Very good. Thank you. Thanks everybody. Welcome. Let's start straight into the slides. One slide three. which I think is up in front of you right now. Let me do a little bit of stage setting here for how this presentation is set up. This is the only page that uses the statutory numbers, that is to say, the reported numbers after applying IFRS 16. As you know, we like to look at our businesses on a pre-IFRS 16 basis because we think that, that makes it easier to understand and analyze the actual underlying cash performances of the business, which we spend a lot of time trying to do. So once we get past this slide, everything that you'll be looking at will be on a pre-IFRS 16 basis. The other thing that you'll notice is that we make a lot of stress on underlying performance, right, as opposed to the full reported performance. Why do we do that? It's essentially because when we look at the underlying, right, we are excluding the effect of very material one-off things like asset sales, of which, of course, in the first half, we had the sale of U.K. Power Networks and we had the sale of U.K. rails, right, which are wonderful things to have, right? But you're not understanding your businesses if you're just looking at gross numbers that include onetime events such as those. The second thing that we had to do this year is to exclude all of the effects relating to the telecoms business in the U.K. Frankly, the mathematics of comparing the first half last year when we had 3 U.K. on a stand-alone basis for several months, and then we had the merger impact coming in, which gave us a rather large noncash loss and a lot of cash that came in later on. We then proceeded from there and you get to looking at this first half of 2026. Our interest in MergeCo generated losses, right, for us as they built out the combined business plan, which was expected. But nevertheless, by the time we get to the month of the end of April, we've achieved certainty that the transaction to sell our interest, our remaining interest of Vodafone is going to complete, which basically means that from that point on, right, we treated it -- we've treated our interest there as an asset held for sale. We've stopped equity accounting, right, for the results. All of that noise makes a period-on-period comparison very, very, very messy. So we decided the best thing to do is simply to ignore and not take account of the impact, right, of the U.K. telecom business when looking at the first half of 2025 or the first half of 2026. So that's the scene setter or the background setter. And now I'll get into the meat of the slides and try and move as efficiently as I can. Starting with the revenue. Obviously, quite a healthy 7% revenue growth in underlying revenues. The one thing that I would point out, and this is a recurrent theme is that we enjoyed by comparison to the first half of 2025, some very favorable foreign currency headwinds. So for example, when you look at this revenue growth, actually 4% of that comes from positive ForEx movements compared to the January to June movements in 2025, right? So it's good, but we need to be realistic about what we're seeing underlying in the businesses and take account of fair winds or fall, of course, they go into the results, but they don't have a whole lot to do, right, with your operational management of the businesses. When we get to net earnings, I mean, again, we have a solid 6% pre-IFRS 16 growth, 7%, right, post. That's actually a very small numerate difference. And that translates into the reported EPS, obviously. And the dividend per share, the way that we did that was pretty well exactly the same way as we've been doing it for many periods now was to look at the underlying pre-IFRS growth, right, 6%, right, and take a slightly cautious approach in the first half. You'll know that last year, of course, in the second half, we made sure that the dividend for the whole year, reflected the underlying earnings growth for the full year. And I would expect that we would do that again this year. If we go to the next page, okay, we're now in a world where everything is presented on a pre-IFRS 16 basis. You can think of that the major difference being that when you see EBITDA numbers, you're looking at EBITDA after lease expenses, and that is particularly important in businesses like our Retail businesses. So we had very good underlying EBITDA growth. But again, 2/3 of that came from positive ForEx movements. Pretty well the same pattern in terms of the underlying changes in EBIT. Once you go to operating free cash flow, that number looks a little bit disappointing because it's a decline compared to the first half of last year. But there's really nothing to be alarmed about. We'll go into this in a bit more detail in a later slide. But fundamentally, there were 2 significant investments made, right, in what are called associates and joint ventures in 2026 that were not there in 2025. And that's an equity investment that we made in Northumbrian Water. And you can just think of that as money good because that under the regulatory regime, all of this does is it makes sure that the company is not overly debt burdened, right, in order to spend, what it needs to spend over the course of the next 5 years. So Northumbrian Water will never be like Thames Water. And that's just an equity investment that's going to give a very, very good regulated return, right, as we go forward. The other was a strange one. It's a timing difference. In 2025, we received a major return of capital from TPG, which is another associate, in Australia. And we were always going to use that to repay loans, but we didn't get to do it in 2025. We did it in early 2026. So it's really a timing difference, right, rather than a real difference. If you take those 2 items out, which total HKD 3.7 billion, right, then obviously, you get back to pretty well the same growth in operating free cash flow as you see in EBITDA. The last thing that I would point out is the obvious, which is with the cash inflows in the group, our consolidated net debt to total capital dropped to 8.1%. And obviously, with the proceeds that we've now received in the second half from the sale of our interest in VodafoneThree in the U.K., that drops to more in the area of 2%, right? So we have a very first world problem in terms of being overcapitalized, if you want to think of it that way. If we go to the next page, we take a look at EBITDA, right? First, looking at the circular charts on the left, I would not look at the reported charts because they're very distorted by the onetime elements. So looking at the underlying really not much significant change. Important to note, as always, that this company is the multinational arm of the group. And so a total of 5%, right, of our cash generation, if you want to think of it that way, comes from Hong Kong and the Chinese Mainland. There's another slight distortion in here because the EBITDA contribution, right, from Cenovus, our share of Cenovus' EBITDA was really quite high. And that all lands in finance and investment. And you might have thought that it would land in Canada, but it doesn't. It lands in finance and investment. So that's why that's 24% compared to last year, 20%. If we go down and take a look at the mix by business, I mean, you've got the same sort of minor distortion in terms of finance investment and others relative to everything else. But other than that, not a lot, right, has changed right in the mix. I think now if we go to the waterfall on the right. The first thing we have to do is go from the reported numbers in the first half of 2025, right, and take out the onetime items, which I described, including all of the U.K.-related items. So that basically gives you an underlying EBITDA number, right, comparable for first half of 2025 of 53.4 billion. And if we go through very quickly, right, the -- how you get to this year's reported number of 79.6 billion; ports, right, is a little bit down. That's really quite unfair because that is after taking account of our 2 ports in Panama being stolen from us which accounts for $450-some-odd million of lost EBITDA for the 4 months from February. And we also had a significantly lower contribution from some interest in shipping lines. So if you take those out, actually, we would have had good growth, right, but for the unlawful expropriation that took place of our Panamanian assets. So Ports is operating very well underneath and Dominic will be talking more about that later. Retail, healthy growth, right? Infrastructure, I can tell you right away that, that is entirely due to losing the contribution from the assets that were sold, U.K. Rails and U.K. Power Assets for the months that they were no longer owned by us. But everything else, right, basically showed the appropriate amount of growth, right, year-on-year. So the infrastructure results are actually very good despite being a little bit lower on the EBITDA front than in 2025. CKH Group Telecoms we'll be going into in more detail, not having the easiest of times, right? The cost structure doesn't go away, but some of the revenue opportunity did go away. And bingo, you get an adverse comparison to the first half of last year, and I'll let Kwan go through that later on. The contribution from finance and investment and others, is significantly up. Now that's really because of 2 reasons. One is the contribution that we got from a very, very good performance from IOH in Indonesia, which is accounted for under this division. And also the Cenovus contribution, partially offset by a onetime gain that we had last year, which we didn't have this year. So if you go all the way over to the right and you -- after the HKD 56.5 million of underlying EBITDA, you add back, right, the onetime items and VodafoneThree's results, right, you get to a $79.653. And then you'll notice that the impact of IFRS 16 would take that to $92.9 billion. So that's actually USD 1.7 billion difference between pre and post-IFRS on the EBITDA line, which is precisely why we like to present it, right, on a pre-IFRS basis rather than a post-IFRS basis. If we go to the next slide, operating free cash flow, right? Again, as I said before, it does look a little bit disappointing, but that is entirely due if you look at the brown bar, right, on the right-hand side of the first half 2026 HKD 30.635 billion, right, incoming, you'll see that HKD 3.7 billion that I referred to in the investments in associates, right, and joint ventures. That's what the light brown color is about. And of course, if you take that out, then you would have completely restored growth. If you look at the circular chart, right, really not much to comment there, although, again, the finance and investment contribution here has actually shrunk, which is interesting because the EBITDA has gone up. But because that is largely due to Cenovus, right? The fact that the EBITDA goes up by our attributable share doesn't mean that the cash necessarily comes into operating free cash flow. What goes into operating free cash flow is the dividend that we receive, right? And so when you take that into account, the contribution is quite a bit lower. I think as we move to the right-hand chart, what's probably most interesting is to understand what this is telling you in terms of the reinvestment profile of these businesses, how much money goes back into them out of the cash that they generate. So if you look first at Ports, right, it was 21% of EBITDA, right, in the first half. If you look at Retail, I mean, extraordinarily earnings-efficient business, right? The reinvestment rate is 12%, right, of EBITDA in the first half. If you look at Infrastructure, it's 25%, right? When you get to Telecoms, right, of course, it's 43%. So our highest rate of reinvestment or requirement to keep capital at work, right, is in the Telecoms business, which is precisely why it makes it quite painful if you have constraints on revenue and margin growth at the same time. And in finance and investments, you've got this, as I say, monstrous leap, right, in terms of the share of EBITDA, that was actually HKD 8.7 billion coming from Cenovus. But when you get down to what we actually got by way of dividends, right, it's not HKD 13.5 billion, it's 2-pointsome-odd billion, right, and very, very low, reinvestment. That's the loan repayment that I talked about that was actually done through an associated company, which is why it's in that little light brown color there. If we go then down, we'll get through this, I promise, operating free cash flow to actual free cash flow. The bar on the left-hand side, the graph on the left-hand side just takes you through right, from operating free cash flow on an actual basis. So these are the sums. So interest and taxes paid, HKD 7.4 billion. That's actually lower than in the first half of last year. Working capital changes are also lower than in the first half of last year. Telecoms licenses, minor, minor spending in Austria and on the license in Hong Kong and others, really nothing of great importance in there. Most of that relates to noncash customer acquisition cost capitalization in the telco businesses. But nevertheless, that gets you down to free cash flow of HKD 7.705 billion, right, which looks a little bit lane compared to the first half of last year, which was HKD 10.697 billion. So to understand that, you have to go to the graph on the right-hand side. and walk through the year-on-year comparison. So you start by stripping the proceeds of the U.K. merger that were in the first half out of the reported free cash flow for the first half of 2025, right? You also take out, and this is really quite interesting, there was a very favorable foreign exchange movement, right, on inventories in the first half of last year for exchange rate movements between January 1, 2025 and June 30, 2025. This year's movement actually was the reverse, right, for the same period in 2026. So you've got to take that out to get to the comparable number. So that's the comparable underlying first half. Free cash flow last year was actually HKD 10.7 billion. And then we go through the attribution of that. The EBITDA of subsidiaries seems to be contributing very little, and that is not really a correct assessment. I mean, Ports EBITDA was actually up. A.S. Watsons was up significantly. Infrastructure was up on an underlying basis, but it unfortunately got eaten up by declines, right, in contribution right from the subsidiaries right in Telecoms. Dividends from associates and JVs are up for the year, and that is particularly true in A.S. Watson and Infrastructure and of course, the dividends that we received in finance and investment from Cenovus and IOH. The working capital changes, as I say, was a little bit better than last year. The CapEx and telecoms licenses was a little bit worse. You're seeing a bit more spending in Ports. I think Dominic will talk about that. We've got some catch-up ball to play in terms of some of the older facilities. So we will be spending more in CapEx and Ports this year than we were last year. And you'll see that again in the second half, actually. But again, the investments in associates, the next column, the HKD 3.2 billion, that's what I was talking about on those 2 investments that we made that drove that big difference. And so that fundamentally is how you get down to $7.7 billion, right, of underlying free cash flow. The items to the right that are negative, right, the advances to U.K. Telecoms businesses were basically commitments that have been made at the time of the merger and then were paid in the first half of this year that weren't made -- that didn't exist in the first half of last year. And the exchange impact, as you can see, negative this year, then you add in all of the net proceeds from the one-off disposals and you end up with the reported number of free cash flow, which is HKD 58.3 billion, which is 88% ahead of last year. So we've gotten through that. I will turn you over and stop droning on. I'll turn you over to Kwan, who will give you a quick snapshot of our financial profile.