Craig Shesky
Analyst · Alliance Global Partners
Thank you, Gerard. For those in attendance or for those who have reviewed the presentation during Strategy Day, a lot of this is going to be familiar, but there was quite a bit of detail. So I'm now happy to go through some of the key points in our historic landmark pre- feasibility study and initial assessment in deeper detail. Project economic studies come with three levels of increasing confidence, an initial assessment, which gives you a sense of what the product could be within a broadband of plus or minus 50% cost estimate accuracy. We produced an IA in March 2021 over the NORI- D area. A prefeasibility study gives you a sense of what the project should be and then narrows that accuracy to within 5%. And last is the feasibility study that describes what the project will be with an even tighter cost accuracy band, and that's often the basis for project finance. So on August 4, we published two new studies, a PFS for NORI-D and a new IA that covers the rest of the resource in NORI and TOML. Together, these two studies should give you a good sense of what our first project should be in the NORI-D area and what the rest of the resource can be in terms of economics. So taking a step back and looking at the geographical areas that each study covers. The PFS covers NORI-D, the IA covers everything else, but neither study covers the additional ground that we've applied for under the U.S. law, where we know we have priority right. And our management team estimates these areas to have approximately 300 million tons of exploration potential, given the proximity to NORI-D and TOML A-F areas where we do have quite a bit of exploration data. So the results as of the middle of 2025, a total combined project [Technical Difficulty] comprised of an NPV of $5.5 [Technical Difficulty] of that, an additional $18.1 billion on NPV for everything else. So let me zoom in a little bit on the feasibility study, or PFS. The estimated amount of recoverable modules for the study is 164 million wet tons. Assumed production start date is Q4 2027 with the life of mine just over 18 years. Annual production in steady state was modeled at 10.8 million tons of wet nodules and steady state for the PFS is defined as the year's 2031 through 2043. Offshore, this level of steady-state production is going to require four converted drillships. In onshore, we assume processing in existing RKEF, rotary kiln electric arc furnace in Asia, and then building refining capacity in the United States. We expect to start relatively small towards the end of 2027, then gradually renameplate capacity [Technical Difficulty] before adding a second vessel in 2030 and then ramping up to steady state with four vessels by 2031, hitting our nameplate capacity of 12 million tons per year in a few of years of production. But again, on average, during that steady state, 10.8 million tonnes per annum. We expect to generate almost $600 per dry ton of nodules during steady-state production. As one might expect, it's not a smooth line prior to the construction of U.S. refineries, the revenue per dry tonne will be a bit lower, a bit less than $500 per ton in 2032, for example. And then by the end of the 2030s, with two U.S. refineries running, expected revenue per ton is approximately $640. Overall, the revenue mix is expected to be quite similar to what we shared with the market over the last several years based on the initial assessment on NORI-D from 2021. 45% of revenue coming from nickel products, 28% from manganese, 17% from copper and a 9% cobalt is the smallest contributor to revenue. So where does all of that put TMC on the cost curve? Well, including the valuable byproducts, which are estimated to account for about 55% of total revenue, our C1 nickel cash costs are just over $1,000 per ton, and that's lower than nearly all producers outside of Russia, including most Indonesian producers. Even on an all-in sustaining cost basis, our nickel costs, including byproduct credits, would be just over $2,500 per ton. Said simply, we will be profitable in nearly any nickel price environment. With steady state revenue per dry ton of just under $600 and OpEx per ton of $340, which also accounts for corporate overhead and royalties, we arrive at our EBITDA margin per ton expected to be about 43% or $254 per ton during the steady state years defined as 2031 to 2043. During that time, of course, we expect to transition from mainly selling matte from Asia to then selling higher-value refined products like nickel sulfate, cobalt sulfate and copper cathode in the United States. So the early 2030s would see EBITDA margins in the low 30s. But by 2040, that EBITDA margin is closer to 50%. And this anticipated ramp-up in profitability makes it worthwhile to spend on the onshore refinery CapEx after we begin production, while also taking a huge step towards helping the U.S. establish mineral independence. So how are we going to develop these commercially viable operations? Well, the March 2021 initial assessment for NORI-D envisioned $7 billion of upfront CapEx, of which $2.2 billion was for offshore vessel CapEx. For the prefeasibility study, we've been able to bring that offshore preproduction number down to less than $500 million for the offshore component. And where possible, we've assumed contracting the services we need and only deploying CapEx where without deploying CapEx ourselves, we wouldn't be able to get the service. And as a result, our development CapEx assumes for $4.4 billion onshore for construction of the refining capacity to match the offshore production. This approach ensures that we can deliver critical products to the U.S. as contemplated by NOAA regulations while significantly increasing our payables by producing a higher-value product, again, nickel sulfate, cobalt sulfate before any U.S. refineries are built. We have an opportunity to either give offtake to Korea Zinc for alloy and matte on the condition that processed materials are returned to the U.S. or we control through their facility and return processed materials to the U.S. ourselves. Because we've not yet developed the definitive agreements with Korea Zinc, some of the production is left at the alloy and matte level. And as far as the U.S. refining capacity, well, we're aiming to build that together. And many of the meetings that Gerard talked about and many that we expect to occur in the coming months are to give that effect. But as I said earlier this month during the Strategy Day, we're not going to bite off more than we can chew. And we do expect to be in production and producing significant revenue prior to green lighting any such onshore spending. In fact, approximately $4.2 billion of this $4.4 billion onshore CapEx estimate is assumed to be spent in the 2030s, well after we've been in production for some time, generating significant revenue. Moving on to the initial assessment. That second study shows the potential of the resource beyond NORI-D, effectively the rest of NORI and TOML. And the estimated amount of recoverable modules for the initial assessment is 670 million tons wet. Assumed production start date is 2037 with the life of mine of 23 years. This initial assessment assumes contracted services offshore with eight production vessels, each equipped with three collectors at 20 meters each. So putting it all together, adding up the NPV of $18.1 billion for the IA and $5.5 billion for the pre-feasibility study, we arrived at the total estimated resource NPV of $23.6 billion. And over the life of both projects, on an undiscounted basis, revenue of approximately $369 billion and EBITDA in excess of $200 billion and a position in the first quartile of the cost curve that makes this model very difficult to break across any commodity cycle. And yet, despite the undeniable quality and size of this resource and our expected position in the first quartile of the cost curve, we feel we remain undervalued compared to peer developers and explorers. On the left side of this page, you'll see a TMC valuation example, which again is purely for illustrative purposes. Using a slight premium to the upper end of the nickel developer and explore valuations and you apply that to the PFS NPV of $5.5 billion, which keep in mind, in that PFS, we expect to have a more defensible cost curve position and generally lower CapEx per ton than many of those peers. And then you add to that the average nickel developer or explorer valuation multiplied by the initial assessment NPV, you get to a total illustrative market value based on comps of approximately $10 billion, which would be over $20 per share. From there, you can see on the right side of this page, what nickel or copper producers trade at as a multiple of net asset value. And this shows the potential for multiple expansion as production approaches and then begins. So moving on to our liquidity profile. At June 30, TMC had pro forma cash of approximately $120 million. Now the headline in our filings for both our press release and our 10-Q was $115.8 million, but that $120 million includes the final registered direct offering proceeds, warrant exercises and unsecured credit facility payments made just a few days after quarter end. So by July 4, it was $120 million. And as we disclosed last quarter, our S-3 shelf registration statement capacity has been used and current ATM expires in the fourth quarter of this year. So again, TMC expects to refresh the S-3 and ATM before year-end as a matter of good corporate housekeeping. The ATM was last used on April 17, 2025, and this was prior to the second quarter strategic capital raises. On to the financial results. In the second quarter of 2025, TMC reported a net loss of $74.3 million or $0.20 per share compared to a net loss of $20.2 million or $0.06 per share for the same period 2024. The net loss for the second quarter of 2025 included exploration and evaluation expenses of $10.5 million versus $12.4 million in Q2 2024. General and administrative expenses of $11.5 million versus $7.9 million in Q2 2024, and other items totaling $52.3 million versus a slight gain in Q2 2024. Exploration and evaluation expenses decreased by $1.9 million in the second quarter of 2025 compared to the same period in 2024, primarily due to a decrease in mining, technological and process development activities partially offset by an increase in share-based comp due to the amortization of the fair value of restricted stock units and options granted to officers in the second quarter of 2024. G&A expenses increased by $3.6 million in the second quarter of 2025 compared to the second quarter of 2024, mainly due to an increase in share-based compensation as a result of the amortization of the fair value of RSUs and options granted to directors and officers in the second quarter of last year as well as an increase in consulting costs pursuant to the U.S. regulatory path and other financing activities. Other items significantly impacted the net loss in the second quarter of 2025, include the Nauru warrant costs, change in the fair value of warrant liability and foreign exchange movements. Moving on to free cash flow. Free cash flow for the second quarter of 2025 was negative $10.7 million compared to negative $12.2 million in the second quarter of 2024. Net cash used in operating activities was $10.7 million for the second quarter, primarily due to higher payments to campaign eight vendors in the comparative period, and this was partially offset by an increase in environmental payments. Free cash flow is a non-GAAP measure, and I would like to point you to the non-GAAP reconciliation table included in the slide deck on our website. We do believe that the cash on hand is going to be more than sufficient to meet working capital and CapEx requirements for at least the next 12 months from today. In the first half of 2025, of course, we had a significant increase in the cash balance following the receipt of funds of $85.2 million from the Korea Zinc partnership, $35 million net proceeds from the registered direct offering, $14.8 million from the ATM use in the first half of the year, and $6.9 million from various stock option and warrant exercises. A portion of these proceeds was used to repay the $7.5 million Allseas working capital loan, along with outstanding interest prior to its maturity. Our accounts payable and accrued liabilities balance as at June 30, 2025, was $47.1 million, and this includes $32.4 million owed to Allseas for various services provided, again, the majority of which can be settled in equity at TMC's discretion. The significant increase in warrant liability is due to the increase in the fair value of private warrants reflecting the significant increase in the company's share price. So with that, operator, we'll turn it back over to you and take some questions from those on the line.