Lars Barstad
Analyst · Sherif Elmaghrabi from BTIG
Thank you very much, Inger. Let's look at Slide 8 and have a discussion on the various market themes. So I mentioned initially that it's been a lot of noise around us. We've had paralyzing U.S. policy changes like [indiscernible] limited impact on the energy complex so far and for tankers in general, but this is, in total, quite worrying for global growth prospects. And as we proceed, we will learn how kind of big these impacts may be. We've had a very positive development on sanctions, both by way of scope widening. The various agencies are literally adding new vessels to the sanction list and new operators on a day-to-day basis. But we've also seen that there is a bit more will in enforcement of the same sanctions. But I think most importantly is the behavioral changes specifically by India and China on the way they operate with -- or towards OFAC listed vessels. And so far, both Russia and India -- sorry, China and India, seem to be shunning vessels that are on the OFAC list. There are some excitement around Russia and the Ukraine seize fire discussions. There is also a parallel discussion ongoing in respect of nuclear deal with Iran. Both outcomes can have pivotal changes for tanker market dynamics, and I'm going to come to that later. We're also seeing some positive movements on OpEx [indiscernible] and OpEx policy. They seem at least until now, quite eager on returning oil to the market, which is positive for compliant tank utilization. I'm also going to come into or talk into old school, demand, supply and inventory movements. It's quite only, this chart was a recurring theme in our presentations kind of early in 2020 and 2021 and so forth but it's been out of the deck for a while. But there are some interesting moves happening. And also, again, [indiscernible] the same after Q4 report. Active trading fleet has stopped growing and despite the deliveries we're going to see in 2025 and to some extent, '26 as well. The overall trading fleet looks to continue to reduce. I would very much like to draw your attention to the chart on the top right-hand side, and this is kind of mind boggling. If you look at vessels that are either sanctions, not sanctioned yet, but have been lifting Iranian-Russian [indiscernible] barrels during the last year or are older than 20 years that population of vessels makes up 25% of the VLCC fleet. It makes up 46% of the Suezmax fleet and 52% of the Afra/LR2 fleet. Of course, a reversal of actions will make a material amount of particularly Suezmax and Aframax return to the market. A lot of these guys that are lifting Russian barrels are doing so in accordance with the price cap. So they are, of course, perfectly allowed to do that but any tightening on sanctions could suddenly make them move from the gray side to the more dark side. There is also an increase in demand for non-focused vessels, in particular the Russian market. And this fleet for this portion of the fleet is gradually growing. But it also exemplifies how sensitive our market is to sanctions and changes in sanctions, basically due to the amount of tonnage that is up or in play. So let's move to Slide 9 and look at the old school market logic. The chart on the left, it is a bit extreme, but it's obviously post-COVID development in oil demand and supply. So quite a steep pricing curve there in the beginning, but more -- now it's more normalized. If you look at the gray area, which represents EIA latest forecast, we're actually moving into an overall supply and demand around 106 million barrels by the end of 2026. What's more interesting is that supply, and this is obviously motivated by OpEx increase, but also or fueled by OpEx increase but also, to some extent, by expected production growth in especially Guyana and some in Brazil where we're going to end up in an oversupplied position in the oil markets. Historically, and this is the chart on the right. If you look at the ebb and flows of inventory builds and grows, they correlate quite strongly to the performance of the overall tanker market. This is pretty easy to explain, and this is not due to utilization by way of floating storage. You don't need a carrier strong enough to achieve this in the market. It's simply the incremental volume that ends up being transported that's not going directly for consummation it's going for storages, either in China, Japan, Korea or even in the U.S. And I don't think I need to remind the audience that we are at years low inventory around the globe. Let's move to Slide 10. I'd just go through some of the headlines affecting tankers these days. So on tariffs, there was a 90-day delay on the enforcement of the Liberation Day tariff and the tariffs themselves are being eased. Also on the tariff side, energy is to a large extent -- exempt, so we don't really need to -- or we don't really fear this will affect global trading patterns that much. On the USTR the recent proposal from USTR shows a softening stand or softening wording with the key exceptions for oil and energy. The final proposal is expected by the end of May after the more recent hearing. But so far, it looks like exports from the U.S. is extent and oil discharge into the U.S. is not a material exposure to Frontline and also half of our fleet is non-Chinese. So we may still be able to serve that market. Overall, in the U.S. accounts for around 17% of the global oil market. So it's not an absolute disaster if this is related to relationship or communication from the USTR remains as we saw it last. We have maximum pressure on Iran 2.0 or a nuclear deal. This is back in the headlines in the middle of this trade war, negotiations are ongoing. But in the case of making a nuclear deal with Iran for them, lifting sanctions is a red line. And if the audience can imagine what will happen then. So 1.4 million to 1.6 million barrels per day of export capacity that can grow quite rapidly, will then all of a sudden become a compliant barrel. And as I've said repetitively, compliant barrels need compliant ships. Yes, you might see some vessels being able to return to the compliance market but in general terms, most of the vessels that are engaged in Iranian trade right now have absolutely no chance to come back into the compliant market. The actors in the compliance market have extremely strict rules and relations around the ships they want to engage. And these ships are also carrying an environmental risk cargo worth for VLCC around $120 million. So it's not something a Charter is going to kind of take a light on. Then we have Russian sanctions expansion, this piece or a seize fire discussion going on between Russia and Ukraine. On the table, there will for sure be sanctions either lifting or tightening? Whether we look at it right now, it's more likely that we're going to see tightening rather than easing. EU lastly, added 168 or I thought thereabouts vessels to their sanction list. U.K. added 100 about 1.5 weeks ago and it seems like OFAC is going to continue their pursuit to find sanctions breakers around the Russian trade. There is also a discussion coming up whether if the oil price cap is going to be reduced from $60 to $50. So a lot of excitement on that. Then sale exemptions removal, there was formally a situation where you could export equity barrels out of Venezuela so typically Chevron we're allowed to take the oil that they actually own in Venezuela. This has, to a large degree, now been removed, and it's only on a case-by-case basis. We see Chevron being able to take oil [indiscernible]. This means that their exports, which actually grew to 800,000 barrels a day in the last cycle is now going dark. And then we have this, as I also touched upon earlier, the Shandong Port in India OFAC compliance. This is extremely welcoming because it's actually the only way sanctions can work is that the receivers or the actors self-functioning using these vessels. We have the Red Sea, Israel and Amas and I should add in the U.S. to this. There is now a seize fire between U.S. and the [indiscernible]. This has not materially changed our position on trading the Red Sea area. And it has not materially altered traffic claims yet but it's also so that it's quite a fluid situation and any kind of action that happens around this conflict could suddenly trigger an attack. So, so far, we do not want to risk the lives of our seafarers by trading through the Red Sea. But then finally, we have OFAC [indiscernible] which is almost disappearing in all these other narratives that have said that they might potentially kind of return their voluntary cuts back to the market by October. It's going to be exciting to see what comes out of the next meeting, and there is already signals that they might add -- sorry, 411,000 barrels per day in July as well. What we have seen kind of the initial production rises, have not really given us that many more molecules into the market. I think this is primarily due to the fact but it's more a paper exercise to catch up to the over production that's already present in OFAC. But from June onwards, the volumes that might come will be real molecules coming into the market. I'd like to draw your attention to the right-hand side on this slide, and you've all seen the fleet development with the orange line being a [indiscernible] below 20 years of age. And again, it's still so that very few shafters, if any, accept the ship that's above 20 years in our industry. But if you look at the chart now here, we've looked at basically all tankers that take part in the market that are not OFAC listed and not on long-term storage and not kind of close to trading tankers. And there, you can see that the overall tanker fleet actually shrunk by 0.5% in 2024 and including all the deliveries coming into 2025. It's not really that many, but there are some looks to continue to shrink. Let's move to Slide 11, and I'm quite happy to say that sanctions actually do work not by way of volume. It's more or less -- it's quite sticky, the volume that is coming into the market. But by way of the fleet that is actually carrying this oil. The January expansion of particular of sanctions has -- and also the self sanctioning by China and India has made the market conditions for an OFAC listed tanker extremely poor. As particularly, the Russian crude has been below the price cap, it's attracted a lot of compliance tonnage to come in and service this market. But this kind of fall in utilization OFAC listed tankers is extremely promising. On the right-hand side on the top, we've played with a scenario that sanctions are either -- are removed and this is important because tightening sanctions and removal of sanctions will actually both yield a positive effect on our market. And there's about 7 million barrels per day of global transported oil that is exposed to 1 sanction or another around the world. And just imagine if all this comes back. It's not likely, but it just gives you a picture. This 7 million barrels would equate to more than 200 VLCCs worth of transport need and looking at the fleet composition, it's not very likely that we have that kind of capacity easily. I think it is, however, likely that 1 or maybe 2 of these will actually come in and become non-sanction barrels over the next years. Back to sanctions [indiscernible] do work. If you look at Iranian crude inventories, the float storage seems to be on the rise. And this is basically due to crude struggling to find a home. Let's move to Slide 12 and looking at the good old order book. There's nothing material that's changed since our Q4 report, but I'd like to draw the attention to the fact that for the VLCCs that are now far more OFAC-listed VLCCs than there are vessels in the order book. Suezmax more of the same, if you adjust for was on OFAC and mind you, OFAC listed vessels are extremely unlikely to return to the compliant market the order book is almost ignorable. And the same goes for Aframax and LR2s, even though the LR2 has a very high nominal order book. If we look or kind of have a look back at the chart I showed on the first -- on Slide 8, with 52% of that fleet exposed to one sanction or another we're actually not that worried about that fleet going forward. Also on the age situation for LR2s in particular, they seem to lose efficiency and become less attractive as a products trading vessel at the age of 15. And this is still the case in the normal tanker market. So let's move to Slide 13 and look at the summary. I've basically put the positive heading of pressure building question mark. That's at least what it feels like on the floor here. So oil supply and demand suggest we approach a period with the old school inventory buildings with the utilization implications that has for the tanker market in general. Demand for compliant tonnage is growing as the sanction scope and enforcement widens. And again, the fact that certain key players in this market are actually self sanctioning, particularly against OFAC. Less active tanker fleet growth will remain muted for 2025. We actually continue to see oil demand looking to increase and considering the aging of the fleet, this gives us the tailwind we need into -- further into '25 and into '26. Policy changes do create more questions and answers. We will get, hopefully, some answers by the end of this month, but the overall wording has softened. And again, I'm going to repeat this until it changes, World Oil Trade continues to be serviced by the oldest fleet in more than 2 decades. And obviously, if we look at the regulatory landscape we are in with the carbonization being a key goal for the industry, this is very contradicting. And lastly, from [indiscernible] continue to retain our material upside, as Inger pointed to. We have a modern spot-exposed fleet ready to service the compliant oil market. Thank you for that, and we can open up for questions.