Nicholas O'Grady
Analyst · William Blair
Yes. Now, you're going to get me monologuing I mean I think, look, at the end of the day, our cash flows and profits are up several hundred million dollars since the beginning of the year, and the stock obviously is not. But I'll be candid about the perception challenge we face we are a non-op, which means at the end of the day, we buy and invest in oil and gas properties. In the public markets, we are rightfully or wrongfully compared against E&P operators. Their job is to manage production and spending and are judged accordingly. We ultimately should be managed by the investments we make and their value over time. That's tough admittedly when we typically buy and hold assets to life, but managing guidance is not the same thing as creating value. And I think there's a fundamental disconnect in the analyst community today. As many of you know, I spent 15 years on the buy side, and most of that time, the idea was to look at the company's asset value as a driver for ultimate equity value. This did get out of control during the pre-2014 kind of oil armageddon period when companies were valued for acreage without regard to the capital required to keep it, not to mention the fact that much of it wasn't worth what was assumed at the time. And look, I have a ton of respect for the analyst community and the market is at any moment what it is. But today, people rightfully or wrongfully are focused almost solely on quarterly guidance and free cash flow yields as they see them. 8 years ago, on my first call as the CFO, I literally discussed as one of the first people in the space openly to move the company to a self-generating cash position and to pay shareholders a fair and reasonable return. Don't get me wrong, free cash flow is really important. But the definition of it is very tricky and often misrepresented in a depleting business. I'll add that even those that do still attempt at NAV may not understand the differences between how we book reserves and inventory as a non-op compared to an operator, which are inherently different in the sense that we can't simply book inventory that we don't control the timing of, and we can't count locations before operators ultimately decide where they're spacing it. As Adam mentioned, we're one of the only E&P companies that actually budget for acquisitions in our regular budget every year. Most public E&Ps are not replacing their inventory. So what you call free cash flow is actually in reality of depleting annuity. And I don't think that's a fair comparison, which is why NAV should be an important part of the equation, what is in the end, effectively a depleting real estate business. So if you look at our reinvestment rate, of course, it's less immediately productive by design, but we continue to stack on assets. That's not capital efficiency as the market views it for the record. Over the last year, we spent over $100 million acquiring potentially north of 80 locations in the Utica. This does nothing but make us screen worse in the "capital efficiency" and "free cash flow metric", yet definitively adding asset value to the enterprise, albeit nonproductive at the moment. You can tell the -- and I can tell you the bonuses paid for that land are up, in some cases, 50-plus percent since we began that campaign. So no cash flow, just CapEx, but did we add value likely the answer is a resounding yes. As I stated in my prepared comments, screening leverage is another example. If we borrow money and buy an asset, the market has focused on the leverage as a negative when comping, but they don't recognize that now we have an asset that's worth a heck of a lot of money. And I can say with a lot of certainty that the current future values of our Uinta and Utica assets, which were funded with leverage are greater today than when we purchased them and likely grow further over time as the operators improve and delineate. Again, this is a business model viewpoint, we struggle to reconcile at times. We could be unlevered and screen better. We could only spend money on D&C capital and look better by these metrics. But at the end of the day, now we have these assets. And in virtually all the cases scarcity and quality has proven that the assets that we purchased are now appreciably more valuable. If we need to monetize them to prove to the market as a mechanism that the value since only cash yields are being used, we're fine with that. At the end of the day, our job is to maximize value. But it's a shame they're not analyzed for what they would be in virtually any private setting. Put it to you this way, if our assets were at the lowest end of our expectations, and we sold half, we'd take in roughly half our float and have 0 debt. That implies a stock value more than triple the current levels. So if the market wants to be singularly focused on production volume cadence versus expectations, a leverage multiple and a free cash flow yield, where 75% of the competing stocks are not replacing any inventory, but just depleting away. That's incredibly shortsighted when in reality, we're about owning and harvesting assets at good values. At the same time, we need to ensure the market understands how valuable all the assets we purchased have become. You have an insane dichotomy going on at the moment where people are paying north of $330,000 per acre and assets have never been so sought after at significant premiums to even a few years ago, and yet a public market that wants to give it away. But to be fair, when that happens, the [ onus ] is on us to prove it and make no mistake, we will. Back to you.