Dominic Frederico
Analyst · UBS. Please go ahead
Thank you, Robert, and welcome to everyone joining today's call. Assured Guaranty's second quarter of 2017 was another highly successful quarter. Non-GAAP operating shareholders equity per share and non-GAAP adjusted book value per share attained record levels once again. Operating income reached $141 million, and the present value of new business production or PVP totaled $70 million in the second quarter. Year-to-date, through June 30, our new business written as measured by PVP is 114% greater than through the first half of last year. In the primary U.S. municipal bond market, par volume sold was 16% below that of the second quarter of 2016 due to lower refunding volume. However, insured volume was only down 7%. Monolines insured 7% of total part issuance including more than 27% of new issue par and 58% of the transactions sold by single A issuers. Assured guarantee widen its lead by being selected to insure 62% of the insurer pars sold up from 57% in the first quarter of 2017 and 53% versus the second quarter of 2016. We insured over a billion dollars more par than we did in the first quarter for a 38% increase despite average 30 year AAA municipal interest rates that were lower in the second quarter than in the first and credit spreads than narrowed to the tightest levels since last July. Through the month of June we ensured 80% of the new issue insured part due partly to S&P placing our competitors on negative credit watch during that month, more on that in a moment. Our second quarter par volume also reflected increased demand for insurance from institutional investors in large scale transactions. We insured more than $100 million dollars in each of seven primary market transactions. These include a one of the largest insurer airport revenue transaction in years in which we insured $256 million dollars of par for the St Louis Lambert Airport. For the first half we insured a total of 12, $100 million plus transactions, the most for a first half since 2011. We supplemented our primary market performance with another strong quarter in the secondary market. In total for the first half we ensured more than $1.2 billion of secondary market par issuing 241 policies that represent a 62% sixty growth in secondary market par insured versus the first half of last year. The number of our secondary market policies written increased by only 3% which means our secondary market transactions are increasing in average size. In terms of secondary market PVP. This is the second consecutive year in which our first air production more than doubled that of the prior year first half in this important market. Our international infrastructure business continues to perform well on the heels of an outstanding first quarter, in the second quarter we completed another U.K. university accommodation transaction and as part of the European Euro Tunnel debt refinancing we demonstrate that our guarantee can be used on the international transactions to assure liquidity for debts or missed payments that may be due long into the future. This application of a financial guarantee policy for debt service liquidity purposes has been used rarely if ever in the European market and we believe that will provide a beneficial, it would be beneficial for raw idea of potential future transactions. In addition we took an important step towards consolidating our European operations in June. Assured guarantee Europe PLC or AGE. The AGM subsidiary that raises our new business in Europe acquired our other three European subsidiaries from AGC. These include AGCs long time U.K. subsidiary and the European subsidiaries we acquired from CIFG and MBIA. We put in the merge these three companies into AGE subject to regulatory a judicial approval upon the merger obligations and bonds insured by those three companies will become short obligations of AGE. And therefore receive AGE's financial translating. This will be particularly significant for holders of bonds guaranteed by the former MBIA U.K. which we renamed Assured Guarantee London because those bonds would be upgraded. Overall we believe this combination of companies would give us a simplified, more easily understandable profile in the international market while also reducing the operational costs associated with maintaining multiple companies. Additionally the both the combined companies increased economic size and investor reach one handed visibility in the market. Running out the second quarter production our structure finance team executed six aircraft residual value transactions and we see additional transaction flow in that space. We're also looking at opportunities in consumer not alone securitizations, whole business securitizations, insurance company reserve financings and other capital management solutions for financial institutions. Coming back to the rating agency activity, since our last call in June, S&P Publicly acknowledged Assured Guarantees competitive superiority by placing our two active competitors on negative credit watch. Saying that their competitive positions may be sufficiently weaker than ours to make greater ratings differentiation appropriate, S&P also observed that Assured Guarantee was the only the Monoline participating in multiple financial guarantee markets a source of the diversification that S&P now properly deems a strategic advantage. Somewhat surprisingly in late June S&P positively resolved the negative credit watch a one of those competitors by affirming its AA rating. There by a signing that grantor the same rating as assured guarantee. Despite having previously recognized our greater share of par of premiums written, better pricing power and operational results and a more diversified products strategy, however, at the same time S&P did downgrade the other competitor single A which prompted that company to seize running new the business for the time being. This means we are the only active guarantor with stable double AA category ratings from two different rating agencies with a diversified business model, superior claims paying ability and operating results as well as having access to the capital markets. As of the also affirmed this AA financial strength rating with stable outlook on all these Assured Guarantees principal subsidiaries. S&P followed up in July with its full annual review in which it cited our very strong capital adequacy, market leadership in terms of par insured premiums written, well diversified underwriting strategy, proven track record of credit discipline and strong operating performance. The S&P affirmation followed call bond rating agencies affirmation of AGM AA plus stable rating last December and last month Croll affirmed its AA plus stable rating on Mac. As per Moody's they published their semiannual update on April 28 with no change in our ratings or Outlooks. They have also notified us that they will not withdrawal the AGC rating as we requested. Moody's continues to impose an unfair and uninformed at the rating on AGC. That is based primarily on subjective, qualitative factors that have little or no reflection on a guarantor's financial strength or ability to pay claims. The rating also fails to reflect AGC substantial leverage improvement since Moody's first applied its current rating in January of 2013. Parks closure has declined 51% including a 42% decline in below the great exposure while claims paying resources were reasonably constant going from $3.8 billion to $3.6 billion and AGC has seen strong financial results since then with operating earnings of $1.3 billion so, with exposures have the low investment grade declining by similar amount and generating an income of $1.3 billion how can Moody's not see a reason for changing the rating for AGC and it becomes rather obvious why we requested them to drop the rating. Regarding better agency behavior all three rating agencies have previously said that our exposure to Puerto Rico credits is unlikely to result in the change in our ratings. Even under severe loss assumptions as I previously noted we estimate our year end 2016 excess capital under the S&P capital adequacy model to be $2.8 billion. And our current investment portfolio annually generates income approximately equal to the average annual debt service due on all of our Puerto Rico credits over the next ten years. In its recent annual review S&P wrote that Assured Guarantees current capital position could observe losses of roughly $2.3 billion on our exposure to Puerto Rico issuers and without accounting for any other factors there would mean though change in our capital adequacy or financial risk profile which implies that there should be no change in our rating. We were consciously over the last three years to help Puerto Rico right itself while two administrations have repeatedly ignore the law and play short term political considerations ahead of long term economic health of the Commonwealth and its citizens. Now we are forced to take the necessary legal actions to restore all of our rights under the U.S. and Puerto Rico constitutions and laws including PROMESA. Puerto Rico's Financial Management and Oversight Board has compounded the Commonwealth disregard for the rule of law by asserting its certification of a fiscal plan that fail to comply with PROMESA and by forcing most Puerto Rico debt in the bankruptcy like proceedings that Congress intended only as a last resort after every effort to reach negotiated settlements had been made. Senators Cotton of Arkansas and Tillis of North Carolina wrote to Oversight Board Chairman Carrion on April 7 about numerous non-compliance concerns including the fiscal plans failure to comply with lawful priorities and liens established by the Puerto Rico's constitution, its failure to differentiate between non-essential, essential spending, its elevation of all non-debt spending above that service and its unexplained economic assumptions as well as complaint to the Commonwealth and oversight board had not responded to creditors attempts to initiate credit negotiations. Unsatisfied with the Board's Response, Senator Cotton followed up again that the fiscal planes failure to respect relative lawful leads and priorities create a dangerous precedent that could barely destabilize the municipal bond market. As you know we've been making a similar point for a long time, Senator Cotton also noted that according to a Wall Street Journal, mutual fund investors nationwide stand to lose $5.4 billion as a result of what he calls the Board bizarre interpretation of PROMESA. He is right in that characterization under this fiscal plan, the government intends to make payment 100% of government employment or bonuses yet not pay secured creditors contradicting the governor's claim that he will reduce the size of the Island's government. Approximately 25% of the non-farm workforce in Puerto Rico are government employees compared with 50% for the United States, clearly an unsustainable total and a huge economic burden for the Puerto Rico economy. In this fiscal plan, every expense is deemed essential except paying debt service, yet as part of PROMESA, the government must be able to demonstrate the ability to access the capital markets and who would lend to it, whether to exhibit this level of disregard for the law and creditor rights. As I said in our last call or our last call, we filed an advisory complaint challenging the legality of the fiscal plan because it violates various sections of PROMESA and the contracts taking an due process clauses of the U.S. Constitution and therefore should not be the basis for any point of adjustment under the bankruptcy like provisions of PROMESA's Title 3. Other members of Congress are equally astonished by the oversight board's defines of the very law that created it, Congressman Bishop Chairman to House of Natural Resources Committee questioned the oversight board for failing to approve the previously negotiated PREPA Restructuring Support Agreement even before the board outright rejected at the end of June. As you have observed the June 15th letter to the Oversight Board chairman, the board will be defying the intent of Congress if it did not certified the PREPA RSA under Title 6 of PROMESA which was intended to encourage conceptual agreement on debt restructuring. Congressman Bishop wrote that the decision to implement the RSA had already been made by Congress with the passage of PROMESA and that the oversight board's dilatory tactics run countered to plain language of PROMESA. He wrote that subjecting the RSA to the fiscal plan was outside the scope of the board's powers and a violation of PROMESA that could result in severe adverse effects for the Island. This is from the chair of the House committee responsible for PROMESA but the oversight board ignored his admonishment and continued to act legally in violation of Puerto Rican and U.S. laws including PROMESA. The RSA has been arduously negotiated among numerous parties beginning more than three years ago, during that period Assured Guarantee and other creditors provided forbearance and hundreds of millions of dollars of liquidity to stay well by the Electric Utility. We know other creditors are willing to forego our rights to place PREPA in the receivership in the interest of finding the solution that best serve the needs of PREPA, Puerto Rico residents, the Commonwealth and the creditors, the success of that conceptual resolution would have provided a roadmap that other Puerto Rican issuers could follow to avoid expensive and time consuming litigation and help Puerto Rico regain access to the capital markets but now by rejecting the RSA and forcing PREPA in the Title 3, the oversight board has recklessly squandered approximately $18 billion spent by the Commonwealth and million more spent by the creditors to successfully negotiate the RSA. Given this outcome, Puerto Rico and its citizens would have been better off if PREPA had been placed in receivership years ago which would have removed the political interference and allow us to focus on making the operational changes it so urgently needs, for example by adjusting rise the levels over now PREPA to cover its debt and other expenses and modernize and right size its operations. These are rate increases that PREPA is legally obligated to charge and collect and that rate payers can afford because the rates have declined significantly over the last few years. From an average rate of approximately $0.26 per kilowatt hour in 2014 with a high of $0.29 in February of that year the electricity rates charged by PREPA gone to an average of approximately $0.18 per kilowatt hour in 2016 with a low of $0.17 in March of 2016. This occurred because savings from lower fuel costs were passed directly through the consumers in the form of lower electricity rates with no attempt to apply any portion of the savings to pay debt service, improve liquidity or invest in the modernization of power generation and distribution. Additionally, beginning in 2015, a portion of the rate decline was attributable to re-landing arrangements agreed to by Assured Guarantee another forbearing PREPA creditors, which enable PREPA to defer bond payments and thereby effectively further subsidizing electricity rates where there have been assertions that Puerto Rico has had high electricity rates, PREPA's rates were 25% below electricity rates charged by various utilities another U.S. and Caribbean Islands from 2008 to 2014. We previously saw the judgment compelling the oversight board to certify the PREPA RSA for implementation under Title 6 as PROMESA required it to do so. The board has given us no choice, but to also seek relief from the automatic stay to permit appointment of a receiver to insure the lien provided to creditors as part of the collateral package produces net revenue sufficient to pay debt service. Additionally, PREPA is violating the special revenue protections of the bankruptcy code by failing to remit special revenue bond collateral for the timely payment of debt service. There is a similar situation at the highways and transportation authority, we therefore saw the judgment that would halt and reverse the diversion of special revenues pledges collateral for the HTA bonds to other Commonwealth expenses. Under the HCA bond resolution, HCA pledged its special revenues as the security for the payment of the HCA bonds subject only to a valid claim of claw back under Puerto Rico law, a valid claim of claw back is triggered only if there has been first of application of all available resources to pay the GEO bond debt service and there is still a shortfall to GEO bond payments, to-date the Commonwealth has not satisfied the preconditions to a valid claw back in addition even assuming the preconditions for a valid claw back have been met making the constitutionally protected GEO payments is the only legal use of claw back bonds, they cannot be used to pay any other expenses. For Puerto Rico, it's illegal behavior has caused many other creditors to press their cases in court elected and appointed Puerto Rican officials abetted by the oversight board continue to disregard the laws and constitutions of Puerto Rico in the United States and in ventured pledges, further the Governor's oath of office included his pledge to quote preserve and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution and laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico why should we conclude at this point about his integrity and honesty related to his oath of office in light of his behavior, behavior that will subject Puerto Rico to a multitude of judicial proceedings that will further waste precious time and resources and distract the island from developing plans and strategies to right size the government and grow the economy. With every new violation of the law the commonwealth and the oversized board further destroyed their credibility making the possibility of future access to the capital markets let alone statehood increasingly remote. With our 30 years of reliable strength and performance we are the premier financial guarantor. Today we remain the insurer of choice in US public finance our international business has solid traction and we have a broad range of opportunities in structured finance. We have more than enough capital to support these financial guarantee and businesses and plan to deploy a portion of the excess capital in an alternative investment that benefit from our core competencies and credit expertise and have the risk profiles in line with ours. And we will continue returning our excess capital to shareholders through dividends and share repurchases. As we pursue these strategies our foremost priority will be as it always has been to protect our policyholders with uncompromised financial strength and reward our shareholders. I will now turn the call over to Rob.