On October 13th, you heard from the Mylan Management team and Board of Directors. They outlined four key claims which have little basis in reality. On slide 22, you can see Mylan's distortion of the facts versus the reality we're going to remind you of today. One, this also represents a discount to our superior, multiple and a substandard premium. Two, this is not an accretive transaction. In fact, it is dilutive to Mylan EPS until at least the year four. Three, there is virtually no alignment between our businesses that would service the basis for generating at least $800 million in synergies. Four, Mylan would ultimately destroy value that belongs to Perrigo shareholders' accordance of metrics, yielding a lower trading multiple and a lower growth rate. I'm going to take a few minutes to talk you through each of these elements now in greater detail. As we noted before, Mylan claims they are entering a robust multiples that you can see on slide 23 that previous transactions involving comparable company's and industry have provided significant premium evaluation to shareholders. But Mylan doesn't just falls short to come. It implies no premium to Perrigo's durable trading multiples, a multiple that Perrigo has earned through a superior track record. In their presentation Mylan attempts to discredit Perrigo's valuation. The reality as you can see on slide 24 is that we train like our consumer and peers. And have done so consistently over time. When you're comparing us to Mylan and its peers, the different is stock. Our consumer facing business puts us at a sustainable competitive advantage to Mylan and its generics peers, and positions us well as I said earlier to perform through recent pharmaceutical industry volatility. Slide 25 further underscores the gap in valuation of our two companies, which has been a consistent one over time. Recently Mylan has fallen well below its peers, down over 25%, since they chase that rate. A change that can't just be explained by market volatility and noise. We are the only ones who have notice that Mylan may be the only company in the S&P 500 without a realistic expectation of a takeover premium. Corporate governance is not just a standby. It has real value ramifications and boils down to a simple fact. We have historically traded at a premium to Mylan. We deserve to trade at a premium to Mylan and we will continue to do so in the future. Why would we want to expose our shareholders to a stock that is trading and justifiably so as a nine times multiple? Mylan claims this transaction would be "meaninglessly accretive to shareholders" They do so by inventing yet another creative interpretation of well understood terms. As you can see on slide 26, no matter what words they attempt to put around it simply can't hide that this is the dilutive transaction for Mylan shareholders. If you tender, this is the stock you will receive. As ISS rightfully point out, why would shareholders take on the risk of a management team that does not offer accretion until at least year four? Mylan claims that they are well positioned to capture the benefits of the proposed transaction. On slide 27 you can see the limited opportunities for synergies as well as a significant integration and execution risk. Our consumer-facing business represent approximately 75% of our offering expenses in that sales. Mylan has virtually no presence in the consumer-facing space which makes vertical integration and streamlining a completely unrealistic way of attending synergies. Of all Mylan's API they have only six that would support production of the 4,900 OTC products we make. They don't make ibuprofen, they don't make [indiscernible] and they don't make acetaminophen. Meanwhile, Robert Coury in the Mylan team have tried to indicate that they are well-positioned to capture cost of goods sold synergies through vertical integration. This is simply not the case and it demonstrates the truth. They don't understand this business. As a shareholder, you need to ask yourself do you really think Mylan without any experience in the space can run Perrigo's world-class OTC supply chain and operations better and more profitably than we can. In their presentation, Mylan indicates that their fourth tenant is "immediate value for Perrigo shareholders." As we and other third-parties see it this is a bad deal. We have a consumer facing business at a time when questions have been raised about prescription prices. We want nothing more than to have the Mylan Offer and to be able to deliver leading shareholder returns without being tied to Mylan's anemic prospects. Our shareholders can do better than have their fortunes tied to Mylan's. Ultimately, our respective historical long-term returns speak for themselves. Again, I have to ask, why would you trade our stock for their? On slide 30 you can see that the guidance we put forth earlier today for 2015 and 2016 is underscored by the consistency of our track record in delivering earnings growth. Historically we've delivered in EPS compound annual growth rate of 19% and every year we have done so on an increasingly bigger base. This is a leading growth rate that distinguishes us in the marketplace. And you can see on slide 31 that we are confident this trend will continue. Further, we're committed to leveraging our earnings growth to return value to our initiative like the share repurchase plan we announced today. And this is even before we include the additional upside from future strategic M&A. I'd like to walk through the building blocks on slide 32 to give you greater clarity on the financial tree. Perrigo today offers you greater value than the Mylan offer on the table. Let me explain. Mylan has reported $800 million in synergies by year four. Using basic math, if you assume 25% synergy achievement in 2016, the first year and a Perrigo shareholder ownership of 40%, this is $65 million in after-tax net income benefit in 2016 to Perrigo shareholders. In contrast, the optimization actions we announced today had an effective tax rate of between 14% and 15%, which generates $94 million in after-tax benefit going directly to Perrigo shareholders in 2016. So, to keep it very simple. Just by executing on our existing plans, Perrigo beats Mylan's numbers and Perrigo shareholders retain control of the company that has driven superior multiple year after year. Perrigo shareholders come out ahead in that income impact even before you consider capitalization. The stock difference in capitalization of our two company's only amplifies this difference. Why seek control of the company when standalone Perrigo can provide you more value. In their presentation, Mylan realized heavily on an inventive concept, a hypothetical unaffected share premium or HUSP, which is entirely self created and self serving. As you saw on the last slide you can see again on slide 33, our shareholders shouldn't be interested in a made up HUSP. They, like us, are looking at the very real and ATH. No matter how you run the numbers. Our implied value ranges from $190 to $202. But don't just take our word for it. These are industry estimates which come in at an average price of $203. All of these numbers represent a significant premium to what Mylan is offering which as of last night stands approximately $169 per share plus you retain full ownership in control without the transaction or executed risk – execution risks associated with Mylan's bad deal. And with that, I will turn it back to Joe.