Jane Elfers
Analyst · Telsey Advisory Group
Thank you, Anthony. And good morning, everybody. After briefly reviewing the Q1 highlights, I will focus my remarks on four topics. First, I will cover how the multi-year strategic positioning of our real estate portfolio allows us to capture a greater portion of the incremental market share donated by poorly positioned retailers now and in the years ahead. Second, I'll update the status of our digital transformation, including the upcoming launch of our personalization initiative, which follows our accelerated digital investment in 2018. Third, I'll provide an update on our progress with respect to the Gymboree integration. And finally, I’ll provide an update on our private label credit card program. Starting with Q1 results, despite a later Easter and the liquidation of approximately 800 Gymboree and Crazy 8 stores, our sales and ETFs results significantly exceeded our expectations. Strength starting in mid March and through the month of April, helped to offset significant weakness in the first six weeks of the quarter, when, as anticipated, the Gymboree liquidation event and delayed tax refunds weighed on our results. Our Easter dressy assortment was very well received and drove significant outperformance, resulting in a comp sales increase in excess of 20% for the month of April. As a reminder, I reassumed day to day direction of merchandising, starting with this delivery. Let's move on to our real estate strategy. Our portfolio of brick and mortar location provides us with a meaningful competitive advantage in securing market share. We continue to execute our fleet optimization strategy with the objective of maintaining maximum flexibility and leverage in the current retail environments. The US has experienced a marked increase in retail bankruptcies and store closures with nearly 6,500 retail closures already announced in 2019, exceeding the total store closures for all of 2018. As the digital disruption continues, we expect to see more bankruptcies and store closures from retailers that are unwilling for incapable of investing in digital initiatives. We expect continued bifurcation of winners and losers in the space. Within brick and mortar retail, we expect additional bifurcation, as the higher quality centers strengthen at the expense of the lower quality centers. TCP has been strategically ahead of the curve for several years, as we've dramatically slowed down openings, accelerated store closures in low quality centers, and significantly shortened lease term to allow for maximum flexibility within the portfolio. Our multiyear real estate strategy strongly positions to capture the benefits of meaningful market share redistribution as we believe competitors will continue to donate sizable market share in the coming years. We estimate approximately 40% of the US children's apparel market revenue is generated by retailers that we classify as market share donors. And this group has ceded approximately $600 million a year in revenue over the last three years to a stronger group of market share takers. Importantly, we estimate that only 25% of the sales generated by this group of market share donors is located off mall which implies that retailers that are well positioned in the mall in the outlet and on e-commerce, where most of these market share donors are located are best positioned to capture what we believe will be sizable ongoing annual market share donations. Conversely, we estimate only 8% of the sales done by the industry's group of market share takers is generated in the mall, which reinforces our strategic real estate positioning and its ability to continue to capture incremental market share. Now, let me update you on TCP positioning in the mall. In 2017, we shared with you that out of the approximately 1,060 malls in the United States there are projections that up to 260 will close. We refer to these 260 malls as dying malls. We are currently not located in 80% or 208 of these dying malls, after having closed over 20% of our stores in these malls in 2017. Further of the remaining 52 dying malls where we still have a store, our average lease term is now less than one year and these total locations makeup only approximately 2% of our total US revenue. Stripping out to 260 dying malls there are approximately 800 A, B and C malls in the US, approximately 37% are A+ and A, and 51% are B and 12% are C malls. So it would be 800 remaining US malls, 88% of them are designated A or B centers. The Children's Place is currently in 451 of the remaining 800 US malls, approximately 29% of our stores are in A+ or A, 59% in B and 12% are in C malls. So nearly 90% of our stores are located in A and B malls which experience traffic growth trends that are meaningfully higher than our optimal locations. Our lease term in the thriving A and B centers is now approximately two years, which provides us with meaningful financial and strategic flexibility. So as we continue to hear retailers such as Gap, who announced they now plan to close approximately 50% of their mall based specialty stores, and Sears, J.C. Penney and Justice, all announcing store closures, our store overlap with this collective group of predominantly mall based market share donors is nearly 60%. This concentrated door overlap, combined with our accelerated digital investments in 2018 gives us meaningful first mover advantage to capture more than our fair share of what we believe will continue to be a large market share annuity in the coming year. With respect to our off mall locations being impacted by the overlap with the market share takers, it's important to note that we only have 28% store overlap with the group of market share takers versus 60% overlap with the group of market share donors. And in the centers where we overlap with the market share takers, our stores have outperformed our corporate average sales growth by 240 basis points. This speaks directly back to our real estate strategy of positioning our off mall locations in quality centers, with a network effect of having multiple options for children's apparel offsets the impact of being located in the center with a share taker. Importantly, we're the only retailer within the group of market share takers in the children's apparel space that isn't taking share by simply growing square footage. Since 2015, we've gained share despite closing 103 stores. This speaks directly to our ability to balance top-line growth with strong margins and returns on invested capital versus most of our peers who are pressured to choose a path of either growth or margins. Moving on to the upcoming launch of digital personalization. We accelerated approximately 30 million of a planned 50 million of incremental digital investments into 2018 with a large portion of the investments tied to supporting personalization initiatives. This investment provided TCP with the advanced data analytics and tools to segment our customer database at very low level. We now have a complete 360 degree view of our customer across both online and retail channels, with over 400 customer behavioral segments identified, which now allows us to begin to deliver personalization across channels. We anticipate that personalization will result in increased conversions, retention and engagement and help us to further optimize our total marketing spend. We expect sales, margin and ROIC benefits as we execute upon this strategy. In the past, we've indicated that 1 point move higher in the conversion of our digital traffic yields approximately 75 million in incremental digital revenue annually. Further, personalization will offer a significant benefit to conversion in our brick and mortar channels as well. We will begin to deliver personalization this quarter, and based upon the results, expect to ramp up the initiative in the back half of the year. We're excited about our upcoming digital personalization initiatives, which is likely to add fuel to an already strong digital business at TCP. Our digital business continued to lead in Q1, as we delivered mid single-digit growth in a very difficult quarter and continue to provide our millennial moms with stronger omni-channel offerings. E-comm penetration increased 270 basis points to 29% of net sales in Q1 versus 26% a year ago. In the stores, our mobile POS transaction rate increased nearly 40% in Q1, which is up meaningfully from Q4, when shipped from store adversely impacted store conversions as store associates devoted time and attention to fulfill online orders. Our outside digital growth is fueling our loyalty and private label credit card programs, which are key to our digital transformation. In 2019, we plan to continue to make foundational enhancements to further support our digital platform including, moving to responsive design, adding a content management system, adding a digital asset management system, cross-device linking to drive personalization, a full POS software rollout with Save the Sale functionality, and the continued rollout of BOSS. Now I’ll provide an update on the Gymboree integration. Although it's only been week since we took possession of the assets, we've hit the ground running. Our team is focused on bringing back the highly curated elevated bow to product that the Gymboree customer loved prior to their merchandising changes. In an effort to maintain continuity with this legacy Gymboree product, we’d engaged the services of Li & Fung, the original sourcing agent for Gymboree. In design, as we look ahead to the launch of the Gymboree branded product in early 2020, we are confident that the seasoned veterans in our design organizations can lead the Gymboree product launch. In addition, we have added talent below the senior leaders to supplement the Gymboree efforts and we are currently working with a long tenured executive from Gymboree to consult with us as we ramp up our efforts. We're getting encouraging early reads on our Tiny Collections products, which we have the strategic foresight to develop to fill the void left behind by Gymboree’s sales merchandising strategy. Importantly, the AUR in Tiny Collections is well above that of our TCP branded products, which is a positive signal that we have customer acceptance at higher price points. Although early days, the line has exceeded our expectations and the response on social media has been very positive. We've included examples of what mom is saying about Tiny Collections in the Q1 Investor Presentation on our newly redesigned IR web page. With respect to real estate the Gymboree data allowed us to create a list of about 40 centers that we continue to study, inclusive of the 25 stores already identified as productive openings for us over the next two years. These stores will be located in thriving centers and we'll fill major void left behind by Gymboree’s departure. As discussed, off mall has largely been where the market share takers reside and they have been achieving their market share gains, predominantly by simply growing their square footage. However, with respect to the Gymboree customer, it's important to note that our due-diligence process reveals that the higher income Gymboree customer with a family income of $95,000 per year has a very low propensity to want to shop off mall at mass merchants, with only 5% of Gymboree customers indicating it as a preferred channel to shop. The Gymboree customer values higher quality elevated head‐to‐toe outfitting product that’s simply isn't found in the mass merchant channel. We believe that the Gymboree customer will likely stay in the mall and online as she searches for a new home. This mall and online preference along with our ability to speak directly to her and with the brands she already knows and trust reinforces our ability to capture more than our fair share of abandoned Gymboree revenue. Our technology organization is working on system changes across our network to accommodate the Gymboree integration. We are laying the foundation for a next gen omni-channel model for Gymboree with over half of revenue likely generated by e-commerce and the remainder driven by a carefully selected group of 200 plus TCP store locations that were among Gymboree’s strongest brick and mortar locations. We're engaging a branding agency to assist with the re-launch and support engagement with the Gymboree customer until the product arrives in early 2020. We were pleased that Gymboree maintained detailed database records for each brand, including over five years of transactional history, which allows us to plug and play opportunity into our existing digital personalization infrastructure. Engagement with the Crazy 8 customer has already begun. Although still early in the process of contacting the former Crazy 8 customers, we’re already experiencing open and click through rates that are nearly double that of the TCP e-mails, which is leading to earlier and stronger than expected conversion rates less than a month after purchasing the file. We will continue to keep you updated on the progress we're making on the Gymboree integration. Finally, I'd like to give you an update on our private label credit card performance. In Q1, our private label credit card penetration increased to 22% of sales from 21% last year. Our private label credit card mix reflects a healthy 50-50 split of new and existing customers. Importantly, we know that any calculations of the impact of private label credit card on our sales requires assumptions to be made for the difference between what the customer spends utilizing the private label credit card over what she would have been using another form of tender. As a result, the change in private label credit card penetration year-over-year is obviously not 100% incremental to sales, reinforcing that our private label credit card offering is only one of many drivers of sales growth at the Children's Place with market share gains that’s dominant driver of our comp sales increases. With respect to the Gymboree opportunity as it pertains to our private label credit card. Following our purchase of the Gymboree IP, we have direct access to a database that contains millions more unique names to whom we can now offer our My Place Rewards and private label credit card loyalty program. Gymboree did not have a private label credit card program. They had a co-branded credit card business, which represented a modest low-single-digit percent of sales. This provides us with a meaningful opportunity to drive incremental, private label credit card revenue, further fueling our progress towards their 30% penetration goal. The addition of the Gymboree and Crazy 8 database reflects an opportunity to increase our active file by over 50%. And now I'll turn it over to Mike.