Stefan Krause
Analyst · Goldman Sachs
Yes, thank you, Anshu, and good morning to everybody for joining us here on our second quarter results call. I know it's going to be a busy day for everyone so let me walk you quickly through a couple of slides that we provided to you. As you can see on Page 3, the underlying performance of our operating business was strong this quarter. Each one of our core businesses recorded better year-over-year revenues, while the bottom line was impacted by higher year-over-year litigation expenses, as we continue to build our reserves to address the legacy legal risk that we have always communicated to you. So let's turn to Slide 4. And on Slide 4, obviously, we'll increasingly point your attention to the Core Bank results as the best indicator of what sustainable performance for Deutsche Bank will be. As you can see, the Core Bank continues to deliver consistent revenues, and a very low level of loan losses. On a reported basis, noninterest expenses increased 1% year-over-year. On our adjusted basis, noninterest expenses in the Core Bank decreased 5% year-over-year to EUR 5.4 billion, mostly reflecting the initial savings from our Operational Excellence program. Pretax profitability in the Core Bank, as you can see, was EUR 1.5 billion this quarter or EUR 2.3 billion excluding cost to achieve in litigation. The Core Bank achieved a pretax return on average equity of 13.2% annualized, and 7% on a post tax basis. Let me turn on to Slide 5 now. The revenue environment, as you can see in the second quarter, was decidedly mixed. As you know, for the Investment Bank April and May saw strong direct markets across fixed income and equities and good levels of client activity. However, the Fed's tapering comments in mid-May led to a broad sell off in June across most of the asset classes. And as a result, June market conditions were substantially more challenging. June was characterized by a general repricing of credit and lower levels of liquidity, especially in areas of fixed income trading. Of course, PBC and GTB revenues continued to face headwinds from near 0 short-term interest rates. Both businesses have been able to compensate by increasing volumes in their core products and also by increasing fee income. Despite these challenges, revenues in the Core Bank increased by 5% year-over-year. On Page 6, you can see our provision for credit losses in the second quarter was EUR 473 million, an increase of EUR 119 million from the first quarter of 2013. Despite the increase, we have continued to experience very low levels of provisions for credit losses. The majority of the increase this quarter was driven by higher charges in the NCOU, relating to our IAS 39 portfolio. Within the IAS 39 portfolio, the carrying value to fair value gap has narrowed to approximately EUR 800 million from EUR 3.7 billion in the fourth quarter of 2009. On Page 7, we show you our noninterest expenses. As reported, our cost has increased by EUR 350 million or 5% year-on-year. This includes litigation of EUR 630 million and cost to achieve of EUR 356 million. On this slide, we also show our adjusted cost base, which excludes the effect of cost to achieve, policyholder benefits and claims, litigation, impairments of goodwill, other severances and other disclosed one-offs. This year aligns our external disclosure with the way we manage costs internally. The adjusted cost base decreased by EUR 207 million year-over-year. The comparison of first half 2013 expenses to the first half of 2012 presents a fuller picture of the progress we have made since announcing the Operational Excellence program in July of 2012. Our adjusted cost base has decreased by approximately EUR 580 million. Litigation expenses were EUR 762 million versus EUR 512 million in the first half of 2012. The timing and size of litigation expense going forward are unpredictable. However, as we have said previously, we have assumed a continued headwind from litigation in our budgeting and capital planning for the next couple of years. When we go on Page 8, we show you the progress on our Operational Excellence program. We continue, as you can see, to push forward with our program. The primary objective of the program is obviously to strengthen DB's operational platform. This quarter, we have invested EUR 348 million in cost to achieve related to this program, bringing the total to approximately EUR 570 million in the first half of the year. Please note, we expect the majority of the 2013 cost to achieve to flow through the second half of 2013, as major initiatives are still in the ramp-up phase. On the savings side, the first full year of the program has yielded cumulative savings of EUR 1.1 billion. We are well on track to reach our target of EUR 1.6 billion in savings by year-end 2013. Let me now turn to Slide 9 where we provide more transparency on our OpEx initiatives. We've added this chart to enable you to follow the progress as this will report to you progress on the initiatives. But to start with, as a reminder, the Operational Excellence program is not primarily a cost-cutting exercise. Firstly, we are aiming to strengthen our operational and control environment by increasing flexibility and greater process discipline. In turn, this will help us to eliminate duplication and create efficiencies which then leads to sustainable cost savings. As you can see on the slide, the majority of our initiatives, which represent over half the expected savings, have progressed through the program control framework through the validation and execution phases. In strengthening our platform, we have eliminated more than 1,000 IT applications and integrated previously separate retail platforms. Also the OpEx program is comprised of over 160 initiatives, successful execution of the top 10 initiatives will yield approximately 40% of the targeted savings. Our progress to date in validating and moving initiatives towards execution and final completion gives us confidence that the plan is proceeding on track. Turning to profitability on Slide 10, you see pretax profit was EUR 792 million. Net income was EUR 335 million and in the current quarter, the effective tax rate of 58% was mainly impacted by expenses that are not tax-deductible and adjustments for income taxes of prior periods. On page 11, let me start on capital with the current valid regime which is still Basel 2.5 before I talk to our Basel III ratios. As you can see here, we finished the quarter with a Basel 2.5 Core Tier 1 ratio of 13.3%, 120 basis points higher than at the end of the first quarter of 2013. This increase in our Core Tier 1 ratio reflects our capital raised, but also lower risk weighted assets versus the end of March. The Tier 1 ratio on a Basel 2.5 basis now stands at 17.3%. Let me turn now to Slide 12. Over the quarter, our Basel 2.5 Core Tier 1 capital increased from EUR 39.3 billion to EUR 41.7 billion, principally due to the additional EUR 3 billion from our rights issue. Over the reporting period, we will also achieve a reduction of EUR 10.6 billion in Basel 2.5 risk-weighted assets. Credit risk, RWA came down by EUR 2.8 billion due to our continued de-risking activities and further asset sales of approximately EUR 5 billion, partly offset by business growth in other minor assets. Operational risk, RWAs decreased materially by EUR 3.3 billion, benefiting from BaFin approving the full integration of Postbank related operational risk in our DB Group MR [ph] model replacing the previous simple sum of the parts. Further reductions relate to foreign exchange, EUR 2.1 billion, and market risk down EUR 2.4 billion. Let me now move to Basel III on Page 13. As Anshu already discussed, our fully loaded Basel III pro forma Core Tier 1 ratio for June was 10%, and we achieved this whilst adding further to our litigation reserve. On Slide 13, you find the same reconciliation from Basel 2.5 to Basel III, with phased-in fully loaded as we have shown you in previous quarters. We now report EUR 367 billion risk weighted assets under Basel III, a EUR 52 billion increment to Basel 2.5, EUR 2 billion lower than last quarter. On the capital side, the debtors between Basel 2.5 and 3 are also largely unchanged from prior quarter, also deductions in the fully loaded scenario are now amounting to EUR 18 billion compared to EUR 19 billion in the previous quarter, principally due to lower DTA-related deductions. We go to page 14. I think this is an interesting slide as we continue on the discussion of RWAs and risk-adjusted leverage versus non-risk-adjusted leverage. As most agree, leverage obviously fails to assess the quality of the balance sheet as well as the firm's ability to fund itself. Leverage, in our view, forces banks to run a very different business on the obvious consequences is that -- one of the obvious consequences obviously is the need to originate higher-yielding assets and, by definition, therefore taking on more risk. Our average loan loss provisions have been 20% of those of some of our peers over the past 5 years because of our respective regulatory focus, has led us in a very different portfolio composition decisions with a focus on higher-quality borrowers. This slide evidences the clear positive correlation between RWA density and average loan losses, looking at a selected peer group across U.S. and Europe. This is an important -- this important difference will not obviously be captured by simple leverage definitions. Let me now move to -- before I move on to some key current issues, let me move on to the segment results first. Hold on. So on Page 16, I'll start with Corporate Banking & Securities. As you can see on Page 16, CB&S saw a very good start to the second quarter of 2013 as the positive economic momentum from the first quarter continued, leading to tighter credit spreads, higher equity markets indices, strong primary activity and higher client activity levels versus the prior year quarter. However, comments from the Fed regarding QE tapering in mid-May resulted in concerns about the direction of Central Banks' policies across Europe and the U.S. The spike in money market rates in China in June also had a negative impact on market sentiments. These concerns resulted in a broad decline in activity levels in June 2013. CB&S performance was strong with revenues increasing 9% year-on-year while declining 19% quarter-on-quarter, reflecting the usual seasonality. Excluding the impact of Basel III RWA mitigation of CVA and DVA, CB&S revenues were up 13% year-on-year. Within this environment, CB&S continued to operate at low-risk levels this quarter. VaR declined 7% quarter-on-quarter, and our Basel 2.5 risk-weighted assets are down 19% year-on-year. Noninterest expenses were EUR 2.9 billion, unchanged from the prior-year period. Continuing the momentum seen in the first quarter of 2013, noninterest expenses x litigation CtA were materially lower than the prior year quarter with reductions in both compensation and non-compensation costs, reflecting solid progress on the Operational Excellence program. This reduction was driven by lower headcount, lower infrastructure costs and other efficiency initiatives. As you can see on the next page in the second quarter of 2013, debt Sales & Trading revenues were down only 11% year-on-year despite a marked deterioration in the market environment in the later half of the quarter, which heightened uncertainty and a selloff across asset classes. Rates and flow credit revenues were resilient despite a backdrop of heightened market uncertainty, a lack of liquidity and widening spreads in June, followed by the market selloff. FX revenues were significantly higher than the prior year quarter, driven by another quarter of record volumes resulting in record second quarter revenues. DB again topped the Euromoney FX survey for the ninth consecutive year. RMBS revenues declined significantly compared to the prior year quarter, as decreased market activity resulted in lower volumes, reflecting specific uncertainty on the Fed's QE tapering. EM revenues were significantly higher year-on-year due to a strong performance in flow businesses. This important -- improvement, sorry, was most notably in LATAM where the June market selloff was not as marked as in the other EM regions. Credit solutions performance was resilient across businesses, with revenues only slightly lower than the prior year quarter which benefited from a significant one-off gain. The current quarter performance was notably strong in Asia, particularly in the first half of the quarter. Our debt franchise was ranked #1 in the U.S. by Greenwich & Associates for the fourth consecutive year. On the next page, you can see the equities revenues that increased 55% year-on-year, driven by strong cash equities and derivative revenues while prime brokerage revenues remains in line with the prior year quarter. Second quarter 2013 equity Sales & Trading revenues were DB's highest second quarter equity revenue since 2009. Cash equity revenues were up year-on-year supported by positive market sentiment and a solid performance in electronic trading, amid low liquidity conditions. DB's performance was especially strong in the U.S. and Europe. Equity derivatives revenues were significantly higher year-on-year driven by increased client activity. The business reported strong revenues in the Americas and Asia. Prime brokerage revenues were in line with the prior year quarter reflecting stable client balances. On Page 19, revenues in Origination and Advisory, as you can see, increased by 45% year-on-year, significantly outpacing fee pool growth. As a result, we continued to strengthen the record market share position we attained in 2012. In EMEA, we continued to rank #1, and our market share increased from the first quarter. Higher year-on-year revenues in equity and debt origination were offset by lower year-on-year revenues in the advisory business. In the advisory business, lower market activity, especially in cross-border, resulted in lower revenues. In equity origination, we achieved record market share in EMEA. DB had a very strong performance in high yield and ranked #2 globally. On page 20, I go to Global Transaction Banking. Income before income taxes in GTB was EUR 322 million in the second quarter of 2013. Similar to the last quarter, GTB continues to face pressure from persistently low interest rates in core markets. For instance, [indiscernible] decreased a further 26 basis points year-on-year. As well as increased pressure on margins, from a regional point of view, the pressure is most pronounced in Asia and EMEA due to the difficult economic environment. This quarter's revenue performance was partially inflated by a gain from the sale of our Deutsche Card Services business. In our ongoing businesses, we continue to grow business volumes. For instance, our trade-related volumes increased by approximately 10% year-over-year. Loan loss provisions increased year-over-year mainly driven by further provisions related to the single client credit event in Trade Finance mentioned in the first quarter. Other than this singular event, we do not see any deterioration of the average rates profile of our portfolio. Noninterest expenses including CtA decreased 10% year-over-year, demonstrating the business' ongoing cost discipline as well as the nonrecurrence of integration cost. We expect the difficult market conditions to persist in the second half of the year, but we will continue to support growth in GTB with the goal to attract increased volumes in our core markets and amongst our core client groups. Turning now on the next page to Deutsche Asset & Wealth Management. As most of you have noted, integrating our various wealth and asset management business is one of our most ambitious strategic initiatives. And I can really say that the early indications are very positive. Reported IBIT was EUR 82 million for the quarter. However, this includes EUR 171 million of cost to achieve. For the first half 2013, profitability, excluding cost to achieve, increased to EUR 489 million. This quarter revenue, excluding the Abbey Life gross up, increased by 6% year-over-year driven by higher equity markets and increased client activity. Most encouraging, the underlying cost base is beginning to reflect the integration efforts. Resources have been reduced and streamlined. By example, total capital demand has decreased by 22% year-over-year. Front office headcount has declined 9% year-over-year. Overall, our adjusted cost base is down 6% year-over-year and the adjusted cost/income ratio is 7 percentage points lower. The picture on flows this quarter is mixed. Net inflows of EUR 300 million reflect EUR 3 billion of inflows into the private bank, which were primarily offset by outflows from our fixed income and cash mandates, and to a lesser extent, outflows in retail products. Let me turn now to our PBC business. PBC again achieved a very strong result in the second quarter with a reported IBIT of approximately EUR 0.5 billion which is the second best reported quarter since consolidation of Postbank. Adjusting the reported IBIT for cost to achieve, as well as PPA effects, the IBIT would have been EUR 722 million, which is a record result in this adjusted basis. This quarter IBIT benefited from a positive development in investment in credit product revenues, but also from a few specific items, totaling approximately EUR 100 million, related to Consumer Banking Germany and Advisory Banking International. The strong improvement in advisory brokerage and credit progress were offset by weaker revenues from deposits and payments products, reflecting a continued low interest rate environment and a strategic reduction of deposit volumes especially in Consumer Banking Germany. Our expenses were impacted by higher investments into Postbank integration and other measures as part of our Operational Excellence program. They also contained a positive nonrecurring effect related to the HuaXia Bank credit card cooperation. Overall, our cost/income ratio improved year-over-year and operating cost continued to trend lower. Within the client propositions, let me quickly cover them. Advisory Banking Germany IBIT, excluding CtA, increased year-over-year, reflecting higher revenues from investment products, as well as lower provision for credit losses. In addition, credit product revenues improved, driven by higher volumes in the mortgage business. Advisory Banking International achieved a very strong result. This was driven by a higher contribution from HuaXia Bank and also included expanded revenues from investment products across all major countries. And Consumer Banking Germany IBIT benefited from certain revenue one-off items and reduced risk cost. As we have seen last year, CtA is planned to significantly increase in the second half of the year, so we caution you against annualizing the first half year's results. So let me turn on Page 23 to consolidation adjustments. As you can see, pretax loss in C&A was EUR 205 million this quarter compared to a loss of EUR 72 million in the prior year quarter. Valuation and timing differences saw positive effects related to shifts of the euro and U.S. dollar interest rates curve. The lower level of profitability was also driven by positive effects from the interest income on taxes in the second quarter of 2012. So then let's turn to our last division, which is the Non-Core Operations Unit. As you can see on Page 24, once again, the de-risking in NCOU has positively contributed to the group's capital position. During the second quarter, we successfully reduced Basel III RWA equivalents by EUR 11 billion, which included the sale of the legacy U.S. CRE portfolio by PB Capital, further disposals of low rated securitization assets as well as the rollout of advanced credit rating and operational risk models. Our adjusted assets and pro forma Basel III RWAs have already fallen below the EUR 80 billion year-on-year end target that we originally set in 2012 and reflects an acceleration of our de-risking activities where markets have remained constructive for most of the quarter. NCOU continues to deliver capital accretion for the group, providing a Basel III pro forma Core Tier 1 ratio improvement of approximately 11 basis points in the second quarter, after taking into account the pretax IBIT loss. While asset disposals delivered a net gain in the period, deterioration in market conditions for June has negatively impacted IBIT performance, especially revenues. A significant portions of the assets in the NCOU are fair value accounted and remarked on a regular basis. I ask you to take that into account. The NCOU reported better-than-expected revenues in the first quarter of this year, which were somewhat offset by the weaker development this quarter. So on Slide 25, gives you some more detail on the NCOU assets. I'm happy to confirm that we have now achieved a reduction in both adjusted assets and Basel III equivalent RWAs of almost 25% in the first 6 months of 2013. Added to our successes in the second half of 2012, we have now generated EUR 3.6 billion of capital accretion from NCOU de-risking activities which equates to a Basel III Core Tier 1 benefit of 84 basis points. During the second quarter, our EUR 11 billion Basel III RWA equivalent saving included the following notable transactions, approximately EUR 2.3 billion in relation to the sale of the legacy U.S. commercial real estate portfolio that we inherent -- inherited with our Postbank acquisition, and savings from sales of other wholesale assets accounted for an additional EUR 3 billion reduction. Basel III pro forma RWAs now stand at an EUR 80 billion target. We would expect to continue to reduce RWAs for the rest of the year, of course, subject to constructive markets. From a leverage perspective, we have already showcased our adjusted asset reduction targets and would expect assets to continue to decrease throughout the year. As previously advised, we do expect the pace of de-risking to lessen over time and the sale of assets is resulting in an ongoing reduction in underlying revenues. The reduction of adjusted assets, capital and risk remains at the forefront of our decision-making progress and we will continually evaluate the rationale of exit versus hold to take advantage of market conditions and to optimize and protect shareholder value. So before I cover the last key current issues and let me now move on to 2 special topics. This quarter, we have 2. Before obviously the leverage discussion, a few words in response to a media report concerning Deutsche Bank's involvement in certain enhanced repurchase transactions, the accounting treatment we used for those transactions and the implications of those transactions on our capital position. First, with regard to Deutsche Bank's involvement in enhanced repurchase transactions, these transactions are widely used and offered by banks internationally as part of normal course of business. In a standard repurchase transaction, we buy securities from a client as collateral for a loan and enter into a repurchase agreement to sell back the security at a later date at a higher value, in lieu of interest. In an enhanced repurchase transaction, the bank may sell this collateral and will settle the repurchase agreement normally with cash. Typically, the bank hedges the risk inherent in the collateral by means of selling a credit default swap. The benefit of these enhanced repo transactions to clients is that they offer a reduced interest charge on the borrowing undertaken, as the proceeds from selling the CDS are effectively partially passed on to the client. In exchange, the client accepts the risk. In the case of default, the losses may be higher comparative to a conventional rebook. Based on the nature of these transactions, Deutsche Bank has the obligation to account for the net receivable or payable on its balance sheet according to International Accounting Standard IAS 32. There is no discretion on that. Secondly, with regard to impact of these transactions on our capital position, enhanced repurchase transactions are immaterial for our core ratios. These transactions are negligible for Deutsche Bank's capital ratio or leverage ratio. Total net to trading liabilities, which include enhanced reported transactions, are around 0.5% of total net liabilities. I want to highlight as well that the figures provided in the notes for Q1 and Q2 have not changed significantly over the last couple of quarters. Further, since 2008, these portfolios have never been material as part of our balance sheet. Now that I think I've bored you enough with a lot of results, I really come to the key current topic that you have all been expecting, I guess, which is obviously the discussion of our leverage ratios. So let's turn on Page 27, and bear with me as I walk you through our thinking around leverage. As you know, regulators, politicians and analysts have shifted their focus towards leverage ratios in the past few months. As you know, there are several methodologies proposed by the Basel Committee, the U.S. regulators, the PRI, the FINMA and the EU. Most of the proposed rules are far from final and/or will only apply to a subset of the group. For us as a European institution, the European capital requirements directive and regulation, or CRD4, will be binding. CRD4 was passed in Europe in June this year which does not currently specify any minimum leverage ratio. In fact, the definition of ultimate leverage measure and any potential minimum requirement is still subject to an EBA review in 2016, following an extensive monitoring period. This review will also include a recommendation as to whether leverage should become a hard Pillar 1 requirement from 2018 on or not. The CRD4 exposure, for leverage purposes, largely follows the original BCBS approach as per December 2010. For us, it amounted to EUR 1.583 billion at the end of June as you can see on the chart, including a CRD4 gross up of EUR 413 billion, which includes derivatives based on the regulatory current exposure method, meaning including notional based add-ons, but with no recognition for collateral, neither cash nor securities. It includes secured financing transactions that are treated according to the supervisory volatility adjustment approach, a standardized method used by regulators to calculate counterparty credit exposure for SFTs. Off-balance sheet exposures, notably undrawn credit facilities and guarantees extended and other effects like add-backs for DB claims with regard to collateral paid under [indiscernible] agreements, et cetera. In terms of capital, CRD4 is using Tier 1 capital under the phase-in and phase-out provisions equally included in Basel. Regulatory monitoring of leverage results has already started a public disclosure of the leverage ratio under CRD4 will start in the first quarter of 2015. Given regulations are still in flux internationally, and each with a high degree of uncertainty as of their final definition, we heavily caveat our pro forma numbers. Changes in definitions of the leverage ratio may alter the resulting leverage ratios substantially both up and down. Whilst we monitor against multiple measures, our primary focus right now is CRD4, which is the legal basis in Europe and, obviously, the regulation which will ultimately apply to DB group. I therefore do not want to drive the speculation any further by presenting numbers under a multitude of definitions, but focus instead on our leverage ratio under CRD4. Now, considering the EUR 430 billion CRD4 gross up for end of June, our pro forma CRD4 leverage exposure at the end of the period was EUR 1.583 billion, as I mentioned. With a Basel III pro forma Tier 1 capital of EUR 55 billion, or our CRD4 leverage ratio under the Basel and CRD4 phase-in provisions, amounted to 3.5%. Then, moving to a fully loaded Basel III scenario, but making the assumption that some portion of currently available additional Tier 1 will be replaced with new issuance as the old paper gets phased out, we arrive at an adjusted fully loaded CRD4 leverage ratio of 3%. As discussed, CRD4 does not yet set an explicit minimum ratio nor fix leverage as a Pillar 1 requirement, but a 3% minimum would not be unexpected and also seems to be the typical figure used by the market these days. So on a phase-in basis, we already exceeded a potential 3% requirement some 5 years early. And on a fully loaded adjusted basis again, assuming replacement of still eligible hybrids to new AT1 issuance, we today meet such a potential 3% minimum. As we have seen with solvency ratios, the market has made it clear that fully loaded is the preferred basis. We do not, however, consider that this presents a meaningful picture when looking at Tier 1 capital in the near term. Firms such as ourselves carry a significant volume of existing AT1 capital, which receives regulatory recognition and which will be phased out over a very long time. As this existing AT1 phases out, we will issue new eligible AT1 to support our total Tier 1 capital base. As such, we believe that the adjusted fully loaded capital base comprising fully loaded Core Tier 1 plus all currently eligible AT1 is the most appropriate measure. Let me be clear, this is an illustration on how we fulfill regulatory leverage requirements articulated in the European regulations today, assuming the 3% minimum. But we understand that market expectations and potential revisions to the current regulation may force us to reduce leverage further and we have all intentions to do so. So let me give you some further detail on how our thinking is on the next page. If you go to Slide 29, as I said, we are far from complacent about our leverage position, and we have a significant tool book of actions that we will look to apply over the coming quarters. You will have seen that we have already significantly reduced our total adjusted assets. Relative to the third quarter, we have reduced total adjusted assets by EUR 100 billion, nearly half from NCOU de-risking. While we see further opportunities for reductions in our balance sheet assets, there's also considerable potential to bring down the current CRD4 gross up. Here, we intend to reduce derivatives leverage through more efficient implementation of netting, especially against central clearing houses and a program of derivative tear ups and trade compression. Other measures include closer scrutiny of the volume of unutilized lending commitments. In aggregate, we are committed to reduce, over time, our current CRD4 exposure by about EUR 250 billion. While this does not come for free, we believe that any adverse P&L impact is manageable. According to the due diligence of our leverage task force, we calculate the full impact of utilizing the leverage tool books could be approximately EUR 600 million in one-off costs and roughly EUR 300 million of foregone future IBIT. On the capital supply side, we will see continued contribution from retained earnings, as well as a potential to issue new additional Tier 1 instruments as part of our existing AT1 starts to phase out. We have now implemented a similar process on the leverage side as we had with our Core Tier 1 Solvency ratio, and we expect this new program to be equally successful in delivering meaningful improvements in our leverage position. We are obviously aware that the debates regarding leverage is likely to continue. It is likely we would see further proposals which will influence the regulatory framework. We endorse the goal of building a more resilient financial system. The actions we take now will move our CRD4 leverage further above the 3% mark, giving us flexibility to comply with various regulatory outcomes. We remain committed to our current strategic vision in delivering, obviously, our strategic ambitious agenda and the targets contained herein. So this ends my presentation, and we gladly take your questions now.