Joseph L. Hooley - State Street Corp.
Operator
Let me start that one, Alex. This is Jay. The – I thought the treasury report I'm sure everybody's gone through it by now was a pretty balanced report with regard to ways to recalibrate and fine-tune some of the Dodd-Frank and Volcker legislations. So, I think, it was a good framework. And hopefully, once we get some of these appointments with the Fed and other agencies, they'll start to attack that. For us, we have a pretty narrow set of concerns and issues. The most prominent one is the one you mentioned, which is the drag that excess deposits have on the leverage ratio. And that is prominent, not only in that report, but in all the conversations that I have with regulators. Everybody, I would say, acknowledges that, that was an unintended consequence of the regulations. So I think there's a real desire to fix it. The fix, the conversation around a fix is kind of two dimensional. One way to adjust the excess deposit issue for the trust banks would be simply to rescale the leverage ratio and that's one of the conversations out there so that you'd give the custody banks a little bit more headroom to accept these deposits. And at the same time, put in place some kind of a provision so that in a crisis or in a market event that we get relief from the leverage ratio. So that's one kind of conversation, which would tend to just deal with the trust bank issues of the leverage ratio. And then the broader thought out there is to reduce the denominator of the leverage ratio to accommodate central bank deposits, and that's, remember, that Bank of England took that approach in their leverage ratio. I'd say, and obviously that would treat not only the trust banks but the other, the rest of the banking industry as well. Those are the two paths that are being discussed. I think it's going to depend on, again, new appointments and getting people in place and figuring out what the best way to deal with it is. But I have very high confidence. I can't tell you when that the issue will be addressed because I think it's acknowledged in all circles that it was an unintended consequence of the regulations. With regard to the broader regulatory reform agenda, as I say, our needs, our issues are narrow. I think more broadly though if we get to extended cycles on the resolution and recovery plan, if in CCAR, they held the balance sheet flat, all that would be additive to not only the cost of complying with regulation, but as you rightly mentioned, freeing up capital within State Street. Eric, I don't know if you'd add anything to that.