Bruce Schanzer
Analyst · Raymond James. Please go ahead
Thanks, Nick. Good evening, and welcome to the fourth quarter 2018 earnings call for Cedar Realty Trust. Before beginning with my prepared remarks, I want to sincerely thank my senior executive colleagues who I'm - whom I refer to as my kitchen cabinet, as well as all the members of team Cedar for their commitments to collaboration, congeniality and everyday excellence. There was a famous aphorism ascribed to the economist John Maynard Keynes, that states, the market can remain irrational longer than most investors can remain solvent. I was reminded of the same toward the end of this past December. On Monday, December 17th, we came to terms with a buyer for one of our bottom half assets. It was an approximately $10 million sale priced at a cap rate below 7%. Keep in mind, the consensus net asset value or NAV for Cedar of approximately $6.15 per share for our entire portfolio utilizes a 7% cap rate, which necessarily means that analysts in arriving at a cap rate for our portfolio, are using a cap rate above 7% for our bottom half assets. On that day, December 17th, after weeks of downward pressure on our share price, we fell over 12% in a single day drifting down to a low of $2.73 per share in the days that followed. This share price level implied a cap rate for our entire portfolio of well over 9%. We were literally selling for more than a 50% discount to our consensus NAV. Equipped with the real-time market color from that day's asset sale, we confidently announced a share repurchase plan the following day at an initial $30 million. Since announcing our share repurchase plan, we have been active purchasers of our stock and have bought in approximately 2.8 million shares or 3% of our outstanding shares at a weighted average price of $3.25 per share or an approximate 9% cap rate for a total of approximately $9 million. Essentially we sold one of our lower rated assets at a sub 7% cap rate and used the proceeds to purchase a pool of our better assets at a 9% cap rate. Notably, just last week, we came to terms for another roughly $10 million sale of another bottom half asset, this time at a 7.25% cap rate. As all will agree, selling our lower half assets at roughly 7% cap rates to purchase our better assets at an approximate 9% cap rate is compelling. Essentially this is the investment equivalent of shooting fish in a barrel and it is irrational. Today, you will hear from Robin and Phil about both our results and forecast. You will hear from them that there is no financial or operating distress at Cedar. In fact, as Robin will discuss in greater detail, we have a strategy being actively executed that we believe will meaningfully grow our NAV in the years to come. We owned retail real estate which admittedly is a challenging arena in which to operate. However, even with a recent spate of anchor bankruptcies that has hurt our occupancy, we are still 91% occupied. I imagine one of my children coming home and telling me he or she got a 91 on a test and my seeing this is a sign that things aren't going well. And keep in mind students generally get scored out of 100, while our effective full occupancy is well below that figure. So our occupancy is solid, with a little room for improvement and a leasing pipeline that causes me to be optimistic. Nonetheless, it is still not possible to reconcile observable and realizable private value for our real estate, which supports our consensus NAV at a minimum with the trading level for our shares. In my opinion, the explanation for this irrational public private disconnect is much simpler and it presents a compelling and sustained investment opportunity. Over the last few years, we have seen slightly less than half of Cedar's ownership drift into the hands of ETFs and index funds. This is a little greater than for REITs in general though it is consistent with the overall trend. In December, it appears that the downward drift in our stock was largely attributable to selling by these fund vehicles. The selling appears to be a function of fund flows and not fundamentals. Accordingly, it was truly an example of sellers who were so insistent on selling, they were selling without regard to publicly available information and intrinsic value. For Cedar, on the other hand, we have precise information regarding our portfolio. We know what our assets are worth and our underlying net asset value. Accordingly, we were presented with a unique opportunity, which we have and will continue to exploit on behalf of our shareholders. However, as the John Maynard Keynes saying highlights, we are constrained and fully exploiting this irrational buying opportunity by our responsibility to our shareholders to be conservative in our use of their capital. The fact is that this public private disconnect is irrational. We don't own B malls malls that are experiencing some fundamental secular decline, rather we own a portfolio of relatively stable grocery-anchored shopping centers that are retaining their value based not on our opinion or hope, but based on real transaction comps that we are executing in real-time. Although net operating income growth in our core asset type has moderated, the underlying assets are experiencing a steep value decline as I suggested by the trading in our shares. Taking a step back, one of the central principles of REIT capital allocation is that a REIT manager should only issue equity at a premium to NAV and should sell assets to purchase shares when trading at a discount to NAV. Although we are a small REIT and clearly aren't getting much value for our management platform, I am proud that we have done an unassailable job of staying true to these principles. As set forth in our corporate presentation, we have issued common equity twice in the last five years, both times when we were trading at a premium to our consensus NAV and are now repurchasing shares with the proceeds of asset sales, when we are trading at a meaningful discount to consensus NAV. This is textbook REIT capital allocation and we are proud of this track record though we would admittedly much prefer not to be trading at such a profound NAV discount. In that being, as we think about our long-term corporate strategy for growing our NAV and share price, we must not lose sight of the clear opportunity that is right in front of us as we continue to look down the road toward building the Cedar of the future. As many of you who have followed Cedar now, our long-term corporate strategy is to divest our grocery-anchored shopping centers in lower population density markets and migrate our capital into mixed use redevelopment projects in some of our highest population density submarkets within the DC to Boston corridor, specifically South Quarter Crossing and Riverview, both of which are in Philadelphia, as well as East River Park in Washington DC. In looking ahead to the second half of 2019 when we anticipate breaking ground on at least one of our three major redevelopments, our thinking around funding these projects is evolving as we consider our capital allocation alternatives. With a remarkable risk-adjusted return available to us in our common stock that is best exploited with the sale of our lower half assets, we have begun looking at identifying a joint venture partner for at least one of our redevelopments. On last quarter's call, I noted that our DC project sits within an opportunity zone and certainly that is a consideration for how we might tap attractively priced third party capital in order to fund a portion of our redevelopment costs. This is, of course, an evolving situation that will be a function of shifting dynamics in both the public and private capital markets. However, one of the hallmarks of Cedar is the nimbleness in how we approach and utilize the capital markets. You all can expect our opportunistic, yet highly quantitative and analytical approach to persist, as we weigh the various capital allocation alternatives to create value for our shareholders in 2019 and beyond. As we have discussed in the past, including during my earnings call comments last quarter, this year we are resetting our operating FFO per share on account of the dilutive effect to our operating FFO from the divestitures that will be required in order to fund our redevelopments. Although Phil will discuss our guidance in further detail, we are generally focused on maintaining our operating FFO per share through the execution of our redevelopments and will not simply dilute our earnings through asset sales to capitalize the projects. Accordingly, we think the combination of current cash flow from our core portfolio, coupled with a substantial anticipated construction in process, could support a share price that eventually reverts closer to our consensus NAV. In thinking about the progress we are making on our redevelopments and as Robin will discuss in greater detail, we are in active lease negotiations and poised to hopefully finalize anchor deals at all of our projects in the coming months. Unfortunately, the redevelopment process doesn't lend itself to regularly scheduled quarterly updates, so we certainly cannot brag about our progress with great specificity, though it is impressive and exciting. More generally, I can tell you that all of team Cedar is enthusiastically anticipating these projects, which for many years have just been pictures and numbers and will now start taking on a tangible form. Whether it is well timed share issuances and buybacks, carefully executed redevelopments or simply our disciplined balance sheet management, the one thing our shareholders can rely upon is that our capital allocation decision making will continue to be done with thoughtful analysis and with our hallmark nimbleness. Our capital allocation track record is one of which we are rightfully proud and we look forward to continuing to make what we hope will be viewed as smart decisions when viewed through the crystal clear lens of hindsight, as we embark on the next phase in our Company's evolution. With that, I will give you Robin to discuss our leasing results, as well as the progress we are making on our redevelopments. Robin?