Phillip Reinsch
Analyst · JMP Securities
Thank you, Lindsey. After my remarks, Lance will give a recap of the quarter, and then we'll open the call up to questions. An unprecedented near total shutdown of the U.S. economy beginning in March due to the COVID-19 pandemic heightened fears of extremely high credit default levels in recession, leading to derisking occurring at all levels of the fixed income markets. Credit asset pricing came under severe pressure, destabilizing fixed income markets. All financial firms regardless of size or business model were adversely affected. Levered and unlevered investors across the spectrum began a process of derisking and, in many instances, selling their most liquid positions to raise cash to meet margin calls and redemptions. In the mortgage REIT sector, firms are already experiencing liquidity drains due to declining treasury rates, which led to losses on derivatives held for hedging purposes and valuation-based margin calls. As the crisis deepened, this drain on liquidity became more pronounced and included increased base margin requirements for swaps due to heightened market volatility. Selling of agency MBS intensified as credit-sensitive mortgage REITs try to avoid realizing greater losses from selling less liquid non-agency positions, eventually disrupting trading in the agency MBS markets due to the sheer volume of sellers and a lack of buyers. The end result was sharply falling MBS prices even as market interest rates declined. Losses on derivatives were not offset by portfolio valuation gains. Mortgage REIT book values were crushed. Mortgage REIT equities traded at discounts rarely seen. The Fed began to buy fixed rate agency MBS in earnest on Monday, March 23, but that was too late for a number of credit-oriented mortgage REITs that announced they could not make margin calls. That said, the massive size of the Fed intervention, together with the near exhaustion of selling of fixed rate agency MBS on the part of leveraged firms, has allowed for a more stable operating environment going forward for firms such as Capstead that are focused on agency MBS that were not severely damaged in March. Regarding Capstead specifically, early in the quarter, we were executing on plans to increase portfolio leverage modestly in anticipation of raising common equity. Acquisitions exceeded runoff in January and February, and $13 million in common equity was issued in February, using our at-the-market continuous offering program. In early March, it became apparent that the markets were deteriorating, and our focus shifted to generating liquidity. Runoff from March was not replaced. Swaps were paired out of and not replaced. Repo was rolled into April and beyond. ARM pricing held up fairly well through the middle of March, comparatively speaking, even as the more liquid in traffic fixed rate agency market was breaking down. With the markets continuing to deteriorate, culminating a non-agency business actually trading on Sunday, March 22, we concluded it was prudent to sell a portion of our portfolio to prepare for future projected liquidity needs. I want to emphasize that throughout this time, we've met all margin calls. Looking forward, we have recovered a portion of the lag in ARM pricing relative to fixed rate MBS that was evident at quarter end, with book value estimated to be up 4% to 5% at this point. With this improvement in book value and having not replaced April portfolio runoff, our leverage currently is a comfortable 7.8:1 compared to 8.5:1 at quarter end. As we begin replacing May portfolio runoff, reinvestment returns are very attractive. And perhaps most importantly, our borrowing costs are down dramatically, with unhedged repo rates now typically between 20 and 35 basis points, thanks largely to the Fed having reduced the Fed funds rate at 150 basis points in March to near zero. Wrapping up, we believe the worst of the recent market turbulence is behind us, and our portfolio is well positioned to generate attractive returns on investment capital at lower leverage levels than we have employed in the recent past. Looking forward, we are increasingly confident that for the rest of the year, we can produce core earnings that will meet or exceed our current $0.15 a quarter common dividend run rate. With that, I'll turn the call over to Lance.