Paul Pittman
Analyst · Raymond James. Please go ahead
Thank you, Luca. This has been a year where our underlying business performance and asset values have held up reasonably well. It's fundamentally an okay year from the operating business perspective. However, it has been dismal year with regard to our stock price. It's hard fundamentally for us to understand that disconnect between private market values and public market values. Nevertheless, it's certainly exists in a substantial amount with regard to our company. The asset values have held up despite decreases in primary commodity prices that is as we would expect, that is similar to what is happened historically. There is no reason to think that will not continue to be the case. During the Q&A if anyone has further questions about that and why that happens, happy to discuss it. The AFCO assets we acquired in the acquisition last February are performing well and as expected. They have provided the diversification both in terms of cash flows and in terms of different markets as it relates to underlying asset value that we expected. We are quite pleased with that acquisition. I am not going to address those slides that I mentioned earlier called Q4, 2017 earnings call and webcast slides. And I want to go -- what this presentation covers is a couple of things. Historical performance of the company and some key operating metrics, as well as summary of couple of important pieces of USDA data that are often quoted in the press, yet fundamentally misunderstood. So starting with Page 3, which is the key operating metrics. The point of this page is to give some historic perspective to what we've accomplished in terms of the company. And the development of a meaningful scale as a farmland REIT. So when we went public in 2014, we had approximately $200 million of assets. Today, we have approximately $1.2 billion of assets. Fundamentally very, very rapid growth in terms of asset base. Total operating revenues from 2014 were $4.2 million. They finished 2017 at $46.2 million and 2018 guidance would indicate approximately $60 million in 2018. Again, incredibly rapid growth in terms of our revenues. Adjusted EBITDA went from approximately $2 million in 2014 to $33.7 million today. AFFO went from under a $1 million in 2014 to $13.3 million today. And AFFO per share of course went from $22 million now up to $36 million with some declines from 2016 to 2017 which of course none of us are happy about. But the key takeaway from all of that is that for a company to be public must achieve a meaningful scale to defray incredibly expensive overheads of the company related to the public listing and in particular the accounting surrounding that listing. At the bottom of the page, if you look at the ratios; what we have accomplished is very obvious. We track our expenses in the company in two different ways. Basically a bucket of expenses we really can't control. And then a bucket of expenses we can control. The can't control group is fundamentally property taxes. It also would be insurance on assets and things of that nature. Those numbers are going to be reasonably stable through time, every time we add more assets; property taxes go up, insurance goes up. In particular, if you add specialty or permanent prop assets, your property taxes and your depreciation will increase substantially compared to traditional row crop but you can see the effect of adding AFCO is kind of raised our percentage of revenues going to property taxes and property operating expenses. But turning now to the controllable expenses, what we call in this presentation all other operating expenses. We have steadily driven all these controllable operating expenses starting at about 73% of revenues in 2014, now down to around 22% of revenues. And if you project forward in a team looking at the guidance that we have in the supplemental, you'll see that go below around 15% in the 2018 year. As a percent of total assets, we've gone from about 1.5% in 2014, now down to just under 1%, 0.9%, in fact of operating expenses to total assets and we would expect that to continue to decline next year to the range of about 75 basis points. The takeaway here is that we have grown a very large company relative to the space. It's obviously still small relative to the New York Stock Exchange overall. But what that has done for investors and for the metrics in the company despite the fact the market doesn't understand it is to put us in a position in which we are incredibly efficient managers of a large pool of assets. And we expect those efficiency gains to continue. Now moving to the rest of the slides in this page. All of them basically address the following question. And I get this question from investors from time to time and phone calls. How can it be possible that I just read in the Wall Street Journal about incredible declines in farm income or that farmers have to have off farm jobs to support their farming habit, otherwise the industry will collapse? How can those articles be true and at the same time we're not seeing or not going to see massive declines in farmland values? So what I wanted to cover is I went through a lot of the statistics often cited by these reporters in the Wall Street Journal in other places. And I actually dug into what those -- what they were citing and what those statistics actually mean. So the first slide which is on page 3 looks at what's called US farm income. And you often see quoted in the newspaper, the blue line on that page called net farm income. And it says things like net farm income declines for the third or fourth year in a row or net farm income is down 20% from the prior year or 30% or whatever. The fundamental issue is that the reporter is citing the wrong statistic. If they ask somebody at the USDA what statistic they should cite to be representative of farmer incomes, they would be told to look at the red line, the net cash income line. The blue line is fundamentally put together by the USDA to be a something that is included in the GDP for the nation calculation. It is not meant to be directly representative of the cash income of farmers. It does not take into account transfers of cash from year one to year two. It doesn't take -- it takes into account depreciation and especially aggressive formula. It's just not put together to be used the way the press uses it. Number they should be referring to is net cash income. As you can see, net cash income has not declined anywhere close to the amount of net farm income. This is why you're not seeing fundamental distress in the countryside. If you go to page 4 and you look at U.S. farm net cash income inflation adjusted. The takeaway and this is a long series of data of course because clear back in 1970, it's presented in 2018 dollars. What this shows you is the incredibly high profitability of the 2012 to 2014 timeframe was the unusual event. What we are experiencing today is largely in line with the long- term history of agriculture. While agriculture has not spent very much of its history in the last 50 years or so in there any difficult times in terms of asset values or farmer bankruptcies. And as long as we continue right where we are, we are not going to see broad-based distress amongst farmers. We are in a zone that is like much of the last 50 years. And with the exception of a few years in the mid 1980s, it has been pretty good time for production agriculture. Turning to page 5, and this one when is always shocks me the way the data is recorded, but it's really again very important. The USDA calls anyone who produces, who has the potential to produce $1,000 a year of gross revenues a farmer. So if you have a garden in your backyard and a little standout by the road selling vegetables and you have the potential to sell a $1,000 worth of vegetables in a year, you are called a farmer under the USDA. And you ask the USDA why do they track it down to such a low number? What they tell you is they've been tracking this data for a long time. They are trying to cast in that as widely as possible. But at the same time. They want a long term linear comparability, so they do not move the starting point of being qualified as a farmer, and haven't moved in a long time. However, for sophisticated consumers of this information, they do parse the data into more meaningful divisions, and that's what you see on page 5. To be a real farmer, meaning a full-time farmer what you would need to do is to produce at least $250,000 a year of gross sales. And in many cases -- many people would say it has to be at least a $0.5 million. And if you look at the fundamental economic results for that average farm, you see that they are actually very strong, for the bucket that says $250,000 to $500,000, those farmers are making on average around $100,000 a year from their operation. If you look at the group that is a million or more, you will see that that group on average which of course includes people that have tens of millions of sales, they might be making in the neighborhood of $650,000 to $700,000 a year. Again, this is what the popular press talks about subscale farmers and the difficulty those subscale farmers face. The true economic picture of our tenants is actually much, much stronger. Page 6 sort of just repeats the same thing. So I won't go over it. Page 7. Seven looks at long-term land values and US farmland including buildings. There was a statistic for cropland only which is similar but this one has a longer data set so it's the one I use. What you will see here is that long-term appreciation returns to farmland are between 5% and 6%. You can parse this data with rolling seven-year period analysis. And you still get largely the same result except for that mid 1980s period. The takeaway here is that the market does not give us any credit whatsoever it appears for the long-term appreciation of our underlying assets, which is in fact not true. Our assets are appreciating albeit slower than historical rates. Our view is that they will continue to appreciate and that value should be ending up in our stock price, but it of course is not at this point in time. If you turn now briefly to the supplemental. I want to point just a couple things out on this page. Yes or in this document and this is in the document I'm referring to now is a Q4, 2017 supplemental package. Also available in the link for this conference call. If you would turn to Page 15, you will see that we have issued guidance for the 2018 year. The guidance is reasonably strong top-line revenues go to approximately $60 million, AFFO mid point of approximately $0.42 a share. The one other point that I want to also emphasize on this page because I don't want people to miss it. Everyone should read footnote three carefully, what footnote says is that we will experience somewhat more seasonality in our AFFO, in our reported AFFO than we have experienced in the past. What this is driven fundamentally by GAAP revenue recognition rules and are we required of course to comply with them. And so we get an ever-increasing back in loading of our revenue stream even though the expenses for the year are taken as the quarters come. The key big driver that is making this situation different between 2017 and 2018 is the large Olam transaction that we did will unfortunately have 100% of the revenue from that asset recognized in the fourth quarter. We have tried to negotiate with accountants to get that change, but frankly were unable to. So I do want to point that footnote out so, no one is surprised. Page 17 to look at it for just a second is that buildup of net asset value of the portfolio using cap rates. I want to draw everyone's attention to the fact that we have begun this year to present this on a backward-looking as opposed to forward-looking basis. In 2017, we presented it on forward-looking basis because of the large AFCO acquisition. It was sort of meaningless on a backward-looking basis but it is more traditional among streets to present it backward looking. So now that we have the AFCO acquisition behind us this presentation is on a backward-looking basis. If you run the calculation through it would lead you to a high $12 per share net asset value. Then the final point that I would like to make before I turn it back over to Luca is that I want to make sure that all of our investors do understand despite what I have said that we take quite seriously the difficult stock price performance for the year. We do not -- we are not pleased with this. We are not happy with this. I frankly look at it as an opportunity. I looked at it as an opportunity to personally accumulate more shares in the company when prices are below fair value. I certainly look at it from the company's buyback perspective as an opportunity. But the point that I want wanted to emphasize is that both Luca and I took in the 2017 year substantial reductions in compensation. We did not have these reductions forced on us by our comp committee. We offered them; neither Luca nor I took any cash bonus in the year. You'll see this when our proxy comes out. And we will both took in my case approximately 30% or greater reduction in total compensation. And in the case of Luca 20% or greater. We want everyone to understand that we are in this for the long-term. We're focused on fundamental value. We do not get nervous because some commentator on Seeking Alpha, who frankly doesn't have the courage even the use his own name criticizes our company. None of that matters to us. We buy the farms that farmers want to rent. And we will continue to own them and create value through that process. And then a final comment because I know it will come up. The company's perspective on the dividend. If you read the press release announcing the dividend, we made a clear statement there that we are not cutting the dividend. We are not going to cut the dividend during this calendar year. We're not likely frankly to cut it next year. But we'll leave ourselves the flexibility to discuss that again. Our perspective is that we have issued securities to farmers in particular who have taken our securities in return for their farmland. And it is fundamentally unfair to that group of people to cut that dividend. They sold us those assets with an expectation of a certain dividend payout. We did that deal with them. We of course would cut our dividend as the board of this company which I'm the Chairman of would cut the dividend, if we were forced to. But we have no intention to cut this dividend as a tactical matter. The shortfall and dividend distributions are under $5 million. The appreciation on the portfolio is well in excess of $20 million each year if not more. We are not issuing stock to pay the dividend which is something I read in a chat room from time to time. What we are doing is we are fundamentally distributing part of that appreciation before we actually fully realize it in an accounting sense on our balance sheet. But we are going to maintain this dividend and that is our firm intention within the company. The only thing that will lead us to cut that dividend it would be true financial distress inside the company which required the dividend cut. But we don't see that happening. With that I'm going to turn it back over to Luca to make some comments on the key operational and financial statistics. Thank you, Luca.