Andrew Clyde
Analyst · Gabelli & Company
Yes, so I would say we seek to be the lowest or matched below in our markets, with the exception of some of the specialty cost club operations that have unique membership requirements. So, if somebody who has a big box or a grocery store or another type of offer in front of us, we will be at or below their price. I think that answers the first competitive dynamic. On the second one, I mean, if you think about brands like The Pantry, before that high break-even requirements, high fixed charges, they were clearly pricing for cash margin. With a stronger ownership and financial structure, they're going to optimize that price-volume differential. So those stores that we are competing with are not going to be below us. And in rare cases, are they going to be priced with us? But the top of the market-to-bottom of market gap will have closed somewhat as a result of that. And so, you've got to look at your absolute price relative to the other low competitors, but you also have to look at the differential to the top of the market. When you look overall across all of our markets, we continue to price actually slightly more aggressive to the low in our markets. And the differentials to the state across a wide period of time are actually the same or higher. It's just that you have more of the lower-price competitors in that market. So, they have actually become more convenient to go to in those markets. You also see some high/low pricing from some of the major brands with the loyalty programs, where some of them raise their prices significantly to those customers who do not have their loyalty program then to get cents off per gallon either through their program or maybe some affiliated grocery store program. So, I think, Damian, at the end of the day, it - what you're just seeing is just a continued saturation of more new competitors who price low and then some of the weaker brands being taken out. That said, depending on where those weaker brands are, as those new competitors come into those markets like the Texas example I gave you, those M&A decisions will look different in hindsight now that those stores will be differentially impacted significantly more than the volume impacted our store, in part because of the significant merchandise impact it will have to those competitors. That will then put pressure on their break-even requirements and cause them to think about whether they can afford to price down; or they need to price up as they lose volume, in some cases even more differentially than we will.