Tom Lister
Analyst · B. Riley Securities. Your line is open
Thanks, Tassos. Moving to slide 11, we reiterate our clear focus on high specification, mid-size and smaller container ships, ranging from 2,000 TEU to about 10,000 TEU. The top map illustrates the deployment of ships within our preferred size range, highlighting their operational flexibility, which is a good structural hedge in uncertain times such as these, and their widespread reach. In contrast, the lower map shows the deployment of larger ships at 10,000 TEU or larger, which tend to be more constrained to the main east-west arterial trade routes with suitable Deepwater port infrastructure. I should emphasize that neither of these maps yet reflects the ongoing rerouting of containerized trade around southern Africa as a result of the widely reported disruptions in the Red Sea. We'll come back to this point, incidentally, repeatedly Slide 12 presents a view of idle capacity and ship recycling. Idle capacity increased to 1.3% during the fourth quarter, but has since tightened again as a result of the Red Sea situation. As expected, the uptick in idle vessels was accompanied by the return of scrapping activity for essentially the first time since 2020, albeit at a limited scale thus far. The record-breaking charter markets of 2021 and 2022 saw the lives of many older and lower specification container ships extended and scrapping deferred due to their phenomenal earnings. However, as the market normalizes, which has been delayed for the time being by the situation in the Red Sea, there is an expectation that there will be a catch up in scrapping. Regulatory dry dockings, which ships are obliged to go through typically on a five-year cycle, prompt owners to consider whether investing $2 million to $3 million in a ship is justified by the forward earnings potential of that ship. When a vessel is aging, poorly specified, or both, the answer may well be no, particularly when there's a challenging outlook ahead and the ship likely gets scrapped. We'll look at what this may mean on the next slide. Slide 13 this slide shows the order book, which is heavily weighted towards the larger ship sizes, in other words the over 10,000 TEU segments in which, to be very clear, GSL does not participate. With an order book to fleet ratio of 13.4%, on the other hand, the order book for midsize and smaller ships, which are the segments relevant to GSL, is much smaller but still meaningful. Here, the older age profile of the midsize and smaller fleet is important context and ties in with what I was saying earlier about deferred scrapping and the scrap versus invest decisions that may be driven by regulatory dry dockings. Extrapolating this point, if we were to assume the scrapping of all ships over 25 years old and net those numbers out against the order book for midsize and smaller ships delivering through 2027, our focus segments would actually see negative net growth. In other words, they would actually shrink by 2.2% through 2027. Now this is probably an extreme scenario, but it does illustrate the supply side safety valve for the industry in the event of a protracted downturn. On slide 14, we put some data around what disruptions in the Red Sea actually mean for container shipping under normal circumstances, about 20% of global containerized trade volumes, which are the boxes themselves, transit the Suez Canal, which sits at the northern end of the Red Sea. However, if anything, this 20% figure understates the dynamics at play as much of the container volumes transiting the Red Sea and Suez are on long haul trades, and the longer the trade, the more capacity you need to service it. So if you look at the Red Sea and Suez in terms of global containerized fleet capacity, in other words, the ships over a third, 34% in fact, would normally pass through this waterway, which is the routing shown with the yellow line on the map. If, on the other hand, you're forced to divert this traffic around the Cape of Good Hope as shown on the blue line, then the impact is very significant. MSI in fact calculates that, holding all else equal, if all Suez related containerized trades were to be diverted around the Cape, it would absorb around 10% of effective global containerized fleet capacity. And stating the obvious, this is a big deal, especially as an estimated 80% to 90% of Red Sea and Suez related containerized fleet capacity is already being diverted in this way. This brings us to slide 15, which looks at the charter market after the super cyclical highs of 2021 and 2022, both charter market rates and asset values have been normalizing, with downward pressure accelerating in the second half of 2023. However, this decline was arrested towards year-end and has been converted into positive upward momentum in early 2024. We will provide you with an update on our Q1 earnings call, but market rates are currently trending up from the levels indicated on the right-hand side of this slide, and charter durations are also extending, especially for larger ships. How long these supportive conditions will last is of course anyone's guess, but we're doing our best to lock in charter cover and grow cash flows while they do. With that, I'll turn the call back to George to conclude our prepared remarks on slides 16 and 17.