Steven A. Kandarian
Analyst · Columbia Management. Please go ahead
It's a lot there. Let me kind of click them off one by one. Alt-A, we had about $5.8 billion of Alt-A last quarter, we're down to about $4.9 billion. Some of that related to sales, some relates to roll off; we have not been buying in the Alt-A market over the last quarter. And in most of our Alt-A, you may recall is super senior, which means we bought additional insurance protection, additional subordination, when we purchased the securities sometime ago. And at the time when we bought these securities, there was a very small premium to buy that super senior turn some times only one or two basis points for that insurance, that has held us in good stead. Overall our subordination, average subordination our portfolio is over 12%, which means, over 12% of actual losses must occur before tranche is impacted. Now historically, the high watermark for losses in Alt-A is about 2.4%. Now, we do not think its going to stop there at this time because the market we believe is in a more negative position than it has been historically, but if you look at the ranges in terms of other people's projections about losses, they ranges from about 2.5% to 10%, 10% can be an outlier in the higher side for losses, and again our average subordination in the portfolio is over 12%. So as we run these impairment processes internally, we look on a security-by-security basis and determine if we think any one of these securities may eventually not pay the full amount of cash flows contractually promised to us, and to date through all of our modeling we have taken mo impairments because we believe in all cases, these securities will be money good. Let me move on to subprime, we are down now to about I think it's a $1.8 billion of subprime. It's been kind of rolling off and the vast majority of that of course is AAA. We brought very little kind of in 2006 and beyond vintages. And what we did buy all those AAA, AA credits. So again as we look at the marketplace and model these things on in terms of impairments, we have taken very few write-downs in this area and really don't anticipate taking meaningful write-downs going forward. Again, we stress these securities are pretty hard. So let me go back to just to show what we're doing running these models. We have made assumptions that even from this point in time, real estate prices, residential real estate prices would drop on average 25% in the United States. Beyond that, for purposes of these impairment test not that we necessarily think that that's going to happen, but we try to stress them as hard as we think is practical. Beyond that, we look at specific markets and we have assumed as much as a 40% decline in real state prices and that's in the especially overheated markets in the coasts, places like Nevada, places... certain parts of Florida and so on. So even with those extreme scenarios, we've had a write-down very few of these securities. Let me now switch to home loans; our home loans right now, we're in about $36 billion. We've mentioned to you in the past that we have been continuing to drop the loan to value ratio of these loans that we are putting on our books. Most of what we are doing today is serving a 50% range loan to value and that's based upon our values not necessarily based upon what someone's paying for the properties, we underwrite these properties one-by-one ourselves in our real estate department. And you may recall, we have 150 people in MetLife's real state department, who create these home loans and other kinds of loans like agricultural lending and so on. So we've moved down, actually 150 is the just real estate another 100 people in agricultural lending. We've moved down the loan to value over time and we pretty much have stayed at this very low loan to value ratio in the current marketplace. I will tell you, it is one area both agriculture lending and home loan commercial real estate that we view as an opportunity today because the CNBS market really has frozen up and some very attractive properties are coming up for refinancing or in some cases sales, not a lot of sales going on. And we are able to underwrite these loans on a basis very conservative and make very low loan to value mortgages that we create and at very, very attractive spreads, spreads we haven't seen in many years. So we actually look at this is as a real opportunity for us and this point I believe our delinquencies are something like $3 million in our entire portfolio of $36 billion, so it's virtually non-existent. I think then you asked about CNBS, let me kind of flip a few pages here to pull that up. So our CNBS portfolio is nearly 90% AAA rated and 74% of 2005 and the earlier vintages when the underwriting was much more stringent than we saw in the 2006 and beyond period. Our unrealized loss in that portfolio is $800 million, but again as we stress that those securities in our models we think we'll see very few impairments even with an expectation that the market will drop here in terms of pricing the commercial real estate market. We do not think that commercial real estate market will drop as drastically as the residential market for a number of reasons. And I will just summarize it quickly which is the over building we saw in some earlier real estate recessions especially early 1990s did not occur this time around. And the supply demand balance is far more attractive right now than it was back in some earlier real estate recessions. So, we are still modeling out 10% or 15% further declines in valuation there's been about 10% dip in prices in that market already. So, basically may be a 25% peak to trough kind of dip is what we are modeling out. And based upon that, we really think the portfolio is in very good shape. Let's just go onto credit cards and auto; credit cards about $6 billion in total, auto about by $1.5 billion. We have... as these securities would have been rolled off our books in terms of maturing or in some cases in sales, the average rating on these securities has gone up for us now. It's largely... it's a way toward a AAA rated portfolio these securities. And again I would say to you that, this is an area where we are actually a buyer and while buying is the highest tranches, first pay tranches of AAA rated credit card with the strongest trust, the banks that they have these, and kind of where it's all and also the expertise to manage these trusts, because there is some flux that goes on these trusts in terms of how they can flex these credit card security they are able to have people cut off to some degree in terms of the lending limits, the borrowing limits, they can adjust interest rate and so on. So we are sort of following the strongest players in the market place, we are buying the highest quality tranches, we are seeing historically high spreads, we stress this again the AAA rated trans area at extreme levels beyond anything that people are projecting, and still we can find a realistic scenario that says they won't be money good and given the kinds of spreads we're seeing for AAA rated assets, which is a hard place for live as an insurance company, right now, it's actually delivering very, very strong margins for us against our traditional business, we are buying these securities. And as you might guess, the rating agencies are looking hard at these newly created structures, they are planning to do some very tough tests, the underwriting has got much better by the creator of these securities and we really think this is a good opportunity for us to buy securities in these areas. So basically, we are putting our new money is AAA rated credit cards, selectively in autos depends upon which auto companies and so on, low loan to value Ag loans and commercial real estate loans and those are sort of the main areas we will invest our money today.