Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for standing by. I'm Mia Valle, your Chorus Call operator. Welcome, and thank you for joining the Fourth Quarter 2016 Analyst Conference Call of Deutsche Bank. Throughout today's recorded presentation, all participants will be in a listen-only mode. The presentation will be followed by a question-and-answer session. I would now like to turn the conference over to John Andrews, Head of Investor Relations. Please go ahead.

Operator, thank you very much, and good afternoon from Frankfurt. I'd like to welcome everyone to our fourth quarter and full year 2016 earnings call. I'm pleased to be joined today by both, John Cryan, our Chief Executive Officer, and Marcus Schenck, our Chief Financial Officer. John will open with some brief comments and then Marcus will take you through the analyst presentation in more detail. And as always, the presentation is available on our website at www.db.com. As we did last quarter and every quarter, I would ask for the sake of efficiency and fairness to questions, please limit themselves to their two most important questions so that we can give as many people a chance to participate in the Q&A session as possible. Let me also provide the normal health warning to pay particular attention to the cautionary statements regarding forward-looking comments and you'll find those at the end of the investor presentation. With that out of the way, let me hand it over to John. John?

Thank you very much and good afternoon, everyone. I intend to keep my remarks very brief. I know Marcus tends to take you through the numbers in quite some detail. Let me start with the group financial highlights that are set out on page two and just pick out some numbers. We're doing this in the afternoon this quarter so you will have had a chance probably to look through the numbers in some detail. But a quarter, on the face of it, which was in very difficult circumstances for the bank, towards the top of the P&L doesn't look too bad. We've reported positive jaws. Our net revenues for the quarter are up on the corresponding quarter the prior year, albeit by just 6%. But the quarter was overshadowed by litigation charges and impairment charges, something totaling €2.6 billion, which drove the loss before tax for the quarter of €2.4 billion and that €2.4 billion reversed the €1.5 billion or so of profit we'd managed to make before tax in the first nine months, yielding a loss of about €800 million for 2016 as a whole. And then we have a tax charge on top of that because of non-tax deductible items leading to a net loss of about €1.4 billion. So a disappointing overall result. However, there were some signs that I take as positive. The first is we managed to keep our reported revenues for the year at €30 billion. That was roughly our target. I admit that on an underlying basis they're a little shy of that, but nevertheless so as 2015 to some extent and there is some good news which I'll cover in a second. On the capital front, we managed to reduce our Risk Weighted Assets to the €358 billion level. I would…

Thanks, John. Welcome, and to the people in the US, good morning. Also from my side, to our Q4 2016 results call, allow me an apology right from the start. I will be talking for quite a bit, and in fact maybe a bit longer than usual given it's a full year review. Let me start by guiding you through the net income bridge for the fourth quarter of last year. Excluding C&A and at constant foreign exchange rates, revenues for the group increased by €0.9 billion versus the prior-year quarter. This includes €0.8 billion related to a gain on sales from our Hua Xia stake in the fourth quarter of 2016. Looking at the divisions, Global Markets revenues were down €41 million in Q4 with higher Debt Sales & Trading revenues offset by lower equity Sales & Trading revenues. For CIB, we saw an uptick in revenues of €36 million, the stronger performance in Corporate Finance was counterbalanced by lower Transaction Banking revenues driven by lower balances and the weak interest rate environment. PWCC revenues were up €504 million year-over-year, which includes a €694 million higher contribution from Hua Xia driven by the aforementioned sale, which was in part offset by lower revenues from the Private Client Services, or PCS, business in the U.S. after that unit was sold in September of last year. Asset Management revenues down by €36 million year-over-year, revenues profited from an increase in performance in transaction fees offset by negative fair value adjustments of guaranteed products and reduced management fees as well as the reduced assets under management. Postbank revenues were up by approximately €200 million, driven by ceased revenue burden from an adjustment to Bauspar interest provisions in the fourth quarter – which we booked in the fourth quarter of 2015. Non-Core Unit…

Operator, if we can begin the Q&A, please. Operator?

Ladies and gentlemen, at this time we will begin the question-and-answer session. And your first question is from Jernej Omahen of Goldman Sachs. Please go ahead.

Okay. So good afternoon from my side as well. I guess the first question it's fair to kick it off by saying, well done on settling the U.S. litigation issues and on stabilizing the institution. But I guess that, as a consequence, the debate is now going to shift from the financial stability aspect to the topic of profitability. And I have just one question on this. And it goes as follows. So even post-settlement and stabilization, the funding costs for Deutsche Bank have risen and are higher today than at the time the restructuring plan was initially announced just over a year ago. The balance sheet constraint, I guess, is higher than what you must have thought at the time of the announcement. And if we take all the bad things out from the results, so litigation and one-offs, we get to just below 5% return on equity. So thinking about profitability in 2017 and 2018, when the starting point without litigation, without restructuring costs is 5%, when the funding costs are higher, when balance sheet is a constraint, how do we get from just below 5% to the 10% target or even perhaps just 7% or 8%? That would be my first question. Maybe the second one, purely on regulation. You talked about the Trump effect on the revenue side of the equation. It seems to be that there is a stalemate at the Basel Committee currently on finalizing Basel III. And I thought if you could share any thoughts with us on that. Thanks a lot.

Jernej, Marcus, let me start and then, John, you add. So, on your first question, which is, obviously one which would probably warrant almost a longer discussion, let me highlight the core points. First, I mean, we are seeing, at least relative to where we were three months ago, a tightening in our funding cost. But you're right. It's higher than – and I think you're referring to what it looked like in October of 2015. And we clearly have to do more to bring that down. With more and more clarity kicking in, in particular, on the litigation fronts, we would expect this to come down further. That's the first point. Secondly, we have not yet seen a lot of structural improvements on the cost side. I was highlighting that our target to – excluding Postbank gets to an adjusted cost base by 2018 is to be below the €22 billion number. And in fact, with that, you shouldn't interpret this as we're targeting to be at €21.9 billion. Now I don't want to hand out a number, but we clearly think we need to and can be more aggressive on that side, in particular utilizing – and that's why we put in place, I would say, a qualified hiring freeze. We can utilize the natural turnover that we do have in the bank. That cost save will give us quite some uplift. Most notably, quite frankly, you will also see this in our Retail business. And we do expect the revenue position of the bank that we had experienced in 2016 not to be representative for the coming years. As we've mentioned several times, we are already here in January now seeing just from the way clients interact with us, but also me just looking into the daily…

Can I just add a little comment on your funding cost point, Jernej? You shouldn't forget that the funding cost increase from spread increase that we saw, particularly in the fourth quarter, doesn't have a dramatic impact on our overall cost of funds because although the funded balance sheet is around about €1 trillion, we're only talking about the non-deposit fraction of that. And when our funding spreads were at their widest, we didn't lock them in. We didn't actually issue. We have seen it tightening. We're not happy that it's tightened enough. I actually think this company has always been extremely creditworthy. We just need to be able to show that with very long liquidity. And one thing which I would add just not to overdo the optimism, if you think about our deposit business, we're actually getting some tailwinds now because, less so in euros but certainly in dollars, the shape of the yield curve is actually now enabling us to make money from our liabilities. So a change in the yield curve, I think, over time, will to some extent counter effect the effect over time of replenishing our spread-affected funding.

Thanks for that. John, maybe if I just come back to your question very briefly. So it used to be the case that Deutsche funded cheaper than any of its competitors, particularly in the Investment Banking space. So did I understand your answer correctly? Do you expect that to return at some point in the future?

That's why we turn up to work every day. No, I really do. I mean, we're the Europe's leading bank. We should fund at a rate that reflects that.

All right. Okay. Thanks a lot.

Next question is from the line of Jon Peace of Credit Suisse. Please go ahead. Jon Peace - Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Ltd.: Yes. Thank you. I think, Marcus, you said this morning that fixed income trading was up 40% in January which would be a terrific acceleration and put you on the first quarter 2015 run rate. And I just wondered, is that all client business. Or was there anything unusual and lumpy in there? And then my second question was on Deutsche Postbank. What's the book value of that business at the moment? Because I think it's a bit less than the equity you allocated to it in the Financial Data Supplement. So I think it's a little bit less than €5 billion. And I just wondered, what is your sensitivity around the disposal of that business. How much of a write-down are you prepared to accept? What sort of CET1 accretion are you ideally looking for? Thank you.

Okay. Let me take the second question first. We have not and don't plan to disclose the book value of our Postbank asset because it's not a terribly helpful metric to disclose, in particular when an M&A track is also an option, which is why I also find it difficult to comment on an acceptable write-down. I think the only data that we can point to is that this business has, rounding, €40 billion of Risk Weighted Assets, which would – where about €40 billion would leave the bank in case of a disposal, be that via an exit through the capital market or through an M&A deal. And I guess one thing is also clear, and John has never made a secret out of that, I mean we will only be selling this asset if it gives us a meaningful capital relief, and hence, we will certainly not accept a major write-down. But I really ask for your understanding that from a negotiation point of view, it wouldn't be terribly smart for us to disclose the book value. On your first question, so, on the debt side, yes I did mention that January have seen an almost exactly 40% increase when comparing January 2017 with January 2016. There's nothing unusual there. It's clearly not all client activity. Some of that is also buy and hold positions. Let me, in this context, also highlight that – because we don't want to only throw out selective positive metrics, although, quite frankly, the pickup that we're seeing is in almost every business – where it's still pretty slow is in Equity Sales & Trading, where it's flattish to slightly down relative to the January 2016 numbers. This is predominantly driven by the fact that it just takes some time until you in a way bring back particular those prime brokerage balances which I think we've been fairly clear, some of which we lost in those unfortunate six weeks between September 2014 and the end of October. But there is reengagement and we have gradually seeing this turn. So on the Equity side, I'd be more cautious. It will take more time. The Debt side has reacted much, much faster. Jon Peace - Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Ltd.: Great. Thank you.

Next question is from the line of Kian Abouhossein of JPMorgan. Please go ahead.

Yes. Thanks for taking my question. First of all, congratulations, John, on the NCOU. That seems to be by far the best-performing business meeting its budget, I assume, for the year. I wanted to understand the Risk Weighted Assets movements in the group going forward because when I look at your capital generation, it's been mainly through shrinkage of Risk Weighted Assets. And it looks like that has been your focus for the fourth quarter. And I wonder, 2017, is that going to be a year of let's reengage and generate profits? I know January started well. But still, is that going to be the focus or is it going to be the key issue is capital buildup? And that could mean potential further shrinkage. And that takes me to the Risk Weighted Asset question considering that you used to have or still have a target of €320 billion by 2018 ex-Postbank if that is still relevant, that target, if you're there now ex-Postbank. And the second question relates to the cost base. If I adjust for variable compensation, I'm looking at roughly a cost of €25.8 billion run rate. It's probably even a bit lower I would think. And your original target was €26.5 billion. So you're running roughly €1 billion lower and I wonder is it not time to maybe reconsider the below €22 billion target and give a more updated target at this point? Thank you.

I guess I'll give it a first shot and then, John, you add. So, on your first question, RWA development in 2017 and focus. On the side of Risk Weighted Assets, we would expect those to actually go up, the reason – when you would take as a starting point the end of 2016 situation. And let me highlight and then I'll come back to 2017 what really happened in the fourth quarter. In a way, it's quite simple. You had a €30 billion reduction when you look at the whole group. €10 billion is from the disposal of Hua Xia and Abbey; €10 billion – I'm rounding a little bit – is from the NCOU; and €10 billion is in CIB end markets. This third €10 billion in CIB end markets, look at this as this was a reduction in business volume which we don't think is sustainable, as in will come back and we're actually seeing quite a bit of that already in the first month. So, you should make the assumption that there will be an increase in that space which will also take the Risk Weighted Assets back up a bit. And I think this is more a level which I think is sustainable or more sustainable throughout the year. Now there will always be some movement up or down. We will see some increase on the side of Operational Risk assets against the backdrop that the litigation settlements that we had in Q4 will actually only impact our Operational Risk Weighted Assets with a one quarter delay. So there will be some uplift. So long winded answer to highlight that, €358 billion will probably grow by €10 billion-plus in the very near future and is then more representative for how you should think about Deutsche…

Okay. Thank you.

And the next question is from Stuart Graham of Autonomous Research. Please go ahead.

Oh. Hi, guys. Thanks for taking my question. I have two questions on capital first. The first question is on RWAs again. At the October 2015 Strategy Update, you talked about €40 billion of RWA inflation mainly due to Operational Risk over the period 2015 to 2018, and that was due to industry loss data, so nothing to do with Basel IV. I think so far we've had less than €7 billion of that, so my first question is, how should we think about that original €40 billion guidance? And within that, what if anything are you assuming from the ECB's TRIM project? The second question then is on the SREP ratio, which I think you're fully loaded SREP – fully loaded is 12.76%, which I'm calculating by taking the disclosed 11.76% and adding a Pillar 2G of 1%. So I guess the 12.5% CET1 target was based on a 25 basis points buffer on the old fully loaded SREP of 12.25%. So I guess I'm struggling to understand why 12.5% is still the right target on a fully loaded basis. Shouldn't it be more like 13%? That was my second question. Thank you.

I'll take the questions in the reverse order. So let me start with – I don't know where our SREP level is going to be in 2019 because we have not received our SREP letter for that year. What we do know is the levels we need to achieve in 2017 where the requirements that we need to be is just 9.51%. Now you can look at this and look at the development that we will see with the phasing-in of the capital conservation buffer as well as the G-SIB buffer, which will gradually take that number up, at the end, again, I mean people will probably know or notice the G-SIB buffer will, over time, double from 1% to 2%, and the capital conservation buffer will also double from where it is now. Now it is at 1.25%, and it will grow to 2.5%. These are the movements that we know which will move, over time, until 2019, should move the MDA up mathematically. This has always said that our guide (01:13:34) would move it to 11.51%. How big then the add-on from the Pillar 2 guidance is? Quite frankly, we don't know. And which is why we would stick to what we have been saying so far – namely, we want to be at least at 12.5%. That doesn't suggest we want to be at 12.51%. We want to be at least at 12.5%. But these are the facts that we know today. On your first question regarding the Operational Risk Weighted Assets, you rightfully point out that we had in October of 2017 said that we are expecting a good portion of the €100 billion to come from Op Risk. Some of that will be driven by the industry and our own losses. And as I highlighted, you should expect – the market should expect some increase in Operational Risk Weighted Assets in the year 2017 on the back of the large RMBS settlement and other settlements that we have. I don't want to throw out a number but it's probably – it can be a high-single-digit number which we will see this year. The outcome from Basel, we don't know. We actually think what we're hearing is that the impact on Operational Risk right now looks a bit more muted than what we had anticipated in October of 2015 on the credit side. On the other hand, I would say, there are still some items which are open there that could be somewhat downside in a sense that the number might be lower. On balance, we would still stick to the €100 billion that we had highlighted.

Could I just clarify on that then? So you finished the year with Risk Weighted Assets of €358 billion. You're saying there will be some bounce back in CIB and Global Markets, so let's say that is maybe €10 billion. Then you've got the Operational Risk which maybe that's €8 billion. So it's kind of €18 billion of RWA increase-ish. And then ECB's TRIM project, do you have any clarity around that?

Given – first of all, timing wise, it's quite some time until this will really sort of kick in and we'll potentially start to have an impact and we don't know in what direction. We don't expect that to have an impact in 2017.

Okay. And then just to finalize then, you're basically saying your SREP ratio, you're managing the bank on the phased-in, not on the fully loaded because you don't know what the fully loaded is going to be in 2019, yeah?

Well, in 2019, phased-in and fully loaded will be the same. There is no difference.

But you don't know what the Pillar 2G will be at that point?

That's correct. That is correct.

Got it. Thank you.

Yeah. Thanks, Stuart.

Next question is from the line of Daniele Brupbacher of UBS. Please go ahead.

Thank you. Good afternoon. Can I just briefly come back to the MDA trigger level you've just discussed? And I mean, you said that there is variables. If CCB doubles, that's 125 basis points and if G-SIB doubles to 2%, that's another 100 basis points. So that my calculation would be a 225 basis point increase compared to the 9.51%. So am I wrong assuming it would increase on a five years (01:17:26) basis to 11.76%? So a bit higher. Just wanted to clarify that. And then I wanted to ask about the Risk Weighted Assets in Global Markets. Obviously a big success in reducing Non-Core. But I was wondering within Global Markets, you also at the Investor Day announced certain reduction targets, I think it was €30 billion or something, but that is obviously a net number. And I was just wondering how you think about, let's call it, recycling of existing RWAs. There must be some RWA which is relatively unprofitable and whether you can sort of get out of these positions and reinvest that money at much higher levels. And then, John, just regarding the interest rate sensitivity that was very useful in terms of how you think about it and what your exposure could be. But will it be somewhat possible to be a bit more specific around what a, let's say, 100 basis point parallel shift of the U.S. yield curve would mean at least like in the banking book? I'm not talking about second order impact in terms of trading volumes, et cetera. That would be extremely helpful. Thank you.

On the first question, the 9.51% is still on a phased-in basis. So, when you do the math in the – and we're happy to send you a sheet that shows that and maybe we actually can even put this on the web. On a fully-loaded basis, you will then in 2019 get to the 11.51%. You do the second question?

Yes. And well, the second sub-part of that was the recycling of low return RWA, and that is very much part of the strategy for Global Markets. In fact, we're having the guys in markets formalize that a bit more by setting aside a clear view for us in the senior management of the company what assets are effectively legacy or back book, and then we will see a recycling. I mean, to some extent, if you take our forex business, they're recycling almost daily, weekly, but there would be the ability for us to recycle throughout the group some of the Risk Weighted Assets or the capital capacity that's freed up by running off some of the old back books. Sorry. On the interest rates sensitivity, I mean, it's very, very broad arithmetic, but if you took all of our spread-effected funding and you had a parallel shift of 100 basis points, you could do some quick arithmetic and get to something like €0.5 billion. But it's not great arithmetic, and we wouldn't expect a parallel shift anyway. But it's that order of magnitude.

Okay. Thank you. That's very helpful.

Next question is from Magdalena Stoklosa of Morgan Stanley. Please go ahead. Magdalena L. Stoklosa - Morgan Stanley & Co. International Plc: Thanks very much. Good afternoon. My first question is more structurally about the evolution of your FICC business from here. We've heard about better client engagement, better trading environment, but within your FICC portfolio going forward, where are you likely and of most to commit some balance sheet? And how you think about it more strategically? And on the industry level, if you were to take a stab at the magnitude of the global FICC revenue growth this year, what would your guesstimate be? So that's my first question. And my second request is a follow-up from my predecessor. The interest rate sensitivity – of course, we are kind of looking at a revenue split, which almost 50% is NII. So would you be able to give us slightly more context in terms of your sensitivity to short-end rate both in U.S. and in Europe? And also the level of potential upside driven by the steepness of the yields, be it the bonds or in the U.S.? Thank you.

Okay. Let me take a crack at the evolution of the fixed income business. The big profit driver within our overall complex fixed income trading has always been our Credit Solutions business where credit trading house, first and foremost, when it comes to driving the profit line, and that would be generally the area in which we would to allocate capital. Now within fixed income, comes our forex business. It doesn't have much elasticity in demand. It's a very large, very stable business, but it's one we like. And we like the returns in that. In rates, I think it's fair to say a lot of the business that we used to write, a lot of the long-dated business, some of the complex and non-linear rates products that were written have really gone out of fashion, and that's more now of almost a securities business, centrally cleared, daily margined. And the margins there have fallen. And generally, our old OTC derivatives books are running off, and they're being replaced by a lot more liquid and materialized types of instruments. But credit, I think, is the area where we have a lot of value, where we're one of the market leaders, and where we're seeing, at the moment, a fair amount of client engagement. And it's very complementary to our client franchise out of the CIB.

On interest rates, I mean, admittedly I don't have for you broken down into currency and then short-end and the long-end of the curve, what does it mean? What may be at least directionally helpful is when you look at a shift in the overall curve by 100 basis points then for our stable businesses, and only for those you can actually give a reasonably reliable guidance, that represents an upward shift in the curve by 100 basis points, represents about €600 million higher revenue for the bank. So in our Global Markets business, it's quite dependent on how you're positioned and it's much more difficult and can actually vary the answer depending on the position of the bank, which is why I would shy away from giving any guidance there. But for the stable businesses or where we take deposits, 100 basis point shift is roughly equivalent to a €600 million improvement. Magdalena L. Stoklosa - Morgan Stanley & Co. International Plc: Can we – and I'm sorry to be drilling on this. But, particularly, your euro sensitivity, because there's a friction in the market you could argue. Euribor had shifted up quite significantly over the last month. And if we assume some normalization from the negative, minus €40 billion of the ECB, that's short-end of the curve. Particularly kind of within the Postbank, particularly within your kind of banking book in Germany and in Western Europe in general, what would that sensitivity be? Because it would be very helpful for us as a context of how to sensitize the revenues going forward in those banking books.

So we need to come back to you there. The only reliable data I can give you now is what I said before. Magdalena L. Stoklosa - Morgan Stanley & Co. International Plc: Okay. Thank you very much.

Next question is from Andrew Coombs of Citi. Please go ahead.

Yes. Good afternoon. One question on slide 17 (sic) [16] on the Global Markets revenue outlook and then a second question on slide 34 on litigation. If I start with the Global Markets revenues, I'm intrigued by your comments particularly on the Prime. You said the FX being quick to recover. Equities will take a longer time. So with that in mind, could you give us an idea of the magnitude of the move in Prime Finance client balances over the past couple of quarters and perhaps how much of that relates to clients actually switching prime brokers, i.e., a permanent rebasing lower. And then my second question on slide 34. You made a lot of progress on settling some of the outstanding litigation cases. So I was slightly surprised that the contingent litigation liabilities have increased from €1.6 billion to €2.2 billion. Perhaps you could elaborate on what's driving that? You mentioned increased civil claims but I'd be interested in your commentary. Thank you.

So maybe I start with your first question, which I understand is related to our Prime brokerage business. In terms of balances that we lost in this tricky time period, I would say, it's sort of in the high-teens percentage points that we have lost. And we are now or since then we have seen a recovery of around a quarter of what we had lost. You take the litigation?

Yes. On the contingent liabilities, we don't break them down. A lot of them are related still to legacy positions where we've received suits against us of a civil nature but relating to themes that you'll be familiar with.

Okay. Just last -

The only item I'd like to add maybe to the contingent liability movement, because sometimes this excites people, the increase that we have seen in contingent liabilities is all outside the United States.

Okay. Thank you. As a follow up (01:28:26) -

You're breaking up and your line is very – it's not stable.

Andrew, we cannot hear you.

Mr. Coombs, do you have a handset to use?

Is that clear?

No.

I'm sorry.

I'll come back. Thank you.

Thank you. And we go on with the next questioner is Fiona Swaffield from RBC.

Hi. Good afternoon. I had two questions. One was on leverage exposure and what we should look at going forward because I think if you take out Postbank, you're kind of at – you're already past your goals. So is there scope to reduce the leverage further, any more efficiencies going on and what the plan would be there? And the second is, you helpfully gave the impact or estimated impact of business exits and other moving parts on Global Markets. If we look at PWCC revenues, how much do you think the decline in 2016 was just due to idiosyncratic risk in that position? Thanks.

I'll do the easy one, which was the first one, and let Marcus do the second. On leverage exposure, I do think there is scope for a reduction in our CRD4 leverage. The two areas that I would highlight, one is our liquidity pool. There will come a day when we don't need to run such enormous balances to placate our creditors and we should be able to take that down materially. And then we have, as we've mentioned before, significant add-on in our derivatives book, which I think is really a response to the fact that there's a limited confidence in some of our contract administration systems. And, over time, that will come off and that's still quite a sizable amount. I think it's shy of €150 billion or so.

Your second question was related to the – what we estimate to be the impact from sort of the DB idiosyncratic effects on our revenues. So we gave you where we think this is for markets. So, again, just for sake of making sure that it's clear. Markets, for the full-year, we had a reduction in revenues to the tune of €1.6 billion, of which €400 million we would attribute to conscious decisions the bank took in terms of exiting geographies and business segments. And the remaining €1.2 billion is – a bit more than 50% of that is what we think is DB idiosyncratic noise. The equivalent metric for PWCC – and, again, there's no science behind it but it's kind of slightly shy of €100 million has probably been the impact largely in the Wealth business.

Thanks very much.

Next question is from the line of Al Alevizakos of HSBC. Please go ahead.

Hi. Thank you for taking my question. I've got one question more technical and one more strategic. I'm going to start with the more technical one on the back of you just said – what you just said, Marcus. I'm just interested to know on Operational Risk. I know that we're going to take additional RWA in 2017 because of all the settlements that just happened, but I'm just wondering after how many years actually can you reduce the Operational Risk related to specific losses that happened in the past. So, for example, the libel was a 2012 event. When will you be able to deduct it off the Operational Risk pool for the overall industry and for yourself? And then the second question is about the overall strategy for the Investment Bank. I do understand that you're trying basically to regain some market share. However, given that you have to keep on cutting costs and compensation and defer basically a lot of the bonuses, what actually makes you comfortable in the current market that you can retain all your top performers compared to some of your peers that actually they've got, let's say, more capital and they are coming in quite aggressively? Thank you.

Let me take the second one first. On strategy, it's our intention to pay people market rates. The cost excess in our Investment Bank has always been our administration systems. We run far too many booking systems, far too many booking model. And we gave optionality over the way we did things to people and we're imposing the Deutsche Bank way of doing things. We're standardizing. We're computerizing. And the general and administrative expenses of the bank should come down significantly. The constraint would have been more in terms of capital resources and RWA capacity, but that, as we've shown, is plentiful. So I don't see any constraint over growing that business quite significantly in the course of the next year or two years.

Your question with regard to Operational Risk and when that starts to roll off, typically there would be something like a 10-year timeline, roughly, for that. So we would expect actually in 2018 the first items being starting to be taken out of our historical lock, so to say, but as you can see, it's still going to take quite some time until this will lead to a more material reduction in Operational Risk. And then also we need to see what the outcome in Basel is going to be, because it could be that the entire Operational Risk regime may actually in a way also change and be much more tied to size as measured in revenues and become more proportionate to that. But given today's rules, we would start to see first things roll off in 2018, but we'll have this for quite a while in our RWA.

Great. Thank you very much.

Thanks. And, operator, let me apologize in advance. We're 95 minutes into this, which is the length of your typical Hollywood film, and I know John and Marcus have an obligation so we have time for just one more question.

And the question is from Andrew Stimpson of Bank of America. Please go ahead.

Thanks, guys. Thanks for squeezing me in there. First question on Risk Weighted Assets, and just really helpful commentary around the rebound you expect in markets and then on Operational Risk. But I'm just wondering about Market Risk Weighted Assets. On slide 45 of the presentation packet, it looks like I guess that would make it kind of Christmastime or late December you had a big, what I would consider, VaR exception. I'm just wondering if that's going to feed through to some Market Risk Weighted Assets that isn't to do with client activity. And when that might feed through if that is the case? And then secondly on – I suppose this is a question about leverage. The LCR is at 128%. It is a bit higher than it used to, but it's not exceptionally high versus many of your peers. So, John, I know you said that you would expect that to come down, but given it's not that high versus peers, how much do you think that can really come down? And is it high because of CCAR? So CCAR in the U.S., once that's done it's going to come down? Because by my thinking if that doesn't come down, and you do see some of your securities financing transaction balances come back, then that's going to place some pretty significant backwards pressure on your leverage ratio. So I'm just trying to think how to pair that with the business growth you're talking about in January as well, please. Thank you.

Well, on the liquidity buffer, I was being aspirational as to there being a time when we wouldn't need quite so much. I don't think it will be in the course of 2017 necessarily, although we'll see how it pans out. But I wouldn't expect to see that come down too much. We do need to make sure, though, that it doesn't grow much beyond where it is today.

Despite that you did spot in the Appendix, we'll not have an impact on the Market Risk Weighted Assets going forward.

Okay. Maybe I'll follow up on that later.

Great. Thank you, everyone, for your patience, and apologies to a small handful who could not get in their queues given the extended commentary we had to do today given it was full-year results. Obviously the IR team is available for any follow-up questions you may have, and we wish you a good rest of the day.

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