Ryan Corbett
Analyst · TD Cowen. Please proceed
Thanks, Jim. Let's turn to Slide 6 and review our full-year operational KPIs. Starting on the far left. We produced more than 41,500 tons of REO in concentrate in 2023, exceeding 40,000 tons for the third consecutive year, despite a significant focus on Stage II commissioning and ramp throughout the year. Sales volumes were down around 6,000 tons year-over-year, primarily due to the initial charging of our Stage II circuits with REO, as well as the consumption of REO in concentrate in the downstream circuits to produce NdPr and other separated products in the third and fourth quarters. Lower production volumes in Q4 as well as the timing of sales in 2022, also modestly impacted the comparison. Moving to the middle of the slide, our realized price declined significantly alongside a pullback in the price of NdPr in the market. Moving to the right, production costs increased $330 per ton, driven primarily by Stage II ramp activities, including longer plant turnarounds and the impact of descaling standalone concentrate production. Given a fair amount of our Stage I concentrate production costs are fixed, spreading those costs, as well as plant turnaround and general sitewide costs over smaller sales volumes results in this lower fixed cost absorption. Lastly, on the far right, we produced 200 metric tons of NdPr oxide in 2023, closing our inaugural year of Stage II production with a nice sequential lift in the fourth quarter as we guided to on our last call. Moving to Slide 7 and our full-year financials. Revenue in 2023 was impacted primarily by the decline in realized prices as well as the change in volumes previously discussed, as we ramped Stage II. The flow-through of pricing was the primary driver of the decline in adjusted EBITDA, in addition to the fixed cost absorption just discussed. Lastly, we continued to make certain modest investments in our corporate infrastructure, some of which will continue through the early part of 2024 before declining in the back half of the year, most notably an investment in a new SAP implementation that goes live in Q2. Despite the lower average price during the year, EBITDA margins were still quite robust at 40%. The change in adjusted diluted EPS was primarily impacted by the same drivers just discussed, in addition to higher depreciation brought on by additional assets, namely the rest of the Stage II circuits being placed into service during the year, partially offset by higher interest income on our cash balance and lower income tax expense. Turning to Slide 8 and our fourth quarter results. Concentrate production of 9,257 tons was down year-over-year, primarily due to higher downtime, both planned and unplanned in the quarter. Michael will expand on this in a moment. Concentrate sales volumes fell around 2,000 tons sequentially as we consumed more concentrate in Stage II circuits to produce NdPr and other refined products. Production costs increased $373 per metric ton sequentially from the combination of our longer more detailed plant turnaround, as well as the more pronounced descaling on our Stage I production costs in the quarter. For context on the plant turnaround expenses, we think about Stage I related facilities at Mountain Pass as essentially three interconnected operations with mining and crushing, beneficiation and tailings management, the primary targets along with sitewide infrastructure of our power plant, water treatment plant and others. With Stage II now in service, these turnarounds now encompass nine additional plants, including our drying and roasting circuits, leech, impurity removal, brine purification, separation circuits, and multiple product finishing circuits, as well as a corresponding increase in sitewide infrastructure and support functions. I cannot emphasize enough how well the maintenance and operations teams performed this quarter with all of these new demands. One further note on the production costs is that the Stage II portion is down sequentially and year-over-year as more of these costs are now building into inventory, following the NdPr product through the midstream refining and metallization processes versus being expensed through the P&L. Note also that some of our costs of goods sold in the quarter was related to our modest NdPr sales as well as other rare earth product sales and were not included in the production cost calculation. When you strip out all of the one timers and more difficult compares, we see baseline concentrate production costs up low-to-mid single digits year-over-year. Lastly, in the quarter, we determined that the carrying cost of a portion of our early separated product inventory exceeded its net realizable value based on the recent rapid decline in spot pricing. As we've spoken about in the past, our early cost of production of separated product is higher than our expected costs once we reach our full production levels given we are staffed for higher production rates, and early production often requires additional labor and certain rework that will not recur once operations normalize. This resulted in us taking a write-down of $2.3 million in the quarter, which was included in costs of sales in the P&L and impacted our adjusted EBITDA. More than half of this charge was related to lanthanum products, where our per unit cost of production is particularly sensitive to throughput, but where we aren't yet pushing to maximize volumes as we put the finishing touches on the logistics and supply chain to serve our North American lanthanum customers. These charges are not unexpected as we ramp the plant and may continue into Q1. That said, peeling back the onion and looking at the circuit-by-circuit cost profile gives us further confidence in achieving our expected per unit cost profile as we ramp towards run rate levels. Moving to Slide 9, you can see our revenue and adjusted EBITDA results again impacted mainly by pricing in our concentrate sales volumes as previously discussed. With regards to concentrate pricing specifically, assuming current spot prices hold for the remainder of the current quarter, we would expect a mid-teen sequential decline in first quarter realized concentrate pricing. As for NdPr oxide pricing and oxide equivalent prices for metal sales, we expect prices to reflect a more notable lag with Q1 prices based off of the Q4 average market price. We expect our realizations to be roughly in the middle of the calculated spot market price and the spot price net of Chinese VAT. Moving on to the balance sheet and our CapEx spend in 2023. We ended the year with just under $1 billion of gross cash and over $300 million of net cash each. As for CapEx, we spent $262 million on gross CapEx, or $259 million net of $2.8 million received from the Department of Defense. Net growth CapEx totaled $244 million with roughly $15 million of maintenance CapEx during the year. Regarding cash flow. 2023 was a year of significant investment in working capital, with some amount of permanent increases in work and process inventory from our commissioning and ramp-up of Stage II, as well as spare parts and raw materials as we endeavor to maintain the same world-class uptime levels in Stage II as we've seen in Stage I. Further working capital investment was also required in semi-finished goods to fill certain sales and toll processing channels with separated product inventory to maintain sufficient on-the-ground inventory for continuous metal production. These investments will set us up to meet our growing customer needs, particularly in Japan, and maintain operational flexibility. While some of that investment is therefore semi-permanent, some will indeed convert to revenue and cash flow starting in Q1 as we ramp our sales of NdPr metal to Japan, which I'll talk about in a moment. Further, we invested approximately $10 million in Q4 in VREX holdco, the ultimate owner of our primary toll processing partner in Vietnam. This investment funded the expansion of the VREX metallization facility and gives us a 49% stake in the business. Through this investment, we have secured the ability to ultimately reduce as much as two-thirds of Mountain Pass's target NdPr oxide output into metal, significantly expanding the number of markets and customers we can serve, particularly outside of China. We will recognize our proportional share of VREX financial results as an equity method investment in our financial statements, which will modestly impact our net income and EPS compares beginning in Q1. While we generally did not provide forward-looking guidance, I do want to walk through how we think about 2024 operationally and financially. Firstly, as it relates to separated product sales, depending on the timing of shipping, we expect to book a little more than 100 tons of NdPr sales in the first quarter. Michael will cover our production ramp in more detail in a moment, but given the current pricing environment, I wanted to highlight that we are now tactically responding to this market environment by managing our separations ramp for the remainder of the year. Our goal this year is to maximize our near-term cash flow potential while we position MP for maximum long-term upside. To be clear, we remain extremely confident in our ability to achieve our targeted throughput levels and production costs, but how we get there really matters in a low-price environment. Let me provide an illustrative example. We capture the significant majority of our theoretical gross profit via our concentrate business, but as we move downstream to refining, we capture material incremental profitability. The higher the NdPr price, the greater the incremental profit potential. Because our concentrate product is saleable though, we always want to think about that as an opportunity cost versus a state of the world where our refined product cost structure is not fully optimized. Put simply, every single dollar of incremental variable cost that we can avoid as we optimize our process conditions is weighed against the opportunity cost of selling our upstream product. Ordinarily, we would not think so much about this at say $90 or $150 NdPr shaving say $2 per kilogram off of production costs is less important relative to maximizing the refining ramp as quickly as possible. But again illustratively, and not as any kind of guidance, at a $35 per kilogram normalized production cost of refined oxide in a $50 NdPr world, $2 of unnecessary inefficiencies might eat up most or exceed a lot of the incremental benefit net of the opportunity cost when you factor in all of the flow-through impacts. So think of this as mainly just a 2024 model consideration, but MP is uniquely positioned with added downside protection by ramping more methodically in a low-price environment. We will be thoughtful about utilizing that advantage, and Michael will expand on this in more detail in a moment. Turning to our magnetics business. We are thrilled with our early progress and expect early revenue and modest positive EBITDA contributions from Fort Worth metal sales starting later this year. Importantly, as we focus on capital efficient growth, we expect the cash flow impact of early production of magnetic precursor products in Fort Worth to be much more meaningful than their P&L impact given our current expectation of hitting certain production milestones that will result in material product prepayments, which we expect to be reflected in our financial statements as deferred revenue. While customer discussions are still ongoing and we must continue to execute strongly, we expect that operational success in delivering early American-made NdPr metal to our customers this year should result in our sources and uses of cash in the magnetics business being roughly neutral in 2024. Regarding CapEx, we have consistently guided to a roughly $700 million net growth capital plan for the last couple of years as our total cost to achieve our goals of full rare separations in Mountain Pass and magnet and precursor product production in Fort Worth. Importantly, we remain within the margin of error on that assessment despite enduring inflation since our initial forecast. While we had initially expected slightly higher CapEx than reported in 2023, some of that spend will slip to 2024. So for the full year of '24, we expect to spend between approximately $200 million to $250 million on total CapEx, including maintenance CapEx. Within this capital plan, we expect to continue to make strong progress on our previously disclosed initiatives, as well as further some of the early stages of Upstream 60K and other potential high-return investments in Mountain Pass that will further strengthen and improve our production cost profile. Even with this investment, we expect to maintain a very strong capital position through this pricing down cycle. Taking current spot prices and with all of the caveats that go into forecasting, both regarding pricing expectations as well as regarding our timeline to execution, we expect to end 2024 with at least $200 million to $250 million of net cash on the balance sheet, or greater than $900 million of gross cash. With our strongly cash-generative concentrate business, a thoughtful ramp of Stage II and normalization of the relevant working capital investment, as well as achievement of milestones in Stage III leading to certain product prepayments and the receipt of initial 45X production tax credits, we see strongly positive operating cash flow funding a significant portion of our capital plan. With that expectation set and a lot of execution ahead of us, I will turn it over to Michael to discuss our Q4 operational results. Michael?