Thomas A. Lister
Analyst · B. Riley Securities
Thanks, Tassos. Let's turn now to Slide 12. And here, we reemphasize our focus on midsized and smaller container ships, ranging from 2,200 TEU to a little over 11,000 TEU. Our fleet segment service around 75% of global containerized trade volumes, which are concentrated in the non-Mainlane, intermediate and intra-regional trades. These ships are the workhorses of the global fleet, with the flexibility to service a wide and diverse range of ports and container trades. This stands in contrast to the largest container ships, which tend to be constrained to deepwater ports with well-developed shoreside infrastructure and are only economically competitive in trades with cargo volumes sufficient to fill them. And as supply chains have become fragmented and decentralized amid disruptions and geopolitical uncertainty, liner operators have increasingly opted for the flexibility, reliability and wide operating scope of midsized and smaller container ships like ours. On Slide 13, we take a look at 2 major choke points for shipping in the Middle East. While it is impossible to predict how events will ultimately unfold, we can shed light on the effects we've seen so far in our sector. So over 20% of global containerized trade volumes passed through the Red Sea and Suez Canal before severe transit disruptions began back in the tail end of 2023. Since then, vessels have largely been rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope, a longer and costlier journey, and one that, at its peak, was estimated to absorb around 10% of effective global containership capacity. There is now growing momentum among liner operators to resume transits, but the security situation remains such that risks are reviewed on a per-vessel, per-transit basis. Strikingly, despite capacity being released into the market as a result of this tentative return to the Red Sea and Suez, we have yet to see downward pressure on market charter rates, and I'll come back to this point later. Turning to the Strait of Hormuz, roughly 3% to 4% of containerized trade volumes passed through the Strait before the Iran conflict. Major ports in the Persian Gulf have experienced large-scale impacts on their operations, and shipping into and out of the Gulf remains severely constrained. As has been the case for some time now, the situation remains unsettled, highly dynamic, and with clear implications for the long term. For the time being, these developments add uncertainty and introduce inefficiencies into the containerized supply chain, requiring continuous adaptation and advantaging those with the ability to be flexible and dynamic. Meanwhile, our top priority, of course, remains seafarer safety. On Slide 14, we show the supply side and scrapping trends where the story remains essentially the same. Both idle capacity and scrapping activity are near 0. Disruptions to the containerized supply chain caused by extreme weather events, port congestion, and geopolitical instability have generated the need for additional containership capacity, eliminating slack in the system and making it profitable to keep older ships on the water for longer than might be the case in more "normal conditions." Slide 15 highlights the order book, which in recent years has grown meaningfully. However, as you can see, the extent of growth is far greater for the very large segments than is the case for the midsize and smaller segments in which we operate, for which the order book-to-fleet ratio is around 27% to 28%. This figure stands in stark contrast to the 62% ratio for the large container ships over 10,000 TEU, which pulls the average ratio for the overall order book up to 44%. Another key factor to consider in this discussion is the aging out of the vessels in the midsize and smaller global containership segments. Deliveries from the order book are significantly offset by existing ships hitting 25 years or older over the course of the next 3 to 4 years. In fact, if we were to assume that all these ships of 25 years or older were scrapped through 2030, net growth in the sub-10,000 TEU fleet would only be around 3%. So while the market remains strong and demand remains robust, we will continue to lock in charters at attractive rates for our existing fleet. On the flip side, if there were to be a downturn in the market, then global scrapping would likely increase materially, providing a useful supply-side safety valve. And as we have said many times in the past, in shipping, up cycles are a great opportunity to make money, but down cycles are where the most compelling value-accretive opportunities are typically to be had, as long as you are well capitalized and agile, which we are and have every intention to remain. On Slide 16, we return to the continued strength of the charter market, which I touched upon earlier. Indicative market rates for term charters of prompt positions are shown on the right-hand side of the slide, and these look even more attractive alongside our daily breakeven rates, which we've worked hard to lower to just over $9,500 per day despite an inflationary environment. And with that, I will turn the call back to George on Slide 17.