Jacob Meldgaard
Analyst · Evercore ISI
Thank you, and welcome to everyone joining us today. We started 2026 with a very strong first quarter, delivering results that demonstrate both the earnings power of our platform and the strength of our execution in a supportive freight market. This morning, we released our Q1 2026 results, and we are pleased with the performance. However, before I go into the details of the quarter, I would like to take a step back and briefly talk about TORM and the foundation that underpins these results and continues to differentiate us in the market. Again, our performance was driven by a combination of strong freight rates, disciplined execution and the One TORM platform. While we remain attentive to global developments, we continue to align ourselves with market changes and believe we have a unique ability to react quickly to movements in spot prices. This is something we are often asked about. The answer is that it represents a quantifiable advantage over our peers, what we refer to as the One TORM advantage. It is now embedded in the way we operate and is a capability our competitors would undoubtedly like to replicate. Importantly, this advantage is the result of a journey over many years, a journey that continues to evolve. We are able to track this across a range of performance indicators. For example, over a 3-year period, our MR fleet generated TCE revenue that exceeded the peer average by approximately USD 200 million, reflecting the strength and efficiency of our operating model through higher utilization, disciplined cost control and strong commercial execution. This culture of operational excellence is supported by our centralized management platform that coordinates and accelerates our decision-making. This is good news for our investors because it means we are now extremely well placed for the complex landscape ahead, and we remain confident that the shifting stance of geopolitical uncertainty continue to present opportunities for us. Thus, it's no surprise to us that TORM share are currently in focus among the investment community as a rout to unlock value from this uncertainty. And now please to Slide #4. As always, I'll start with the key financial outcomes for the quarter to give you a clear picture of how the business is developing. During the first quarter, we delivered TCE of USD 286 million, representing a clear continuation of the positive earnings trajectory seen over recent quarters. This was significantly higher than the same quarter last year, driven by consistently firm freight rates throughout the period, which strengthened further towards quarter end. These additions reflect a value chain currently characterized by abnormal trade flows and structural inefficiencies, resulting in elevated margins, not only for tanker companies like us, but also for our customers who are capturing strong profitability across the trading and refining segments. That top line performance translated into an EBITDA of USD 201 million and a net profit of USD 122 million, reflecting both the strength of the market environment and our ability to convert rates into earnings through disciplined commercial execution and operational leverage. Supported by the continued strength we see across our markets and the solid momentum entering the remainder of the year, we are therefore increasing our full year guidance to USD 1.15 billion to USD 1.45 billion, underscoring our confidence in sustaining profitable growth. Also, we continued active fleet renewal, adding younger secondhand vessels and committing further acquisitions while divesting older tonnage. After quarter end, we also agreed to acquire 6 MR resales with expected delivery of 4 in 2027 and 2 in 2028. These acquisitions further enhance fleet flexibility and earnings capacity while preserving a prudent age profile. As of quarter end, our fleet consisted of 95 vessels. Once all the beforementioned transactions are completed, the fleet will increase to 103 vessels on a fully delivered basis. Please turn to Slide 5. Before moving to the broader market, let me briefly address our current operating status. Safety remains our highest priority. We currently have 1 vessel inside the Persian Gulf, and I'm pleased to say that the crew are doing well, morel is high and provisions are not an issue. As we will describe on this call, the market impact has been significant, tightening effective supply and contributing to the sharp increase in freight rates. Bunker prices have also moved higher, although availability remains secure. Throughout this period, our approach has been clear and unchanged. We take a safety-first approach in all operating decisions. Please turn to Slide 7. Following a strong close to 2025, product tanker markets entered the first quarter of 2026 with rates stabilizing at levels well above historical averages. This strength was supported by broader momentum in the crude tanker market, which benefited from record volumes of cargo on the water as well as the return of Venezuelan exports to the compliant fleet and generally more cautious use of sanctioned vessels globally. And on top of this, the development was further supported by the consolidation of the ownership in the VLCC segment. The outbreak of the U.S., Israel, Iran war in late February and the subsequent closure of the Strait of Hormuz marked a further and unprecedented escalation in tanker rates. This is clearly reflected in our commercial performance with Q2 average bookings to date above USD 70,000 per day across vessel sizes. Taken together, these dynamics have created one of the strongest cross-segment market environments we've seen in several years, underpinned by both structural and event-driven factors. And kindly turn to the next slide, turn to Slide 8, please. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz had an immediate and profound impact on global energy flows. Approximately 14% of global clean petroleum product volumes and around 30% of crude oil movements that would normally transit the Strait were suddenly constrained. Combined, this corresponds to approximately 20% of global daily oil consumption. In scale and immediacy, this represents the largest oil supply disruption the market has ever experienced. On the clean product side, the impact was uneven. Naphtha and jet fuel were disproportionately affected, reflecting the Persian Gulf's central role in global exports, accounting for 37% of global naphtha exports and 21% of jet fuel under normal conditions. Diesel and gasoline were relatively less exposed. As the next slide will show, only a fraction of these lost volumes have been replaced so far, underscoring how structural this shock has been. Please turn to Slide 9. In crude markets, part of the lost Persian Gulf supply has been mitigated through pipeline redirection from Saudi Arabia and the UAE alongside increased flows from the Atlantic Basin. However, reduced crude availability at Asian refineries has forced meaningful run costs, which in turn has sharply reduced clean petroleum product exports from the region. By the end of April, global clean petroleum product trade was down by roughly 16% as incremental supply from Western markets proved insufficient to offset the loss of Middle Eastern and Asian exports. Crude oil trade saw a decline of similar magnitude. Despite this contraction in traded volumes, product tanker rates remained elevated. Some of this reflects longer replacement voyages and urgency premiums. But the more important explanation lies on the tonnage supply side, which I'll address on the next slide. And here, please turn to the next slide to Slide 10. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz cuased significant vessel dislocation with more than 200 crude and product tankers stranded inside the Persian Gulf. This equates to roughly 3% of the global product tanker fleet and 6% of the crude fleet. As vessels were rerouted towards regions with replacement volumes, we saw higher ballast ratios and materially increased inefficiencies. In simple terms, ships spending more time sailing empty to reach their next cargo. In the MR segment, increased East to West ballasting was partially offset by stronger West to East cargo flows as Asian product supply tightened. At the same time, we saw an unprecedented shift of LR2 vessels into crude trading, the so-called dirty-ups. By the end of April, the number of LR2s trading clean products had fallen by more than 50 vessels compared with the start of the year despite the delivery of 27 newbuildings. As a result, effective CPP trading fleet capacity declined by around 4% even before accounting for the vessels stranded in the Gulf. Please turn to Slide 11. It is, however, important to recognize that this migration of LR2s into crude trading began well before the Strait of Hormuz closure. Since 2025, the Aframax and LR2 segments have faced extensive vessel sanctioning, largely linked to Russian crude trades. In 2025 alone, more than 200 Aframax and LR2 vessels were sanctioned. This has created a growing disconnect between newbuilding deliveries and effective fleet growth. Since the start of 2025, nominal product tanker capacity is up 8%, yet the capacity actually trading in today is around 4% lower. The scale of sanctions is notable. 1 in 4 vessels in the combined Aframax LR2 segment is currently under U.S., EU or U.K. sanctions. This comes on top of an already balanced order book due to the high share of older vessels. With 60% of the sanctioned fleet older than 20 years, the prospect of these ships returning to the mainstream clean market, even if sanctions were lifted, appears increasingly limited. And now turn to Slide 12. Let me frame this slide with one central point. What we are facing is not a return to normal, but a structural market reset. First, on timing. The duration and persistence of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz remain uncertain despite recent diplomatic attempts to end the conflict. Currently, tanker transits through the Strait of Hormuz remain more than 95% below the pre-conflict levels. We don't know when transit will resume, and we're not speculating on the timing. That uncertainty is real, and we are managing the business responsibly with that reality in mind. What is equally important, however, is what happens after reopening. When transits resume, the market does not simply switch back to where it was. There will be tonnage dislocation and significant vessel repositioning as assets reenter trade lanes that have been disrupted for an extended period. That creates friction, inefficiency and volatility, conditions where agile operators outperform. At the same time, depleted strategic and commercial inventories will need to be rebuilt, a multiyear process that supports sustained activity rather than a temporary outlet. The UAE's recent exit from OPEC enables higher production, which is likely to accelerate the replenishment of global oil stocks. It's also important to remember that tanker market strength was already evident before the Strait of Hormuz closure. Those fundamentals were paused, not erased. From our perspective, the key is readiness. We have deliberately built an agile business platform that allows us to react immediately. So when the trade opens, we are well positioned to benefit from the market reset. Please turn to Slide 13. Now to conclude on the market, the tanker industry today is operating in an environment shaped by an unusually large and growing number of geopolitical factors. Trade routes, cargo flows, sanctions regimes and security considerations are all contributing to greater market inefficiency. Importantly, this is not new, but it has intensified. Since 2022, the number of geopolitical variables we are navigating has increased significantly, adding friction and complexity to global energy transportation. For the industry, inefficiency translates into longer voyages, dislocated tonnage and volatility. For well-positioned operators like us, it also creates opportunity, provided you have the scale, agility and discipline to navigate it effectively. And with that, I'll now hand it over to Kim, who will walk us through the numbers.