Thanks, Marty. This morning, I will provide insights into our Australia mortgage insurance business and the first quarter trends we observed, where both the number of claims and the average claim payment increased significantly, particularly in March, as Genworth and key lenders increased focus on default management. I will also be discussing the results of the portfolio review that was conducted given the first quarter trends that led to the reserve strengthening. I will conclude with some perspectives on business performance going forward. I will be referring to the Australia MI portfolio update presentation that has been posted to our investor website. Before I begin, please note the cautionary note with regard to forward-looking statements and the basis for presenting financial information detailed on Slide 1. As shown on Slide 2, at the end of the first quarter, we had a little over $100 billion of effective risk in-force with an overall portfolio delinquency rate of 0.54%. Our risk in-force is dispersed across 4 major regions, in line with the country's population and across several years of origination or vintages. Overall, our performance has been solid. However, we are seeing pressure in the Queensland region and the 2007 and 2008 vintages. When you drill down 1 level, our business performance is particularly impacted by the Coastal Queensland area and small business and self-employed borrowers in the 2007 and 2008 vintages, with each representing approximately 6% of total risk in-force. I will provide more detail on these subsegments shortly. During late 2008 and through the first half of 2009, we strengthened guidelines and eliminated certain products, which have improved performance of our most recent vintages. Turning to Slide 3. During the first quarter, we experienced higher losses primarily due to loss reserve strengthening of $82 million before taxes, or $53 million after-tax, which was reviewed by independent third parties. The major drivers of this strengthening were: first, Coastal Queensland economic downturn; two, small business, self-employed borrowers in the '07 and '08 vintages; third, the impact of lender servicing and forbearance programs; and fourth, the number of paid claims and severity. As you can see on Slide 4, the first key driver of the reserve strengthening was the impact of the Coastal Queensland economic downturn on housing. We have identified these areas as the Far North, Sunshine Coast and Gold Coast, which are principally tourist areas. You will observe the differentiated performance in these areas with peak to trough home price declines in double digits and even deeper declines on some of the foreclosed properties as well as delinquency rates above the rest of Queensland in the overall portfolio. These areas have been hit hard by depressed tourism, particularly as the Australia dollar strengthened, lower levels of consumer and retail spending and reduced housing demand, driving home prices lower. This is indicated on the left of the slide as Queensland tourism has been particularly impacted through early 2011, but is showing early stages of recovery. This early-stage recovery will not impact our delinquencies over the short term but should aid performance over time as economic improvement work its way into the housing market. Turning to Slide 5. With deeper home price declines and higher average loan balances in Coastal Queensland, when compared to the overall portfolio, our average paid claim on these properties is significantly higher than the overall portfolio. And the number of claims we paid, as well as the average claim, increased significantly on the first quarter of 2012 as we worked with lenders to accelerate claim processing. As shown on Slide 6, the second driver of the reserve strengthening was a small business of self-employed borrower in the 2007 and 2008 vintages. This segment is more reliant on tourism, retail and consumer spending, including rental income where these borrowers have investment properties. The lower levels of tourism and retail spending have reduced income levels in this segment and, combined with higher cost of living in mortgage payments to the higher interest rates, have created increased claims. On the left side of this page, we have provided details on our small business and self-employed borrower risk in-force and you can see the levels included in the 2007 and 2008 vintages, including Queensland and Coastal Queensland concentrations as well as the higher delinquency rates. The impact of underwriting guideline changes in late 2008 and the first half of 2009 has significantly reduced risk in-force for this segment and improved performance of more recent vintages. As you can see on the right, our average claim paid in the segment tends to be higher than the other portfolio, and we have observed an increase in the number of claims paid in the average claim paid from fourth quarter to first quarter. Now turning to Slide 7. As we look forward to future claims development, we see delinquency rates for the pressured subsegments, such as the 2007 and '08 vintages and the associated small business and self-employed borrower, are stabilizing, allowing for the normal first quarter seasonal increase. Newer vintages, especially 2010 and 2011, are seasoning very well at this point. In addition, we see an improving profile going forward in the delinquency mix. On the right, we have provided some key metrics that have been produced by the extensive analysis conducted on the delinquency inventory. You will observe that Coastal Queensland accounts for 15% of the delinquent risk in-force in later stage delinquency categories, while reducing to 10% in earlier stage delinquencies. Also, for the 2007 and 2008 small business and self-employed borrowers, we see a corresponding improvement from 25% to 18%. Based on the work completed, we expect severities to decline as we work our way through the later stage delinquencies to the earlier stages. Of course, future claims development will be influenced by economic and housing market conditions as well as lender servicing. Moving to Slide 8. Another contributing factor was, during late 2011 and into early 2012, we observed an extension of time from initial delinquency to claim payment with 2 key drivers impacting the cycle: lender servicing practices and forbearance programs. The normal cycle from delinquency to claim was on average of approximately 13 to 15 months, which has now been extended given the current circumstances to 18 to 20 months. These delays increased our claims cost. During 2011, as delinquencies increased during the year, certain lender servicing routines fell behind, which created processing delays and caused backlogs to delinquencies. In partnership with key lenders, we increased focus on default management and have seen a portion of these aged delinquencies come through in our first quarter results. In addition, a forbearance process sanctioned by the government has driven delays. This process allows borrowers the opportunity to submit a hardship dispute to an independent third-party to assist in its ultimate resolution. Collections and foreclosure proceedings must cease until a final determination when the hardship is reached. This can further extend the time to claim payment, and we are working with the government to identify areas to improve the process and reduce the cycle time. In addition, we are actively working on servicing issues with key lenders by placing on-site resources to help accelerate decisions, advise on foreclosure strategies and improve delinquency to claim cycle time. As shown on Slide 9. In the first quarter of 2012, both the number of claims and the average claim payment, increased significantly as Genworth and key lenders increased focus on default management. As you can see, this was more concentrated in March with a significant increase in the average claim paid as many of these claims also had higher loan balances. The observed increase in average claim size in March led us to conduct a comprehensive review of our delinquency inventory. Now turning to Slide 10. As a result of loss experience we saw emerge in the first quarter, we felt it necessary and prudent to strengthen loss reserves. Loss reserves are management's best estimate of ultimate paid claims for reported delinquencies including a provision for incurred but not reported losses. In the quarter, we supplemented our normal quarterly actuarial review process with an extensive loan-by-loan analysis of our delinquency inventory. This analysis included obtaining more up-to-date property valuations for all delinquencies with adjustments to further stretch the home price and foreclosure. This analysis form the basis of the reserve strengthening of $82 million. It is important to note that our loss estimates assume no improvement in economic conditions and reserve adequacy may be influenced by perspective changes in economic and housing market conditions. As you can see from the chart, the reserve adjustments were predominantly applied to the late stage delinquencies and loans currently in foreclosure, where we expect higher conversion rates to claim and higher claim severities. The limited strengthening to early stage delinquencies is supported by the changing delinquency mix profile and anticipated improving severity levels. You can think of the reserve strengthening in 2 categories: claims and late stage delinquencies. Approximately $20 million of the reserve strengthening is related to claims to be paid during the second quarter with the residual applied to later stage delinquencies, the majority of which will be paid over the remainder of the year. Now turning to Slide 11. Going forward, we will continue to thoroughly analyze our delinquency inventory and update property valuations to assess our loss reserves. In addition, as mentioned earlier, we have on-site default management personnel at key lenders to help improve collections and optimize loss mitigation decisions with an emphasis on loan workout activity, home sale prior to foreclosure or an acceleration to claim. Finally, we will continue to adjust claims payments for cost outside of our Master Policy and carefully monitor performance for small business and self-employed borrowers as well as Coastal Queensland. Moving to Slide 12. As part of a deeper assessment of our portfolio, we look into other areas that could be sensitive to shifts in tourism similar to Coastal Queensland. The results of this analysis are outlined in the table to the left, highlighting that in other specific tourist areas, we have much lower concentrations and lower delinquency rates. Looking broadly at the vintage analysis on the right side of the slide, we see the underperformance of the 2007 and 2008 vintages with improving trends in more recent vintages. Overall, delinquency trends appear to be stabilizing. Now turning to Slide 13. The results for the quarter were disappointing with a reported operating loss of $21 million and a loss ratio of 154%. Stepping back from the quarterly results, our Australia mortgage insurance business has a history of producing strong annual results, and our long-term views of this business and the market fundamentals have not changed. The revenue generation in the business is solid with over $1 billion of unearned premium reserves and a strong investment portfolio producing investment income. In addition, we are in the process of implementing an approximate 7% price increase in the market. While we do expect to see elevated claim levels over the near-term, we have used the current quarter loss emergence and other information to strengthen loss reserves, we believe, sufficient to cover these elevated claims. However, reserve adequacy will be dependent on future economic and housing market conditions, and the results for the next 2 quarters will be key test for these reserves. We do expect to produce an annual profit for 2012, but our quarterly results will be volatile with more noted improvements in the second half of the year. Moving to Slide 14. As you can see, our capital level remains strong. Our estimated regulatory capital ratio at the first quarter is 153%. The 153% level is consistent with the ratios we reported throughout 2011. Over the past 18 to 24 months, in addition to building hard capital, we have significantly diversified the capital profile in Australia by raising $140 million of local Tier 2 debt and have significantly expanded our external reinsurance program, both in coverage levels and the number of participating reinsurers. As the in-force portfolio continues to season and as profits are generated going forward, we expect the Australian business to continue its strong generation of capital. Related to our planned dividend for the year, we expect the business to generate capital level sufficient to make the payment. However, this payment will be contingent on results for the year, approval by the Australia board and discussions with our regulator. The Australia dividend is less than 50% of the total international MI dividend for the year. Turning to Slide 15. We know there have been views expressed about a housing bubble in Australia by certain parties, while others support the ongoing strength of the housing market. On this slide, we highlight the views of both bears and bulls as well as our own. Our views are: first, lending standards in Australia have remained strong with household formation driving housing demand. On a national level, there is a shortage of housing. The outlook for the economy remains solid, although we do expect continued areas of subregional pressure such as the coastal areas of Queensland. While home prices are high by historical measures, they have been supported by increased consumer purchasing power with home prices moderating since the second quarter of 2010. And while household indebtedness has increased, exposing consumers to rate shocks, the ratio of debt to disposable income has been relatively steady for several years at 150%. The majority of this debt is mortgage-related, which can be repaid over a long period of time. In summary, we expect national home prices to be flat for 2012, allowing further digestion of historical home price increases. In closing, we are disappointed with the quarterly performance, but our approach has been to make adjustments to put this issue behind us. Importantly, we must leverage the experience to improve our processes going forward. Within all of this, our long-term view of the Australia mortgage insurance business has not changed. The business and market fundamentals remain in place and are strong. Now, let me open the call up for Q&A.