Svein Moxnes Harfjeld
Analyst · Chris Robertson from Jefferies. Please ask your question
Thanks, Laila. We have entered into agreement to sell the DHT Hawk and DHT Falcon, with the delivery set to take place during the second quarter. Price is $78 million for the pair and compares favorably to the combined price of $98 million that we paid for them some eight years ago. The fleets are expected to generate some $12 million in combined profits and they will repay the remaining outstanding debt of the vessels amounting to about $13 million in total. Following these sales, the average age or fleet will be reduced and our AER and EEOI metrics improved. On this slide, you will find an update of our cash breakeven levels for the remainder of the year. As per usual, all crew cash costs are included in our presentation, i.e. OpEx, debt amortization, interest, G&A and maintenance CapEx. The numbers are best in class with a required rate of $15,100 per day for the fleet as a whole. And importantly, $8,500 per day for the spot ships specifically in order for the company to be cash neutral for the remaining three quarters of 2022. On this next slide, we wanted to share an observation of the peer group within large tankers. As you will see, there's a distinct change in the development of financial leverage within this group. DHT is represented by the green line and the lowest financial leverage. As you will recall during the last chapter, not only dividend return significant moments to shareholders through quarterly cash dividends, but we also invested in the balance sheets and reduced interest bearing debt by about 60%. Despite the recent tough markets, we have retained our balance sheet strength. And you could also note that we have no newbuilding CapEx commitments. Our takeaway here should simply be that DHT has the strongest balance sheet in the group. I will now offer some commentary on the markets. We believe a market recovery to be underway, but delayed and troubled by COVID in China and geopolitics generally impacting macroeconomics. Admittedly and given all the noise, it is very difficult to predict the near term freight markets. But trying to look through all this noise we see fundamentals developing towards what we expect to be common rewarding markets for large tankers. While inventories are low and are likely more pronounced as energy security is increasingly becoming an issue. OPEC is so far sticking to its plan, but underperformance by the respective members quote us, the much talk about Iran deal takes longer than market observers have suggested. And Russia Ukraine conflict is reducing supply. The U.S. however, announced released from the SPRs [ph], a released that will offer the market a double benefits, firstly through additional barrels to the market over the coming six months, and then likely retail in due course. Further, we don't think it's unreasonable to expect Saudi and the UAE-led OPEC response to higher oil prices at some point maybe in the second half of this year. As you all know shipowners make their living by transporting supply has a danger of talking our own book and stating the obvious more supply would be most welcome. To the sanctions and ensuing trades trade disruptions coming out to the rest of the Ukraine conflict seems to be increasing transportation distances. So far most visible to ships smaller than VLCCs. If freight differentials become too wide, freight tend to flow up and down between the different ship sizes. We saw some of this at the outset of the conflict and should regulate trades see these differentials come back the theory that the tide lifts all boats to hold true. The popin freight rates for VLCCs that you saw a few weeks back is a good indicator that underlying balance is not as bad as the current rates are indicating. Keep in mind that VLCCs typically transport almost 45% of all seaborne crude oil volumes, that closer to 60% on a ton mile basis. This is truly the workhorse of the oil industry. The trade disruptions are changing sourcing of refined oil products, elevating freight rates for product tankers. As this happens at a time of low inventories of both crude oil and refined products, it backs the question whether product tankers are front running crude tankers suggesting the amount for feedstock and thus crude oil transportation to come next. There are currently too many ships in the markets. The road fleet is whoever getting older by the day in combination with low ordering of new ships. The VLCC order book consists plowed 54 ships to be delivered through the remainder of this year and next. This equals a major 6.3% of the existing fleet very low by any reference. With very limited scrapping, the current number of ships older than 20 years has now become significant. These parts of the fleet could grow close to 100 ships by the end of the year assuming low scrapping. You find it discouraging those older ships are not retiring from the fleet, in particular with very healthy demolition prices being offered. Until not long ago, there were hardly any commercial prospects for ships older than 20 years. But sadly, it is only sanctioned trades that keep all these older ships currently in business. These sanctions have simply developed new trades for ships that do not comply with rules and regulations. We do think, however, that something's got to give us dry docks and all the capital expenditure eventually will force all the ships out of the markets. So in sum, all this would lead us to envisage the fleet to potentially shrink at a time when demand for transportation is expected to recover, creating a very rewarding freight environment. It would be a very bold move to bid against large tankers. And with that's we open up for Q&A.