Brian Gallagher
Analyst · Webber Research
Thank you, Hugo. Slide 11, as Hugo says, looks at a number of different features and illustrates, in particular, why the storage of crude in ships has come into play so quickly. With 90% of us on some form of lockdown over the past 45 days in March and April, the IEA forecasted demand for crude has fallen by around 25 million barrels per day during that period. Yet during that same period, we've seen production actually being maintained at similar levels. This disconnect, we believe, has produced somewhere around about 1.1 billion barrels of excess crude, the same level as the EIA and others estimate is the global onshore capacity for storage. Indeed, earlier today, Reuters reported that the storage facilities onshore in Europe are already full. This is reflected in the recent move to use ships to store oil, in particular, over the last 3 to 4 weeks. We believe then that despite the OPEC cuts, which has started to bite in the last week or so, and production shut-ins by commercial players, any additional excess production from here is likely to have to find some form of home in storage and most likely on ships. This will be a key driver for our market over the summer months, but we believe that Slide 12 shows that not all storage is created equal. On Slide 12, we believe it's important to take a step back and look that this process has only just begun. It's important to remember that we've got the Iranian fleet with around 38 VLCCs and a permanent number of around about 20 to 22 VLCCS, which are always storing oil and is part of the infrastructure chain. This has nothing to do with the current COVID-19-related issues. Therefore, around about 8% of the VLCC fleet in the world has always been otherwise employed before this disconnect between consumption and production started. What is also interesting from Slide 12 is that unlike other periods, when we've had storage requirement, this is not just a VLCC show. Traders, for instance, estimate that 61 Suezmax are currently used for what we would say market storage reasons. That's already 11% of that particular fleet. And that there are 65 VLCCs in market storage at the end of April. The true scale and impact of storage, we believe, therefore has not yet fully been revealed, given the speed and scale of the changes that are ongoing in the disconnect between production and consumption. So how do we see this developing? We look at this on Slide 13 with a very simple schematic. We look at the demand for storage that is not just driven by those [Indiscernible] who are out to derive profit via contango, but also increasingly by logistical players, who are forced either involuntary or voluntarily to use ships in order to transit oil or store oil. We believe that this phase will persist well into the second half of 2020. Clearly, and the market focus has been very acute on this, there will be a transition phase in the midterm, as we say, on Slide 13, into a different phase. As the inventory draw starts, if it's slow, then we believe the disruption to stripping will also be slow. If it is more rapid and accelerated, then past experience suggests that the contango price structure can remain in place for a prolonged period of time. In 2015, for instance, we still had 20-plus VLCCs used for storage even when the market went into backwardation in 2016. Many commentators believe that this midterm phase will kick in sooner rather than later, and then the inventory drawdown will be rapid and, therefore, will impact on shipping much quicker. We find it difficult to envisage a shipping sector that works in real time, however. Our voyages take off in days, months, and are often spill over quarter end periods, and often take longer than the simple calculation of how long those voyages will take. There is planning. There is congestion, and there are a lot of external factors that impact on our business. However, we are not complacent. Management at Euronav do recognize that this middle phase will provide challenges for the tanker sector. And when the inventory drawdown starts, that is likely to accelerate and bring pressure on our business in terms of freight rates. But it will also bring what we believe is the last phase in Slide 14 and 15, sustained pressure for a resizing of the global tanker fleet, which we look at in the last couple of slides. Slide 14 shows the large tanker fleet, we believe, is right for resizing. Financing is becoming ever harder. And with increased regulation from areas like Basel IV and environmental pressure from the EU and the IMO, this is only going to intensify. Contracting of new orders is prevented by the requirement for the new propulsion system in order to meet these new stringent environmental requirements. And with an 18- to 20-year life on average for a VLCC or a Suezmax, ordering a new vessel is also having the additional challenge that the likely medium-term trajectory will demand is also going to be a negative pressure. All of this is just really restricting the new supply of tankers reflected in the 23-year low that we see in the order book. On Slide 15 to sum up, we look at the continued grounds for optimism at the existing fleet in which the large end of the tanker space, in terms of VLCCs and Suezmax, has an awful lot of potential change coming. On average, for every quarter between now and the end of 2021, there were 27 VLCC equivalents due for special survey on vessels aged over 15 years of age. Why does this matter? The surveys will require several million dollars worth of investment to be spent in order to give your ship certification for the following 30 months. Owners will have to have confidence and visibility that they'll be able to make a return in this time frame, which, with low freight rates, is going to be harder to justify. One of a better phrase, this pinch point is critical and historically or often been so. This is usually a catalyst for ships leaving the fleet to an alternative lease or to the scrapyard. To put this into context, though, if 2/3 of the vessels that we see on this final slide were to leave the fleet on Slide 14, the global tanker fleet would resize almost instantly to an oil consumption level of 95 million barrels a day, which is where a lot of commentators believe that even on the barest scenario, that's where the consumption levels will move off. It's time now. We probably can move on to some questions. That concludes the end of the prepared remarks, and I'll now pass it back to the operator. Thank you.