Thank you, Gudmundur. Turning to Page 10. As Bill said earlier, we purchased $1 billion of RPL/NPL MBS in the fourth quarter, doubling our holdings of these assets. As we've said before, we particularly like these assets due to their low sensitivity to interest rates and what we believe to be low credit risk, while at the same time, providing low double-digit ROEs. Their low duration is due primarily to the 300 basis point coupon step-up that occurs after 3 years, which gives us confidence that they will have, at most, a 3-year final. In fact, historically, most of these deals have been called well prior to their 3-year soft final. And while the underlying loans certainly have credit risk, the combination of significant credit support, approximately 50%, and the locked out nature of the cash flows on the subordinate piece ensure that the senior bonds are well protected and as credit protection increases as the deal seasons. Turning to Page 11. The credit metrics on the loans underlying our Legacy Non-Agency portfolio continue to improve. LTVs continue to decline due to home price appreciation and principal amortization. Delinquencies have declined as fewer current loans become delinquent and foreclosure pipelines are liquidated. The loans are now, on average, 105 months seasoned, nearly 9 years old, and in addition, since over half of these loans were refinancings, so those -- these were not purchase money mortgages, we know that these homeowners have actually been living in these homes for more than 9 years. As indicated in our press release, we again lowered our estimates of future losses in the portfolio, and we transferred over $14 million from our credit reserve to accretable discount. All else equal, this increases the yield we will recognize over the remaining life of the bonds. Moving on to Page 12. On Page 12, we illustrated the LTV distribution of current loans in the portfolio. In particular, we focused on the at-risk loans, where the homeowner owes more on the mortgage than the property is worth. Although these mortgages are current, the borrowers are not delinquent at present. These are the loans that we worry most about transitioning to delinquent in the future because of the fact that the borrowers are under water. As of December 31, less than $200 million face amount of current loans had LTVs over 110%. This is only about 4% of the current loans in the portfolio. On Page 13. We show realized losses experienced on the portfolio over the last 3 years. Now please keep in mind that these realized losses are fully expected and precisely why we have established the credit reserve, which is presently over $900 million. We knew when we bought these bonds, in some cases, at very substantial discounts from par, that we will not get back the full par amount. And also, please note that after realized losses running at approximately $164 million in both 2012 and 2013, losses in 2014 decreased to $90 million. The $916 million credit reserve that we have today has already been reduced by over $400 million for actual losses realized in the last 3 years. These realized losses occur when the property securing the mortgage loans are liquidated for less the -- than the outstanding loan amount. In addition, for many of the fixed rate bonds in the portfolio, unrealized losses are generated when mortgage loans are modified through coupon reductions to troubled homeowners. While the loan modification reduces the interest rate paid by the borrower, the bond that we own typically has the contractual fixed rate coupon, so the interest collected from the borrower may be less than the interest owed to the bondholder. In order to cure this interest shortfall, the trustee uses principal receipts to pay interest on our bond. Now this use of principal to pay interest effectively undercollateralizes our bond because the underlying principal balance of the loan is now less than the principal balance of the bond that we own. For some bonds, this loss is recognized in the period that it occurs, and this would be a realized loss. But in most cases, the loss is not realized until the period when the loan balance is reduced to 0, and we still have a bond balance outstanding, which is likely many years from now. At that point, this unrealized loss will become a realized loss. Moving to Page 14. We have become increasingly active in the credit sensitive residential whole loan space, growing this asset class threefold since September 30 to approximately $350 million. We're very excited about this asset class for several reasons: Investments in this asset class utilize much the same residential mortgage credit expertise that we have effectively deployed in the Legacy Non-Agency space since 2008; supply dynamics suggest that we will have significant opportunity to purchase these assets as cardholders are obliged to shed them; total supply is estimated at between $500 billion and $1 trillion, with $30 billion to $50 billion of expected annual sales in 2015 and, again, in 2016. Compare this to Legacy Non-Agency, which is the shrinking market with fewer and fewer opportunities to purchase bonds. But don't get me wrong, we're glad to own $5 billion of Legacy Non-Agencies, but it will be virtually impossible to acquire a portfolio like this today. We're also excited to have the ability to oversee servicing decisions on troubled loans. For instance, by offering modifications to borrowers when such a modification will produce a better net present value outcome than foreclosure and liquidation. Again, compared to Legacy Non-Agency MBS where we have no seat at the table, no visibility into the decision and often see losses pass through to the truck that's looking excessive [ph]. Also, Residential whole loans are good assets for us, that is, the qualifying interest for purposes of REIT qualification, which most RPL/NPL mortgage-backed securities are not. And residential whole loans are also qualifying interest for purposes of our 1940 Act exemption, which Legacy Non-Agency MBS are not. And finally, we believe that credit sensitive residential whole loans further round out MFA's focus on credit versus pure interest rate risk. Turning to Slide 15. We are buying these credit sensitive whole loans at material discounts to both their unpaid principal balance and also to the underlying property we value. Our $350 million portfolio comprises over 2,300 loans acquired through 10 transactions with 10 different counterparties. We've established relationships with dozens of key market participants, most of whom are different than our trading partners for Legacy Non-Agency and RPL/NPL MBS. We also note that we've added some leverage in the fourth quarter to this asset class, and we're in discussions with additional lenders to add more financing in 2015. Leverage ratios on this asset class could conceivably grow to 2 to 3x debt-to-equity. But additionally, if we were utilize securitization financing in the future, this leverage ratio might increase again as this leverage would be term, nonrecourse and non-mark-to-market. And now I'd like to turn the call back over to Bill.