Tom Lister
Analyst · McQuilling Holding. Your line is open
Thanks Ian. While our fleet has remained fully employed on term charters, 2016 has been a tough year for the industry. Uncertainty weighs upon the macroeconomic environment, geopolitical backdrop and consequently upon trade fundamentals. 2016 saw among other things the Brexit referendum and the U.S. Presidential election. In 2017, elections will be held in a number of European countries, the results and ramifications of which are impossible to predict, but which may potentially lead to an increase in protectionism, and a weakening of the cohesion of trade blocks such as the EU and NAFTA. In the second half of 2016, Hanjin shipping, formally the seventh largest container line collapsed with bankruptcy declared early this year. The hope is that Hanjin’s fate may serve as a useful wakeup call for all industry participants that unsustainable freight rates and our extensions spot market charter rates are just that unsustainable. Time will tell whether or not this lesson is sufficiently absorbed but as we would argue in the next few slides, a very challenging market over the next year or two particularly for owners with high scrapping, low ordering and potentially further consolidation in the liner sector should hold the seeds of eventual recovery for those owners who can hang on through this protracted downturn. Our thesis is of the midsized and smaller tonnage segments upon which Global Ship Lease continues to focus all the best prospects for such a recovery, but it will take time. In the meantime, the spot charter market remains under significant pressure as do asset values. So turning to slide eight, Containerized trade growth in 2016 was 3.5% up from just 2.2% in 2015. Meanwhile supply side growth fell from the 7% to 8% mark in 2015 to around 1% in 2016. Current expectations are that demand growth should exceed that of supply during 2017. All of this is encouraging but it does -- the facts that the starting point is one of oversupply with idle capacity as at February 20th standing at around 350 ships for a total of over 1.4 million TEU, roughly 7.1% of the Global fleet. Turning to Liner operations, results published so far underline the fact that 2016 has been a challenging year for the sector. However there are tentative signs that things maybe improving with forward guidance from some lines taking a more positive turn than has been the case for a while. We believe this cautious optimism is based on greater pricing and capacity management discipline combined with an expectation that ongoing consolidation and the new mega-alliances will unlock savings through scale and network efficiencies. Unfortunately it does not stand from a material improvement in supply and demand fundamentals. Consequently, we expect the bifurcation in the market with potential improvement for the liner operations while spot market exposed tonnage providers will continue to be challenged by excess supply with the corresponding downward pressure on charter rates and asset values. Looking now for trades themselves. The non-mainlane trades which as you can see from the charts on the right hand side of the slide collectively represent around 70% of global containerized trade volumes, the largest trade grouping into Asia generally tends to outperform as far as – goes the mainlane east west trades in 2016, a trend which is expected to continue. Notable exceptions to this or the Trans Pacific which has performed above trend in 2016 and into 2017 and some of our North-South trades which underperformed last year. As you may know the non mainlane trades are typically serviced by mid-size and smaller tonnage, the focus of our fleet. Slide nine shows that weak supply demand fundamentals have kept spot market charter rates under pressure. The right hand chart illustrates that spot rates for the ship size is captured by the various indices have converged on OPEX continuing trend discussed on the previous calls. And just to remind you, it is really only medium-size and smaller ships, no larger than 10,000 TEU or so that participate in the spot market. Large ships that are either on liner company's balance sheets being directly owned or remained subject to the long-term financing type charters that bought them into the market. As you would expect and can see from the left hand chart, weakness in sport market earnings also puts pressure on prices for second-hand ships. Indeed one industry analyst recently reported in the press has estimated that over 30% of the global containership fleet and up to 85% of the Panamax fleet is currently worth no more than scrap on a charter free basis. Although painful these weeks near-term fundamentals are helpful for the industry's eventual recovery prospects as they capitalized increased scrapping and dampen lines and owners appetite for new orders. This brings us to slide 10 where you can see that scrapping activity is indeed on the rise. At the end of 2016 idle capacity stood at 344 ships and over 1.4 million TEU, roughly 85% of these ideal ships are were lessor owned. This reflects a stress, the sector is under and despite scrap price volatility explains why record 664,000 TEU over three times the volume of 2015 was scrapped in 2016. By broker estimates 200,000 TEU or so were served have already been committed for demolition of sale in the first two months of 2017. Strikingly, this is almost double the volume of new capacity that has so far been delivered in 2017. Our new ordering activity is also very limited. Most of the order book can bring big ships, while most of the scrapping continues to be focused on midsize and smaller vessels for which lessor ownership and specifically German KG ownership is disproportionately high. Turning to slide 11, you'll see from a chart at top left, the fleet segments below 8000 TEU, in other words mid-size and smaller tonnage have shown either net neutral or negative growth during 2016. Given the composition of the order book which had an overall order book to fleet ratio was 15.7% at end of 2016, while ratios for midsize and small segments ranged between 1.3% to 6.8%. We expect this momentum to continue and hopefully to accelerate. Over time, we should help improve supply-side prospects for the midsize and smaller tonnage segments upon which Global Ship Lease can focus. Slide 12 highlights the importance of midsize and small tonnage to the industry. The main chart shows the average ship-size and maximum ship-size deployed in the two dozen or so tradelane groupings which constitute global container trade. Point here is that mid-size and smaller ships, in other words those who are around 10,000 TEU or less remain key to most tradelanes. While big ships are deployed in a handful of trades, most notably Asia to Europe and Middle East some pendulum around the world trades and the Transpacific. At the end of 2016 just over 1600 ships or approximately a third of the global fleet were deployed in a single trade grouping, Intra-Asia. Of these only 12 were larger than 5,200 TEU, while over 1300, still more than 80% were smaller than 2000 TUE. Slide 13 is an attempt to illustrate how the opening of the new Panama Canal locks in mid-2016 has impacted vessels deployment patterns. As you can see from the chart at the top of the slide, maximum vessel size has increased on some tradelanes but decreased on others, that is Transpacific. Meantime, average vessel size is tended to increase across the board except for couple of Middle East trades, but the most significant upsizing apparently on Pendulum Services upgrading ships at 11,000 to 13,000 TEU or larger. The chart at bottom left helps to put this in context by showing the number of ships deployed for our trade grouping. So, for example, big changes in vessel size took place on pendulum trades, but the number of vessels actually deployed on those trades is rather limited. From the chart at bottom right you can see the impact of the new canal locks on old-style Panamax vessels. Unsurprisingly, few of such vessels are now transitioning the canal, and this has lead to increased idling and of course record scrapping of Panamax tonnage. On the other hand, deployment of Panamax capacity on trades which do not transit the Panama Canal has remained stable at about 2 million TEU or in fact is even slightly increased, suggesting that the new locks have triggered the rightsizing rather than the obsolescence to Panamax fleet. But the broader point here is this. Despite some vessel upsizing which has been a characteristic of the industry since its inception, our midsize and smaller tonnage narrative remains intact. So to conclude this section, I'd like to underline the following points. Number one, the world in general and containership in particular faced significant challenges and uncertainties in the near-term, and there may be some divergence in the fortunes of liner companies and tonnage providers during that time. Point two and this follows on from the above. We believe the containership lessor's significant near-term exposure to the spot market will face particular challenges which in turn we expect to drive increased scrapping. Point three; limited new building investments in mid-size and smaller ship sizes combined with accelerated scrapping should tighten the supply of these vessel segments over time. These factors together with the continued demand for our tonnage and tradelanes representing around 70% containerized trade and tending to show the most robust growth suggest to us that the most favorable prospects of recovery over time will be for midsize and smaller ships. Finally, point four, although we acknowledge that three of our existing charters expire within 2017, and a further two within 2018 we believe that with our contracted charter coverage industry-leading counterparties and continued focus upon mid-size and smaller tonnage Global Ship Lease is comparatively well positioned to weather the challenges of the near-term and build value over the medium and long-term. I’ll now pass the call over to Susan Cook to run through the financials.