Yes, I guess the way I think about it is, in the early days in non-QM, we had loss expectations on it, and our originators would take loan loss reserves. And what we saw is that performance was so good, shockingly good that, they built up a [Worcester] loan loss reserves and because there weren't any losses. And so, to me, the aberration has been the really tailwind of home prices and really strong default performance from say, I mean, we started LendSure 2014, 2014 up to middle of 2022, I think performance was aberration good. And I think now we're going into -- we're in a period of time where you see some delinquencies, you're going to see some losses. But I think, it's absolutely consistent with sort of how we underwrite things. And the same thing is true for residential transition lending. You've seen the unemployment note rate tick up. Jay Powell was talking about it a lot at the press conference. We make no predictions about the economy, but we watch things like a hawk. And so, we slice and dice the data a million different ways. We've certainly seen a lot's been written about it that, there's been kind of FICO inflation, that a 700 FICO today is probably more like a 680 FICO four years ago. So, that observation or that belief has informed our credit eligibility criteria. So, we've matriculated up in FICO and I think as an originator, and this gets to the point I want to make in the prepared remarks about how -- it's not just we own originator and we're hands off, we are collaborative. And so, we give them access to our data scientists and our data and our research team to kind of come up with best underwriting practices where you can be relevant to the brokers or the correspondence you're working with, but you're getting great quality loans. And so, if we see performance deteriorations in certain parts of the portfolio, then that serves the feedback loop when you change your eligibility. So, that process, that iterative process of analyzing the data and then updating and adjusting guidelines to the reaction to it, I see that as a big part of our job. And it was a big part of our job 10 years ago, but just 10 years ago, you didn't see a lot of delinquencies. You'd look at it, say, delinquencies are fine. Let's go ahead. Now you're into sort of a much more normal regime. Home prices are more expensive, note rates are higher, people are signing up for bigger payments. There's going to be some delinquencies. And so, we monitor it, we're pricing for it, and I think we're very well equipped to respond to it.