Tom Lister
Analyst · B. Riley. Please go ahead
Thanks, Tasos. On Slide 11, we reiterate our focus on midsized and smaller container ships between 2,000 and 10,000 TEU. These vessels are considered the backbone of global trade, given their operational flexibility and reach across the globe as seen in the maps on the left. Very large container ships on the other hand, play an important role in the very largest trades but are limited in where they can go, requiring deeper water and more specialized port infrastructure and are thus essentially restricted to the large east-west arterial trades. And the really big ships are either owned by the liner operators themselves or are locked up on very long-term charters, financings effectively and are not part of the liquid charter market. As we have built our fleet and invested in retrofits and enhancements, we have focused on highly specified efficient vessels that best meet the evolving needs of our liner customers which includes an emphasis on reefer cargo capacity. Across the fleet, GSL vessels are typically in the top tiers of quality in their respective peer groups, and that has enabled us in a tight market to secure attractive charters for multiple years. Moving to Slide 12. We recap the supply side trends we're seeing. Idle capacity is essentially zero for the year due in part to disruptions in the Red Sea. After a mild uptick in 2023, scrapping activity has once again all but ceased as owners find liners eager to put older vessels to work. Nevertheless, this growing cohort of lower-spec aging vessels will inevitably be scrapped out at some stage, which provides a useful supply-side safety valve. On Slide 13, we take a look at the order book. There has been a notable and well-covered expansion of the order book in recent years, but it is important to drill down into the detail to understand what that actually means. In particular, the vast majority of those orders have been for vessels in excess of 10,000 TEU. And size segment in which GSL does not participate and which, as discussed earlier, is neither as operationally flexible as the ships we own nor a part of the liquid charter market. For the segments on which we do focus, the order book-to-fleet ratio is a far more manageable 11.3%. Moreover, given the ship age dynamics that I mentioned a moment ago, if we hypothetically assume that all ships over 25 years are scrapped out, the net fleet growth in the sub-10,000 TEU fleet through 2027 would actually be negative a reduction in other words, of nearly 5%. The effect of the disruptions in the Red Sea is shown on Slide 14, whereas 20% of all global containerized trade passed through the Suez Canal pre-disruption, container ships are now forced to reroute along the Cape of Good Hope, adding ton miles and absorbing capacity equivalent to roughly 10% of global supply. This has put upward pressure on both freight and charter markets and a year in with no end apparently in sight, it's beginning to feel more structural than transitory. But frankly, who knows. Slide 15 is a closer look at the charter market, and you can clearly see the impact of disruptions to the Red Sea. When looking at the indicative market rates on the right side, I would remind you that our per vessel breakeven rates at the end of the third quarter averaged just below $9,200 per day. The spread between charter rates in the market and our breakevens should give you a pretty clear understanding of why we're so positive on this market and also why we're so eager to lock in as much charter cover as we can on both a prompt and forward basis. With that, I'll turn the call back to George to conclude our prepared remarks on Slide 16. George?