buying. There is no yield anywhere. This is the last complex where yield exists, whether it's consumer loans or corporate credit, even sovereign debt, which I'd argue was the worst credit. You've seen yields collapse. And buyers capitulate and buy down, whether it's high yield or any security to levels we've never seen before to get a piece of -- there's an article in a journal this morning about corporate credit versus sovereign for Exxon and the U.S. government. And I also think we've honed our one skill, which is we can do big. We can do it fast, and we can do it unconventional structure, all of which is sustainable competitive advantage for us if we have the balance sheet. So I will make a comment on our equity raise. I think we raised a little bit more money than we probably needed at the moment, and with our facility with the unsecured line, about $150 million. It does give us flexibility, but we're circling several $400 million-plus first mortgage loan. And there's no way to do these big deals and run an excess return if we don't have the capacity. One of the reasons we get these investments is, particularly now, is the uncertainty. And I got an inbound call yesterday from a large household name real estate firm that wants to throw out a banking portion [ph] of 4 lenders for a $400 million deal -- actually, a $500 million deal, and would like to widen the spread considerably if they can deal with one lender, which is us, and we can accommodate their needs and our needs and use balance sheet guarantees and other things and achieve the returns we want. So that's kind of advantage to us. I'm going to spend another minute on this Time Square investment since it was so large and talk about -- again, it was originated and split between Starwood REIT and Starwood Opportunity Funds. That's only the third deal, I believe, since we were born that we have the split between the Opportunity Funds and the REIT. The metric for splitting a transaction is that the IRR, expected IRR, was greater than 14%. And in this case, I can say it was materially greater than 14%. There is a substantial equity kicker concluded in the first mortgage, which we haven't valued. But I'd certainly buy it for a considerable amount of money as the equity players in the transaction did. And one of the people we competed against in the origination and for the deal was for Vornado. And having been long lifelong friends now with Mike Fascitelli and Steve Roth, we did sell down 25% of the condition both the senior and the mezz to Vornado post-closing because they have, obviously, enormous knowledge of the New York City market and sort of insurance policy. And it made us feel good, even though it's obviously dilutive because we have cash in our balance sheet that could have earned the 11%-plus coupon on the first mortgage. So structurally, the markets have changed in the United States. I was preparing some comments for the conference the other day, and it struck me that 73% of all the banking assets in the United States are now in 6 banks. So too big to fail. We have them. We've created the entire banking system stuck in 6 banks. 73% of all banking assets are 6 banks. And that goes to pricing and collusion among the banks. We have 4 banks that basically dominate the market. And actually, the lowest common denominator sets pricing on the syndicate. And to the extent the banks actually don't want to take all the risk themselves and don't compete with each other, we can step in later in probably a wider coupon with a better execution for a borrower. And like I said yesterday, I got my first call to that effect. You also don't see a lot of foreign banks. What's happening in the banking market is that the banks are pulling back to their sovereign borders. And you don't see the French banks here anymore. You occasionally see the Canadian banks, even though I think they will come back. I'm not aware of why they wouldn't be here. One -- I can name one German bank in the market. But then you will see a Chinese bank occasionally, but they will do only super safe, low leverage deals. So the banking system has become, for large loans, very concentrated. And you can name the 6 guys in the -- and one of them is truly not very active in real estate at the moment, to speak of. So you have 5 players, really, and I'd say 4 players because one of -- there are 2 investment banks included in that. They are #5 and 6, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, in reverse order, by the way, and one is more active than the other making balance sheet in the market today. The life companies are also here, and you see some new players like AIG entering the market. What's driving that credit complex in pricing and CMBS is the CMBS market because it has opened up. There isn't as much product in the market, but buyers are ravaged for yield. And the other, probably interesting thing about the banking system today is their lack of desire to hold inventory. And so they continue to try to price and pace their acquisitions or lending on deals that have not a large gap between the securitization of the loan and the origination of loan and securitization, and that also creates opportunities for us because we actually don't mind holding on to the loan. And right now, we're holding on, for example, that first mortgage on Times Square, which we will sell down at some point. But right, now the coupon is fine and it's better that we can earn on cash. So we're going to hold on to that. So we're not quite as efficient as I'd like to be as a box producing maximum earnings, but we have a very efficient player in the capital markets overall. I'll also point out and just comment about LTVs, loan to value of the portfolio, which are heading lower. 63% is the current LTV of the portfolio, blended average, and that's going to go even lower, if I'm right. And right now, as an equity player, we see the gap between cap rates and the cost of financing is stupid wide, probably wide enough that you can earn high single-digit, low double-digit yields on cash deployed in the equity side of the transaction. That probably is going to come in, too. I don't see the credit complex. I don't see rates backing up. I think we're in for a very slow growth over the next year. I think it will be lower this year. I think rates probably will stay down. And as they stay down, I just see more of the same. I see cap rates drifting down. And also credit -- the real estate markets are probably on margin, okay. They're not -- rents aren't racing away. They're not -- markets aren't emptying out. There's no demand disruption. And tenants are jockeying for space, and corporates are refinancing their balance sheet. So in general, I think the credit quality for tenants is improving, and net demand for space is pretty consistent, not great but not bad. And I do think given there is no yield in the world, you might see continued compression in cap rates across many income asset groups going forward. So that will help our LTV going forward and make our book even better, which goes to book value. It's the first time since the IPO, I believe, that our book value is now higher than our original IPO price, which is $20 a share or like $20.31 or something like that after the offering. And that's great because we can always liquidate the book. And if I go over or under on our book, I'll tell you it's over. I don't think we've been aggressive on our marks at all. I'm always surprised now when I may see what people are lending at and where people are buying notes. Two other things that give us some confidence in the coming year. One is our rollover schedule, the schedule of debt maturities and what management expects to be repaid over the next, let's say -- 14 months is quite reasonable, probably less than we faced in the last 12 months, and that's good. There's a couple of situations in there that could be open to prepay, and we don't think they will be prepaid, so we think that's good. That allows us to deploy what capital we have into additional transactions, not just rolling over capital that's coming due. So I'm going to touch on the dividend, and then I'll wrap it up. We mentioned in the earnings release that dividend was accretive at $0.44. But we also mentioned in the next sentence that we are going to pay a special dividend. We said earnings will be between $1.85 and $1.95. And I expect that we would announce this dividend in December so that it would make -- you have it before the record date and certainly before the pay date of January 15. So we are discussing with the board. We want to see a few things, how they work out going forward. But we believe we should reward our shareholders for the scale of the company and for your support. So we're going to pay an additional dividend. And as we mentioned, that is consistent with what we told you, I think, 2 quarters ago when we said we would look at the dividend now on an annual basis and chew it up at end of the year. So with that, I think I've said my notes. And we're going to take questions from you. Boyd or Stew or Mr. Berry or even Andrew Sossen, who is actually remote today for us. So I hope he's smiling when I say that. So go ahead. We'll take questions.