Christopher A. Viehbacher
Management
All right. Thank you, Sébastien. And good morning/good afternoon, everybody. So we had a lot going on in the quarter and obviously I think the context is important to understand. I mean I think the first factor we need to get out of the way is of course the H1N1 sales that were incurred in the first quarter of 2010. I think last year we signaled very clearly that this was non-recurring revenue. I seem to remember answering a question last year from someone who said, how should we value the sales of H1N1? And I think my response was put a multiple of one on it. So I think we were pretty clear last year that we weren’t likely to see those sales come about and that’s the case. So if, obviously we can come back to it, but I think for the sake of simplicity, for all of the numbers we present, we’re going to assume that H1N1 is out of it, to give a better sense of what the underlying performance is. Obviously, as Sébastien said, this is also the first quarter where we’re consolidating Merial sales, but then of course we’ve always done the comparators on that. So with that out of the way, when we look at the business, I mean, welcome to the patent cliff. We’re right in the middle of it. And yet actually if I look at the first sales we’re still moving ahead as a company. And I think that’s an important achievement, and I’ll show you a little bit what the effect is. But there is clearly the transition going on. We’re moving away from the sales of the traditional growth drivers and more and more this company is looking like our growth platforms. So again, that first slide says, excluding the H1N1 sales, you can see that the sales growth was pretty much flat. Now, given how much we have seen lost, I think it was $500 million in the quarter on generic sales, we have been able to compensate that. So the next two slides, I think, for me outline really what’s been going on in the company more than anything else I can say. So this slide, I took the sales of all the products that either have gone generic or are about to go generic over the period 2009 really to 2012. And the first thing you notice is the list. I mean, the interesting thing about Sanofi is that up until 2009, we actually didn’t really have much exposure to generics. This is one of the few companies in the industry that really never had significant generic erosion until so late in the game. However once we start, we really do it in a big way. And we probably have one of the most concentrated patent cliffs of anybody in the industry, if you look down that list of all those products, that’s quite a substantial list. And they’re pretty much all of the things that probably 3, 4 years ago we were talking about as driving our business. So when you look at the bar chart to the right, then you add up the sales of those products. You see that in the first quarter 2009, which was actually the very first quarter that I presented to you, we still had €2 billion of sales of those products. Now we fast forward to the first quarter of 2011, and you see that €2 billion has melted to about €945 million. So there’s a couple of messages. First is that, we are obviously already a long way into the cliff. We’ve got a fair bit of it already behind us. And that amounts to over €1 billion. In the space of two years, we have lost on a quarterly basis €1 billion in sales. You can see that there is still some to go, and most of what you see there is largely around Aprovel in Europe, there is Eloxatin in there. And those are probably the two biggest blocks of that, because as you all know, Plavix and Aprovel in the U.S. are not consolidated in sales, and are not included in this analysis. But there is evidence of the cliff. That we can’t do much about; that everybody has foreseen for years in advance and that was the challenge facing us strategically back in that quarter. At the same time that I was presenting those Q1 2009 sales, though, we were already talking about the strategy to develop that, and that was largely around the development of these growth platforms. So now we are two years later and what happened to those? And I think there has been an awful lot of skepticism about whether or not any company could really match the significant decline in sales of such a concentrated patent cliff. And my view is that that patent cliff and the imminence of that has been the major factor on the share price. But you can see that in Q1 2009, when we added the sales of that up, those amounted to €3 billion. Now, there’s a little footnote on the €3 billion, because obviously in Q1 2009, we weren’t consolidating any sales of Merial. If you add our 50% of Merial then that number would be €3.3 billion. So that’s where we were, because obviously in the meantime we’ve acquired the other half of Merial. So in a lot of ways, I would personally take €3.3 billion as the baseline for that Q1. Now again, fast forward to Q1 of 2011, and you can see that that €3.3 billion has grown to €4.6 billion. So we’ve lost €1 billion on a quarterly basis. But we have made up with €1.3 billion in sales. So, and those growth platforms, first of all, in absolute size, are significantly bigger even in 2010 than what we were facing on the patent cliff. And by the time you get to Q1 2011, we were up €4.6 billion of business that’s growing and €900 million that will decline over the next couple of years. The other thing is the €4.6 billion represent already today 60% to the company sales. Where were we back in 2009? Less than 40%. Now there’s two phenomena behind that. Obviously, one is the significant growth of the platforms and two is obviously the decline of the businesses coming off patent. Nonetheless, I think a business that got 60% of its baseline growing at 15% and you got another €900 million that will decline, and the rest of that is largely stable. Then, to me, that gives me a sense that even without Genzyme, because none of these numbers have any Genzyme numbers in them, I would add. This gives me a lot of confidence that we can not only come through the patent cliffs, but when we come through the patent cliffs with a different structure of sales, which are far less dependent on patents, and which have a greater longevity associated with them. This is what we had set out to do two years ago and so as I look at this two years later, I think the company has made significant progress. Now if you look at the bottom line, essentially we’ve been able to do the same thing. So Q1 business EPS was €1.66, about €0.20 of that was related to H1N1. So without the H1N1, we’re still at 6% lower, but considering the significant impact of the generics, it’s a reasonably close proximity of that and it’s certainly within the range of the guidance that we had for the business. And of course to do that, that’s largely been because of our cost reduction program and of course we are on track to do the €2 billion by the end of this year rather than 2013. I know there will be a question about, well, what’s the next step in the cost reduction? And we’ll update that when we come to our strategic seminar later in the year because I think now we can start to roll in not only what we want to do at Sanofi, but we’ll have a clearer view of what we we’re going to do on synergies, not only with Genzyme but also with Merial, because Merial has clearly changed in where we are and so – we can even go to the slide on Merial. Merial has been a joint venture for many years, as you know, really it was a joint venture for 12 years with Merck. Not consolidated in the accounts, but also a business in which a company like Sanofi was more closely related to being to a shareholder than active management. Over the years I think there was kind of a fluctuation as to the amount of engagement at a management level between the parent companies and the joint venture. But it’s a company that is a fully standalone company, has its own offices, own production, own research and development, own commercial organization. And so now that it is a 100% owned affiliate, I think there are opportunities to seek some synergies. Now, the synergies we’re talking about I think are beyond the obvious, so some of the back-office such as IT systems and things like that. I think one of the most interesting things is to see how we can find, for example, some of the synergies at a research and development and level. The birth of animal health largely came out of products that were being sold for humans that also worked in animals. Maybe you had to change the dosage for them, maybe you had to change the formulation, but that is how this business started and that’s certainly the business I knew 20 years ago when I first encountered animal health. We’ve gotten away from that a little bit, there hasn’t been much contact between the research and development organizations. You got major cancer centers already doing things like developing cancer treatments for melanoma. You may have seen some things in the press recently about the incidence of diabetes in dogs and cats. So I think before we go spend a euro of shareholder money, I mean, the first thing that we’re going to do is say, all right, what can we do organically to really drive more growth out of the business and really realize some of the R&D synergies. Second is, the business is clearly a very strong business in companion animals, number one. Frontline is by far and away, the biggest product of anybody in this industry in animal health. We do have some strong double-digit growth in emerging markets. But I think if we’re honest, we have to say that we’re not where we would really like to be in emerging markets. Now I know an organization that’s extremely strong in emerging markets and that’s of course Sanofi. And so I think we need to look and see what can we do using the footprint, not necessarily in terms of reps, but certainly as a platform for thinking about how we can invest, pay attention to business development, use our government relations expertise, use some of the back-office facilities to think about expanding and reduce some of the infrastructure costs so that we could more money back into the growth of the business. So there’s clearly areas on that. Beyond that, we’re not where we would like to be in production animals either in terms of really just balance of the portfolio. There is a some very interesting businesses in there. We have poultry vaccines for example, and other types of vaccines. But the business is really clearly dominated by Frontline and Heartgard. And so over time, I think we would like to get – to have a more balanced portfolio. Hanspeter Spek is going to talk about this in a moment, but I’ve asked Hanspeter to work with Merial and really over the next couple of months, really do a deep dive strategically into how we can think about building on this business as we go forward. I don’t think we’re going to be doing big acquisitions. I think the experience we have with the Intervet transaction suggests that big types of transactions may be difficult in terms of obtaining regulatory approvals. To the extent that there are assets out there, then I think we’ll be certainly interested in doing the business development. But at the same time if I look at the first quarter results, we’ve had some very interesting double-digit growth. And so I don’t think we’re in an urgent need to actually go do something. We’re a number three company, we’ve got a – I think a strong company there. We’ve got opportunities to drive more organic growth than what we’ve been doing. So and I guess I’ll just finish by saying, when I look at how many people wanted to bid for the assets that we might have had to dispose of during the potential merger between Merial and Intervet, it certainly was confirmation to me that this is a hot space to be in and that strategically it’s a right choice to be there. And of course, the other major event in the quarter was Genzyme. And we’ve already provided a lot of information in there. And we’ve talked about the business accretion, I’ll come back on that. And we tried to give you some medium-term where we think the accretion is going to be. I think the interesting thing for me just on a financial basis is, it’s a no brainer just on the basis of what we see as a significant return on investment on a cost of capital that is below 2% pre-tax. So this is certainly going to help us on showing a return. I think the interesting thing is also that, as we look back, I mean, we had valued Genzyme significantly higher on an intrinsic basis than the market price at that time. So for us, we see Sanofi as being able to capture a significant percentage, and much higher than the traditional percentage, of the synergies. Now we’re just going through this, because the really important next step is integration. And it is absolutely clear that a biotechnology company with 10,000 people, it’s got a different DNA than a big pharmaceutical company with 100,000 people. I think we’re being smart enough to recognize the difference and are trying to take an approach, which really makes sure we understand all of the levers of the different businesses, and that we’re sensitive, I think, to the differences in culture, and to the fact that we don’t necessarily want to impose Sanofi culture on Genzyme. And in fact, what I would really like to see, are elements of Genzyme’s culture be infused back into Sanofi. And I would particularly cite two things. One is the extraordinary patient-centric culture that is obvious the day you walk into a Genzyme office and have a conversation with someone from Genzyme. And the second is really the research approach that they have and Elias can talk more about that. But I think there are some things that we can learn that could be helpful as we look at how we evolve our own research activities within Sanofi. But clearly we took some risk in doing this acquisition last year. In the middle of last year when we initially launched this, this was just shortly after the consent decree. Now I will tell you that to me, obviously, this is a business where we deal with risk every day. My view of this risk was that I’d rather face a risk that is fixable than one that is not. Buying a company just for its research and development portfolio is a risk that is difficult to fix if it turns out to be wrong. I mean, you can’t fix that in a couple of years. Manufacturing though, especially – and we have an awful lot of biological manufacturing capability, people don’t know it, but quite honestly, there are not a lot of similarities particularly between what Sanofi does and what Genzyme does. And so I think we can actually provide some additional resource. At the same time, I think Genzyme has brought in some very strong people, both Scott Canute and Ron Branning, who have come in the last year, have done wonders in terms of really getting the manufacturing turned around. Stock levels are clearly not where we want to be, and I think as a result, we still are exposed to risk if there is any kind of hiccup in manufacturing. We clearly don’t have the levels of inventory to cover that if we need to. That having been said, I think Cerezyme seems to be largely stabilized. We’ve got one of the highest levels of inventory that we’ve had in two years time. And really I think that that looks good. If I look at Q2 sales for example, all of the bulk was produced in Q1. And in Q2, because we obviously had, there was a hiccup when we provided you with revenue information for Genzyme in Q1. We haven’t consolidated that because that wasn’t part of the Sanofi Group in the first quarter. But you can see that there was a hiccup on the release of two batches, one for Cerezyme, one for Fabrazyme. Both of those are a result of fill and finish issues and both of those are related to the infamous fill and finish facility at Allston. What we can say is that it is the intention of the Group to no longer do any fill and finish in Allston, and we’re able to now do all of the fill and finish at Hospira. And so, therefore I think the risk of a repeat of what we’ve seen in Q1 in terms of batch release, has reduced. It’s never risk free and until we get up to 4, 5 months levels of stock, I don’t think we will be there. But having been said, I think the Genzyme forecast that we should be in a position to supply existing patients with a full dose of Fabrazyme seems like a reasonable forecast at this stage from what we know. And again I think all of the resource that is needed is going into that, I mean in the last year or so Genzyme has recruited over 300 people, for example, in quality assurance to deal with both the consent decree and with the ongoing quality issues. LEMTRADA, you’ve seen some data on that, and Elias will say more. I think the next milestone for that is a Phase III result coming out in July. We have an identification of synergies ongoing. I will say that the good surprise that we’ve had is that we so far haven’t seen any bad surprises. And that’s important. At the same time I think there are opportunities for revenue synergies, which we certainly haven’t taken into account and which I think seem quite tangible and I can go into that in the Q&A. But I think we want to spend a little time really to understand the opportunity. We have a culture work stream to be specifically oriented around the differences that we have. And to me, the biggest objective I have is really making sure that we convince Genzyme people that a new Genzyme within a Sanofi group will have the same mission and objectives as Genzyme stand-alone, except that there is the power of Sanofi behind it. To demonstrate my commitment, I’ve taken the unusual step of, at least on an interim basis, stepping into the CEO role of Genzyme until we finalize decisions. We would expect the finalization of the integration-planning Phase to be about the end of June. I won’t say anything about the detail of this, you can see the slide of the upcoming milestones, other than to say really that I remember the first time we presented this slide, and I think there might have been two or three bullet points. In fact, we used to have to scramble to see what could we put on this. And so I think it’s an encouraging sign of progress that the slide is getting fuller and harder to read. And I won’t say more (inaudible) but clearly I think a Sanofi post-Genzyme has also got a different R&D outlook and there are a number of growth assets, both in the marketplace, as well as potentially coming through. Plus, let’s not forget, we’re seeing some good news coming out of Sanofi’s own portfolio. So by no means are we declaring victory on this, but encouraging progress. And so the last slide I’ll say is really on our outlook for the year. H1N1 is a Q1 phenomenon. As of today, there is still no generic of Eloxatin and the court orders have held. That remains an uncertainty for the year. As of today, there is also only one generic of Lovenox, we don’t have any information really, other than what you do, as to when a second generic might come. In the first quarter of this year, we also did not have a generic, for most part, of Taxotere and that was a benefit to the company. So as we look at this in terms of guidance it’s never been our habit to update guidance after Q1. I remember a former boss of mine used to say, two swallows don’t make a spring. And I think one quarter doesn’t make a year. So I’m not about to change the guidance of Sanofi stand-alone. I mean I think it’s fair to say though, that particularly given a little bit of a tailwind from not having a generic for Taxotere in the first quarter, that we’re performing pretty well as Sanofi stand-alone. Jérôme will talk more about Genzyme, all we can say really about Genzyme at the moment is that without allowing for any synergies, whatsoever, and based on current forecasts, which we’ve kind of made more realistic I think, mechanistically, that would be about 3% to 4% without synergies. If there is obviously changes in yields, that might have a positive benefit, and we’ll have a better idea about what synergies might be achievable and what timeframe, by the time we come to the mid-year. But again, I’ll leave this to Jérôme to say more on that. So with that, I’ll turn it over to Hanspeter Spek, who can give us a little bit more detail on some of our growth platforms and the progress of our business.