Byron Boston
Analyst · Credit Suisse
Good morning. Thank you for joining us. Let’s first go to Slide 6. And even though some of you may be familiar with Dynex, let me just simply summarize our overall investment approach. We have a diversified portfolio that includes fixed and floating rate assets, Agency and Non-Agency securities backed by residential and commercial loans. Our portfolio is constructed to perform well despite volatile markets given our high quality, short duration assets.
Our diversified approach produced solids results in the first quarter, as our CMBS portfolio increased in value even as rates increased during the quarter. Our overall book value per common share increased by almost 5% and we generated a 14.7% return on adjusted equity for the quarter. We have confidence in our risk profile as we have steadily generated double-digit returns without extending far out of the risk spectrum. Selective opportunities continue to exist to reinvest capital, particularly in CMBS. And our RMBS/CMBS capital allocation model has allowed us to find pockets of value.
Let’s move to Slide 7. As I go through the slide, I’ll ask myself several questions and I’ll attempt to answer them to give you a clear picture of our performance in the first quarter. As we look at the Dynex portfolio, what has changed since December 2011? Our Agency portfolio has increased, that’s been very typical assets in large capital raises here at Dynex Capital. It allows us to get our capital deployed faster and take a more selective approach towards the Non-Agency and Agency CMBS sector.
There was a minor 1% change in our overall CMBS/RMBS mix. We continue to minimize extension risk. So if you look at our charts, and you look at the chart to the right, you will see that and if you add the number, 79% of our portfolio were either resets or matures within 7 years. If you look at the lower left hand chart, you’ll see that 67% of our book of business happens to be backed by residential assets, 33% by CMBS assets, that’s a slight 1% change since December 2011.
And if you look at the upper left hand chart, you will take note that the majority of our assets continues to be in Agency sector, both Agency CMBS and Agency RMBS paper was approximately 17% of our book being in Non-Agency securities. Have you tried to diversify further into Non-Agency RMBS? The answer is yes, but the opportunity to find high quality, Non-Agency RMBS paper is limited. And I’ll give you an example. There is one deal that came to the market. We attempted to buy $20 million, we ultimately were allocated $2 million.
So we’ve made our attempts in the high grade Non-Agency sector, but the opportunities have been limited. We have -- what is changed in terms of our overall duration picture? I mentioned a second ago, we’ve continued to minimize extension risks, however we have found more attractive opportunities in the 7.1 and 10.1 sector versus the 5.1 and seasoned 5.1 sectors that we have built our portfolio between 2008 and let’s say 2010.
If we move to Slide 8, and let’s continue to look at the portfolio, has our credit quality changed since 2011? The answer is no. We continue to focus on high quality assets. Let me draw your attention first to the top chart on the right. You’ll note that this chart you’ve seen before. We continue to emphasize CMBS what we call CMBS 2.0 and 3.0, most of our investments have all been originated since December of 2009.
Our prior 2000 category happens to be assets that Dynex has originated, and the 2000 to 2005 category are assets that we originally financed through the government TALF program. We have avoided the 2006 and 2008 period because we consider that to be most -- the worst underrated and structured bonds in the history of the CMBS market. If you notice the lower credit quality -- the lower chart on the lower left, our credit quality 91% AAA, 4% AA, 4% A. And then if you look to the upper left hand corner, we have been willing to take prepayment risks in our portfolio. Our prepayment opinions have not changed. We have not adjusted our strategy. We continue to structure our portfolio or mitigate prepayment risk.
And as you can see the 76% of the premium exposure on our balance sheet has explicit prepayment protection. That comes from the CMBS securities which are all structured with either some form of legal lockout or yield maintenance that will compensate us for any type of premature prepayment activity. 5% of our portfolio is represented by post/near reset paper. The prepayment experience on that book of business has been excellent with average prepayments fees of 10% or lower. And then the remainder 19% of our book of business from a premium perspective has been protected or covered by our selected security strategy which I’ll go into detail in the next slide.
If you flip to Slide 9, you’ll see what type of strategies specific characteristics we continue to emphasize. We’ve used these charts before. We continue to seek out pools that have low third-party originated loans. Dynex portfolio has a 37.9% of our portfolio is exposed to what we call TPO originated loans. Of course it’s over -- versus 50% to 60% for the universe of ARMs as a whole. And let me clarify something, you’ve heard a low balance loan stories in the marketplace, you’ve heard of state specific stories in the marketplace. In the Hybrid ARMs sector, for the most part, there are no specified pools, originations do not segment low balance loans. They won’t segment state specified pools.
The majority of the Hybrid ARM pools are what I would call mixed pools combine a variety of different loans. We take the time and look pool by pool in a very micro manner to minimize those characteristics that are associated with that to prepayment fees. Our favorite again, no third-party originated loans, interest-only loans and emphasizing on non-owner occupied properties.
If you go to Slide 10. Let me ask, have we changed our focus on multifamily securities? And the answer is no. Dynex has been heavily involved in the multifamily sector for 20 years. If you’ll note on the slide to the right, 67% of our CMBS portfolio is backed by the multifamily loans, 33% backed by other sectors. Our overall credit quality 81% by AAA, 12% A, most of the 12% of that A bucket has come through the Freddie Mac K program. Again these are loans -- these are securities that have come through a very disciplined process, disciplined agency process.
It is the only non-consistent programmatic Non-Agency program in the marketplace. Although multifamily sector has very strong fundamentals, we are more alert today in our due diligence of this sector. We were one of the early investors in this sector. We’ve been involved now in building this portfolio since 2009. However, the majority of the marketplace is now taking notice of the multifamily sector, cap rates have dropped considerably and we are aware that this is type of environment where bad credit and investment decisions can be made. Hence our surveillance in due diligence has increased. We continue -- nonetheless, we continue to find value in the multifamily sector.
Let’s move to the next slide. What are the performance facts and what story do they tell? First to the left, the upper left hand chart. Our prepayments results have been excellent. Why do I consider them as excellent? Our average coupon versus many others in the industry is higher and yet our average prepayments fees across the portfolio has actually been lower than many others. What have we done to make a difference? I mentioned a second ago, we selectively pick our pools that go into our portfolio.
However, we emphasize diversity. We methodically structure our portfolio not to be exposed or only expose to anyone sector or as we consider any one type of borrower. And as a result, our average fees have been lower and declining over the last 12 months. We do expect fees to increase as most of the originators continue to try to ramp-up their HARP program, nonetheless and our prepayment assumptions for our portfolio are conservative and higher than our actual experience.
Nonetheless, we continue to believe that we will not see a 2003 type experience in terms of prepayments fees. We believe they will trend up, but we do not believe that they will be uncontrollable and we believe our portfolio has been constructed to minimize our overall experience. Let’s move to the chart to the right, ROE and Book Value. What do these facts tell you? We have continued to generate solid mid-teens ROE without taking on extensive risk.
Our overall leverage for the balance sheet has been below 6% for this quarter. Our overall target is in or around plus or minus a small amount around 6%. As you can see, we generated 14.7% ROE. Our book value increased from $9.20 to $9.62. If we move down to the bottom and consider our net spread. Why did our net spread decrease from 2.56% to 2.41%. It’s a function of math.
As in other -- in past capital raises, we emphasized putting the capital to work in the Agency sector, spreads were lower in the Agency sector than the Non-Agency sector and as a result our average net interest spreads decreased. Again back to once you consider the ROE, overall ROE of the portfolio, again a function of math with the lower average leverage for the quarter in a net spread of 2.41%. If you move that leverage number up to 6% and then you take the net spreads, you’ll start to see what I consider the beauty of our strategy to what our ultimate ROE targets will be in the future.
Let’s move to the next slide. Are there opportunities to invest capital today? The answer is yes. Spreads have tightened throughout the quarter. Best way to look at this period between 2008 and 2012 is that we’ve experienced excessively high spreads in prior years. Spreads are moving to a more normalized level. ROEs continue to be at the double-digits in most -- in almost all respects, those double-digit ROEs are lower than where they may have been in the past.
However our diversified approach affords us a greater opportunity of finding higher ROE investments. We obviously diversify through the residential sector and we diversify and seek out opportunities throughout the CMBS sector. We continue CMBS spreads at the end of -- at the beginning of this quarter widen slightly allowing us even more opportunities to find solid investments in that sector.
Let’s move to Slide 13, extension risk. Why do we worry about extension risk when the Fed is on hold? As far as we are concerned at Dynex Capital, extension risk is a very real risk and we at DX have chosen to minimize this risk by emphasizing short duration assets. If you look at the bottom chart, we simply try to give you examples of how much a security might extend. 30-year securities, that’s some point in a higher rate environment could easily extend between 7 to 10 years. 15-years securities can easily extend 3 years, for short duration Hybrid ARMs, we expect minimal extension. Our analysis is based on history. Our analysis is based on our own experience. And as such, we have chosen to minimize the overall extension risk in our portfolio.
If we move to Slide 14, now let me structure to a repurchase agreements and your interest rate swap hedges. If you’ll take a note to the bottom of the graph to the left, we have structured our repo book with various maturities across 90 days. Some portion of our book, with the largest portion of our book maturing within zero to 30 days. One of the -- I am sorry, 31 to 60 days. One of the challenges that we have is with our hedge accounting, in many respect, it forces us into structure our repo book with maturities between zero and 30 days or maturing within 30 day. We have debated and considered the idea of should we make some changes to the overall hedge accounting election, we have not made any decisions around that.
We continue to look to see, if we put our shareholders in a better risk position, if we make that type of decision, but as we stand today, we continue to elect hedge accounting for our book of business and as such our hedges -- our repo book construction over 90 day period. Throughout the quarter, we continued to add to our swap book. Since quarter end we continue to add to our swap book. We could expect to see our swap percentages slightly increase, as we move to mitigate the overall duration risk in our 5 to 7 year part of our overall portfolio.
And if we move to Slide 16, let me simply summarize. Our portfolio has performed well since 2008 and the earnings power today remains relatively intact. Prepayment risk is mitigated by superior portfolio construction and as I mentioned earlier, we believe our prepayment experience to-date given our high average coupon is been excellent and exceeds the industry. We do expect prepayments fees increase as originators continue to focus on HARP 2.0.
Our credit risk is mitigated by continued focus on highly-rated securities, superior loan origination years and concentration in multifamily sector. I mentioned in our part multiple times, extension risk is mitigated by the short-duration investment portfolio with 79% of our investments maturing or resetting within 7 years and there continues to be attractive investment opportunities. We’re happy with our first quarter and many respects you can simply say that we’ve continued to do what we’ve always done. And as we look forward to the future, we look forward with great anticipation of continuing to deliver solid double-digit returns.
With that I am going to turn it back over to Tom.