Jeff Glajch
Analyst · UBS. Please go ahead
Thank you, Corning. On Slide 5, you can see the consolidated results for the fourth quarter. Beyond this slide, I will focus more on the full year, but the detailed quarterly financial and EBITDA loss for both businesses are in the appendix. For Q4, volume was up mainly from the specialty polymers market and from our new facility in China. This was partly offset by lower volume in the Americas. Revenue was essentially flat due to higher contractual pricing in our rubber business, offset by lower oil pricing in the quarter. Gross profit and gross profit per ton were down due to the cogeneration effects from the lower European electricity pricing and unfavorable product and geographic mix in both segments. In addition, higher maintenance turnaround activity, including Huaibei, the final EPA startup cost, and other timing items affected the quarter. Gross profit per ton was up slightly in rubber versus Q4 last year, but down sequentially at $357. Rubber gross profit was weak due to several reasons. First, volume was slightly up, but we had more volume in China and less in the Americas. This geographical swing adversely impacts gross profit. Second, the expected impact on cogeneration from lower electricity prices in Europe. And finally, continued startup costs at Huaibei and the final EPA project, which hurt rubber gross profit level. Especially gross profit per ton was down very sharply versus prior year and sequentially at $492. While we had higher volume, it was primarily from the lower margin polymer market at Huaibei. This resulted in a less profitable product mix in the quarter. Specialty was impacted by the lower electricity prices in Europe, similar to rubber. European cogen effects are more impactful than specialty on a per ton basis, since global rubber volumes are 3x to 4x times down special. Finally, costs were up due to higher maintenance, startup, and timing related items. We'll talk more about how we expect specialty to recover in both the near and longer term in subsequent slides. One final item in the quarter, our tax rate was extremely high. This was due to a few items which impacted the full year tax rate, specifically a provision for a German tax audit going back to 2017, a prior year tax adjustment, and a full year true-up of our LTIP tax charges. The full year tax rate was 37%. We expect to be back near 30% for 2024. On to Slide 6. For the full year, the success of our 2023 rubber pricing negotiations helped us achieve a record adjusted EBITDA, despite numerous headwinds in both businesses. Customer demand weakened as the year progressed. Ultimately, volume was down across all regions except China. Electricity prices in Europe were dramatically lower from their elevated level in 2022. This alone had a $30 million impact on 2023 results. Without this impact, gross profit per ton would have been up $50 instead of $18. Mixed deteriorated due to the relative performance of our specialty end markets. With the exception of the printing market, we expect those markets to improve over time. Slide 7 provides a year-to-date EBITDA drivers. Strong pricing in rubber was offset by weaker volume across both businesses and less benefits from cogeneration. Last year's very high European electricity prices make for a difficult comparable. We also have Huaibei and EPA startup costs, related startup costs. On Slide 8, our rubber volume decrease was impacted by lower demand in the Americas and EMEA and lack of recovery in tire production in those markets. We experienced a higher gross profit per ton driven by the contractual price increases, but this was partially offset by the lower cogeneration pricing effects. It's important to note that our 2023 gross profit per ton was up 22% compared with 2022. As Corning noted, we had a successful 2024 pricing negotiation and expect next year's gross profit per ton to be in line with the full year 2023 levels. Slide 9 shows in a waterfall chart the effects of rubber as discussed on the previous slide. On to Slide 10. Volume was relatively flat, especially for the year, with weakness across most geographies and the printing market, offset by gains in China and the polymer market. All other financial metrics were down. The change in mix, as well as the reduction of cogeneration effects due to the lower European power pricing, contributed to the weaker results. As we look forward, we believe the following will move in a positive direction for specialty. Volumes will improve as we move toward mid-cycle conditions. Two, as volumes improve, we believe we'll have more pricing power. Three, mix should improve with business conditions and as a result of our debottlenecking of our premium products, it's early, but we're starting to see some promising signs. Four, the EPA and Huaibei startup costs are mainly behind us. And five, the battery market remains a significant upside for us. On to Slide 11, which shows in a waterfall chart those categories affecting specialty as discussed on the previous slide. Gross profit per ton decreased due to both geographic mix, which you see in volume, market mix of sales, which you see in mix, as well as lower cogeneration effects, which you see in costs. Importantly, for the specific mix of products that we sold in the quarter, our pricing has remained stable. Slide 12 looks at cash flow for the year. Our improved cash flow allowed us to both repurchase $66 million worth of shares and reduce our debt by $78 million. Our debt to EBITDA ratio now stands at 2.35x, down from nearly 3x just 18 months ago. As Corning mentioned earlier on the call, we spent $1.10 per share to repurchase stocks and $1.30 per share to reduce our debt. Our goal is to reduce our total debt, improve our net debt to EBITDA ratio, and continue to strengthen our balance sheet. We've made substantial progress in all of these areas over the past year. On Slide 13, we have transitioned to a dramatic increase in our discretionary cash flow conversion as we have stepped up our profitability and at the same time completing our EPA projects. Note that our 2023 conversion rate included $89 million in working capital improvement from changes in our customer agreements. We expect to maintain this benefit in 2024. Let's look at capital spending on Slide 14. Up through 2023, we had a significant CapEx related to our EPA report. This spending reduced in 2023 and is now behind us. With our increased EBITDA and no future EPA capital spending, we expect to focus on growth investments and high return projects as well as a sustained higher level of maintenance projects which will improve reliability. For 2024 and 2025, the majority of our growth CapEx will be for our conductives planned in LaPorte, Texas. We will also complete some high return debottlenecking projects in our specialty business. Other than LaPorte, the growth investments shown in 2025 carry us beyond our 2025 mid-cycle EBITDA capacity goals. We will prioritize those accordingly as we develop our 2025 capital plan later this year. The hash line for 2025 is a placeholder for those potential growth and productivity opportunities. These projects are not committed to at this point and again, we will prioritize them as part of our capital allocation process. Perhaps another way to look at this is between maintenance in LaPorte, we expect to spend approximately $140 million to $150 million of CapEx in 2025. The remaining $50 million to $60 million will be fully discretionary and are currently just a placeholder. On to Slide 15. Before we discuss our 2024 guidance, we want to provide an update on our progress toward our mid-cycle capacity goal of $500 million of EBITDA. We believe at mid-cycle, we would expect global economies and demand for our product to be at pre-COVID levels. We would not expect extraordinary pricing for carbon black, but rather pricing that would increase sufficiently to offset cost inflation. The volume level, which would correspond to plant utilization in the upper 80% range, would generate a rubber volume of 840kt to 860kt and 260kt to 280kt for specialty. The specialty volume excludes the incremental 12kt from LaPorte. For us to meet these volume levels, we do not require significant growth investment except the LaPorte project. We have achieved these volumes before and we are confident we can do it again. On Slide 16, we will have a midpoint of $350 million of EBITDA. To move from $350 million to $500 million, there are three major components. First off, the capital conductives business should add about $50 million. Most of that, 80% to 90%, comes from the LaPorte plant, which we expect to be on stream in mid-2025. The remaining $100 million gain is split $70 million in volume and $30 million in margin. The former is primarily recovering in our end markets to mid-cycle level. This includes approximately 80kt to 100kt in rubber and 20kt to 40kt in specialty compared with our estimates for 2024. Most of this capacity is already in place to achieve these volume levels. There's a portion of the specialty volume growth that requires completely debottlenecking projects for some high-end products. But again, most of the volume gains needed are for market improvement, not capacity increases. Using the midpoints, the 90kt of rubber volume would be at an incremental EBITDA per ton of approximately $400, very much in line with our current GP per ton and with minimal added cost, this math makes sense. For specialty, the incremental volume of 30kt is closer to $100 per ton. This volume is partly due to the recovering in our current market mix, which has a lower incremental profit plus volume gains in our higher-end products, including the debottlenecking projects that we have discussed in the past. This is not simply a math exercise. We have specific products in high-end markets that achieve these margin levels today. Finally, the $30 million of margin gains are pricing a mix. The $500 million target split roughly 60-40 between rubber and specialty. The details for each business are also in the appendix slides. With that, I will turn the call back over to Corning to discuss our 2024 guidance.