Good morning and welcome to this presentation of the Barclays preliminary results of 2009. Some of you may have seen that I made a statement this morning about the decision of John Varley and Bob Diamond to waive a bonus for 2009 despite the exceptional results that we published today, simply to say that I am going to be here throughout this session and would be happy later to answer any questions you may have on this subject. But as for the results, the plan is that there will be presentations from Chris Lucas, our Group Finance Director, from Robert Le Blanc, our group Risk Director and we will conclude with a presentation by John Varley, our Group Chief Executive. And just to set the time context, we expect the presentations will come in at under the hour that we will hope and plan to ramp up the whole session by 11. Thank you.

Good morning and thank you Marcus. 2009 was a year of a great deal of activity at Barclays. We've transformed our investment banking platform to continue to build out our Global Equities and M&A businesses. In retail and commercial banking, we've grown income and actively managed costs to mitigate the impact of market conditions. We saw Barclays global investors can retain the stake in BlackRock and we've taken very significant steps to increase capital, reduce leverage and boost liquidity. You can see the outcome of all these activity and the results that we've announced this morning. We delivered profit of £5.3 billion, excluding a £6.3 billion gain on the BGI transaction and underlying profit more than trebled. This resulted from a very strong income growth of 34%, well ahead of cost growth, at the same time our core tier 1 ratio almost doubled to 10%, adjusted gross leverage reduced to 20 times and we've trebled our liquidity pool to a £127 billion. As you know we announced a new structure for the business in November. We're reporting numbers under the old structure today and we will issue a restatement in the end of March. In general, my comments compare our results for the full year with those of the previous financial year. If I look at how we performed on an underlying basis, after reversing out all gains on acquisitions and disposals as well as movements on credit and gains on debt buybacks profits more than trebled to £5.6 billion. Looking at the group performance in more detail, income grew 34% to £31 billion and cost growth was lower than income at 24%. Discretionary cash compensation in 2009 was £1.5 billion and in addition we have made long-term awards of £1.2 billion which we will vest over a three year…

Thanks Chris. Good morning. I'm going to review impairment across Barclays in 2009 and look at trends in our main portfolios. I'll also cover market risk and our outlook for this year. At this time last year I gave you our planning assumptions for 2009 impairment. We could see that credit conditions were declining rapidly in many countries as the economy slowed and unemployment picked up. We expected the Group's loan loss rate in 2009 to rise to between 130 and 150 basis points. And I explained that this planning was based on three broad assumptions that economies performed at consensus levels, with steady FX rates, and a constant balance sheet. By the half year, the major economies were weaker than expected and we updated you that full-year impairment could move higher. We saw some improvement in impairment trends during the fourth quarter and our full-year loan loss rate came in at 135 basis points, on a comparable basis. The improvement in the last quarter was driven by a good performance in the wholesale books, where we avoided large single name losses as well as better trends in the retail books. I'll take a few minutes now to explain how those impairment trends developed. Total loan impairment in 09 was £7.4 billion, and with the £700 million charge against available for sale assets, total impairment was £8.1 billion. The £7.4 billion gives an observed loan loss rate of 156 basis points, using the actual balance sheet and FX rates. We believe impairment for Barclays will peak well below the level we saw at the height of the property crisis in the early 90s. Barclays have a strong institutional memory about experience and has worked hard to protect our portfolios from the effects of severe credit stress. Let's look at the…

Thank you, Robert. Good morning. Chris has described the main components of our 2009 financial performance and you've just heard from Robert about risk. My intention is mostly to look forward this morning. But before I do that I want to start with two points of perspective and I also want to show you how we've performed versus the scorecard for 2009 that we gave you a year ago. Perspectives, first, when I reflect on the last three years, I'm struck by how often we've had to make explicit choices about which path to follow. The sign-posts haven't always been clear and the consequences of taking the wrong path might have been bad. At the Board and at the Executive Committee we thought carefully about those choices and it would candidly have been easy to be fatalistic about them. But we decided in 2007 that we must impose our will on the course of events to the extent that we could. Second, the objective of a bank is to generate returns for shareholders but banks can and should, in ways consistent with that objective, contribute to the well being of society by conducting their business responsibly and by performing well on behalf of their customers, their core functions of payments and money transmission, safe storage of deposits, maturity transformation and lending and the provision of advice and execution in underwriting and trading. These activities lie at the heart of every modern economy and if economies are to grow with all the beneficial consequences that flow from that, then banks must help their customers take appropriate risks. A key differentiating factor in the performance of banks has been their ability to understand and manage risk and managing risk was a big part of our focus last year, strategic risk, business risk…

Thank you. (Operator Instructions). Thank you.

John-Paul Crutchley from UBS. Want to ask a question on GRCB emerging market portion as was appreciate it now under the new group structure. One strategic question and one tactical question, in ways to see that the growth trajectory you hoped for that business would somewhat counterbalance a strong growth on the institutional side of the business, it sounds like a clearly degree of refocus there. So I just wondered to get some comments on whether you still see that as a strong cash balance too and then the second question may be just in terms of with some particular territories which clearly haven't panned out as you had expected, what should we just particularly expect to say clean up or restructuring or withdraw cost if that was the case for 2010?

Let me make a few general comments and then I will ask Anthony to add to what I say. Can I caveat it though, I mentioned that there was going to be a seminar in December and at that stage we'll give you somewhat more detailed views in the area that you are also going to be in these other areas of GRB and Barclays Corporate, but starting point is that in the context of the Group strategy of finding higher growth through time by diversification, one of the things we've been seeking to do is to increase rapidly the income in GRCB on an international side relative to the UK. Of course we want the UK businesses to continue to grow, but if you look at that relationship today, about 45% of the income in the old GRCB is from the international businesses. And ask a very big change as you know, relative to two or three years ago and our goal through time if we were expressing it in the old GRCB format was that the profit contribution from the international businesses in GRCB would be equivalent in time to the UK contribution. Now clearly that needs to be income lead and I think we have to overcharge the income in the international businesses in this space significantly over the last three years including in the emerging markets but I have not (inaudible) in my presentation. Now I think in some cases we were too aggressive in building in certain markets in to what turned out to be the downturn. So the strategy is unchanged. I think there ways in which we can improve the performance and as I said also in my remarks what we have to do is got to convert the investment that we made thus far in to sustained profit. Let me just turn to Anthony and ask him to add.

Thanks, John. Two things, one is we have a fantastic franchise in the emerging markets in sub Saharan Africa where we have to say well one or two positions and we feel good about the opportunities presented by those commonly over the medium term and particularly with our relationship with Absa. Secondarily, I would say that we have entered additional markets such as India, the UAE of course where we were before Pakistan in Asia as well. In some of those markets we've found a number of opportunities that we've acquired well and most of those were in the corporate bank space and some of them had difficulty in the retail space and what you'll find us doing is rebalancing over time to other things that work and away from the things hat don’t work. What we're looking right now, what that will constitute is the second part of your question around significant clean up or write-down, that's not what we're looking at right now, it's more of a rebalancing. In terms of our international footprint, in general and in retail, we (inaudible) good opportunities given the position that we have in Western Europe where we've show our ability to grow organically and also through fill-in acquisition in sub-Saharan Africa as our management team and also in (inaudible) had particularly good growth there and accounting current (inaudible) all in regulating pressures we continue to believe there'll be opportunities there. Turning around for the global retail banking, we are very much have off the belief that we can balance our strong domestic positions with international growth over time and this is a fine-tuning of activity.

Could I ask a few questions on the balance sheet? A few simple ones to start with and then a broader one. What was the impact of the Protium transaction, if any, on the balance sheet ratios, RWAs and impairments?

The answer to that is none; we looked through the Protium transaction for the purposes of RWAa.

Secondly, could you give us some guidance on the outlook for RWA involuntary growth this year, both from grade migration and market risk weightings?

On the market risk weighting, we've given you of £40 billion to £60 billion of RWAs, I think that range still exists, but at the top end of it. Involuntary grading migration, evidence to date is showing a relatively small impact on RWAs, but I am not expecting it to be major. When I look though at one point at RWAs progression over this year, there is a transfer out of RWAs into deductions for securitizations, which has an impact on improving core Tier 1, but only half the deduction goes against Core Tier 1, but that is included in our calculations.

Then more broadly, could you comment on where you think we're going on capital leverage now. So there's obviously been a significant improvement this year, do you think you're now running it at where you would need to be in the longer run, both on levels of capital on a risk basis and on a straight leverage basis, or how much further do you think you're going to need to fill this?

Let me talk about capital, Robert, Chris might want to add on leverage. On capital it's clearly been the right, both from the point of view of the equity market sentiment. But also from the point of view of what our regulators want to move with the needle and we have in the way (inaudible). And I think it is fair to say that although we set out on this journey back in 2007 in fact and indeed I would say the banking sector as a whole has improved its capital ratio significantly, so the journey doesn't stop from here. If you ask me, is that likely to be on a permanent basis, a requirement for more capital in the system as a result of what happened in the world over the course of last two or three years, I mean no surprises that my answer to that is yes emphatically. We have lots of capital this year in 2009 to anticipate what might come out of Basel for example. I think it's right for us to be thoughtful about the implementation timetable of Basel and indeed thoughtful about the full package of things to be implemented, but we need to take a generally conservative stance and protect our capital ratios because whatever is implemented overtime, I think that the capital requirements will go up, or the deductions will come down. I think we start in a very good place by the way having a 10% core Tier 1 ratio, having a 13% Tier 1 ratio. That's the right place to start and remember that the implementation timetable will be multiyear leverage.

On leverage, when we were at 28 times, I think I identify that I was hoping to get it nearer to 20. We were careful not to keep a specific target, well that was directed to go. I have to be honest, I think we got to (inaudible) than I was expecting which is good news, therefore in the sort of range that I would want to keep it, which means I don't have a specific target to drive it down further in the current environment, if it sits around 20, I think I'll be fine.

Ian Smilie from RBS. Again on RWAs, could you give us a bit more disclosure as to why the counterparty component went down so sharply in the second half of the year please, Chris?

Because there was just less activity around the year end. If you look at the balance sheet on a non-weighted case, you will see that most of the reduction in balance sheet was on wholesale institutions and particularly on settlement balances. Of the £13 billion FICC revenues could you just give us some idea what proportion of that comes from OTC derivatives and what might happen if that was to be brought back on to central clearing with no offsets, which presumably you would be trying hard to push through there?

I'm not sure how precise we really want to be on that, but I think in terms of the broader question, what is the impact of derivative regulation; I think I'll ask Jerry to pick up on this, on both pieces of it. I think the most important thing for us, is that is the legislation has worked its way through Congress through in the US. We've seen so many corporates come and testify to the House and to the Senate about the importance of end user derivates for our corporate clients. So we think this is going to end in a very good place, which is with a significant amount of derivatives going to exchanges, but there is an opportunity to do structured transactions with our corporate clients.

The only thing I would add is that with the increased transparency that comes from electronic execution and the stability that comes from central clearing we would actually expect to see volume growth and kind of a more developed market, that certainly been our experience and frankly we had built our businesses around transparency and derivatives given the role that we had in putting a lot of these markets under electronic execution platforms in the first place back six to seven years ago and in fact our very early embracing of central clearing as a way of improving the capital efficiency of these businesses as well as the stability of the system.

Can I push you a bit harder because one of your US competitors has actually given an indication of what proportion of their FICC revenues come from OTC derivatives, I understand you were trying very hard to offset any impacts that might come through, but just to give us an understanding of the starting point of that £13 billion, how much might come from OTC derivatives?

It's not something that we've disclosed by way of further breakdown and I hope you feel that on Barclay's Capital generally, we had given a lot more data and disclosure over recent years and we give back that chart that shows you income by origin, but I think going down into a further set of details is somewhere we'd be reluctant to go.

But as the finance director, we've not given them any relief from that forecast for 2010 or 2011.

(inaudible) Can we go on to the far side? Yes.

Hi this is Peter Toeman. I had a couple of unrelated questions please. In the second half of the year you saw an extraordinary increase in the cash balances on the balance sheet and you've given us an indication of how much it costs to hold that liquidity portfolio for the full year '09. I wonder if you could give us an indication of if you maintained that liquidity portfolio through 2010, what the incremental cost would be because presumably it was sort of second half rated.

Yes and I think the number I would have for full year would be something in the yield rate of £800 million.

And a £100 billion total that was incremental.

Yes, of £150 million from that.

Okay and my second question is related to the assets acquired with Lehman. I noticed you are still waiting to receive about £2.3 billion of assets from Lehman and about £1.8 billion of those assets are on the balance sheet. Given the time that's past, I know there are legal cases going on but is there a point at which there's a risk that you would have to derecognize those assets if you don't actually receive (inaudible) currency?

Rich here will just comment on that question. The microphone is here.

Chris may want to comment on the technicalities of revenue accounting but we are in the middle of ongoing litigation. So it's difficult to make specific comments. But I could tell you that in the booking of the £1.8 billion and not the full £2.3 billion recognized there may be some delay or whatever in doing that. We believe as to our accounts that we are adequately provided if you will currently for where the litigation stands. Second of all we're very confident that the litigation will end in our favor. You will see no response to the filing by estate and we remain confident we're looking forward to the hearing in March or April and it's not something that we're concerned about at the moment.

I wouldn't add much but I would say we will know that the state has assets or other assets significantly subsidized. They were on the resolution of the legal case which actually perverse as we think we are in a very strong position obtaining assets mechanically. It's something that's relatively easy to do.

Peter Toeman from HSBC, I presented a slide which tells us all the volatile funding in Bar Cap is now more than one year majority and I suppose that's the cost of cash to bat which you haven't actually given us but I wonder if we could assume that the cost of the majority transformation of Bar Cap is actually going to fall predominantly in 2009 throughout very little and further incremental cost in 2010?

We wouldn't expect that we see much more involvement in transformation and see the average maturity based on wear outs and I don't think it needs to change beyond that?

Not about the change but about the incremental cost. I mean should we assume that the cost of all that in the 2009 numbers?

Cost is relative in terms with all that. Yes.

Hi, there I'm from Goldman Sachs. Two questions if I may. The first one is just on the sort of cost to net income or net revenues in Bar Cap. Is it fair to assume that you expect it to continue to be around low 70 despite sort of trading write downs and old gain losses, old debt losses tailing off?

I'll ask Bob to comment but just to remind you what Chris said. Chris said that we are targeted to be in the lower end in a range of 65% to 75% net ratio. Bob?

Yeah that's exactly the place to go. Our budgeted bills in the lower half of that range as Chris said but if you look back on 2009, the £18 billion of CapEx revenues, well that's very-very strong and as we look forward clearly we want to budget our business around our client business and our revenues. In 2009 you have to also look at close to £2 billion in owned credit, a number that's unlikely to recur again as that's kind of going up and down. In close to £7 billion in both provisions in credit market write-downs when you're total leveling up and certainly going forward we wouldn't expect to be anywhere near the type of level. So you see quite clearly how we can see the cost income ratio coming down.

You had a second question.

Yes just very quickly, just to clarify on what's coming on the group impairments. You said that for 2010 you expect sort of positive trends to continue but we shouldn't expect the significant drop that we saw in the second half. Just wondering if you could clarify if we are supposed to take the base I assume on the whole year on 2009 rather than the second half which was quite different.

I was thinking that the base of the £8.1 billion of full year, in that year-on-year we will see that type of decline.

I have two questions. It's Fiona Swaffield from Execution Noble. On the fixed income revenues, you mentioned they were quite resilient versus peers and I think they're down about 36% second half/first half. Could you talk about what's going on? Is the second half an adequate base for us to forecast off for 2010? Have we got a normalization of spread from there or were volumes weak? Just some kind of idea of what 2010 could look like?

Let me have Bob take that and then we'll come to your second question. Bob?

I'm going to answer in general on the business and then ask Jerry to pick on the specifics of fixed income but I think keep in mind still being in the first half and we all say at the end of the first half is that we always expect our second half. We had just for seasonal reasons because you lose about a half a month of revenues somewhere in July in August, this year it was August and around December and December generally poses earlier. So we definitely expect a stronger first half and second half everything else being equal. Secondly I would say that fixed income portion of sick fixed income currencies and commodities were very, very strong in the first half last year and we wouldn't expect it. We didn't see it strong in second half. We wouldn't expect it this year to be wonderful if it was but we would see better opportunities in our equity business particularly now that you knew up and running. In parts of Asia we'll be up and running soon. In our advisory business we were pleasantly surprised that we could finish in the top five in the U.S. M&A and now Europe and Asia are up and running and also in our major market in France services business. Jerry, do you want to say anything more?

Just specifically to add on fixed income I do think we have a normalized spread environment now and volumes again will be driven very much by the environment where I think we have still significant volatility, a lot of uncertainty around direction of interest rates, a significant amount of financing and a very healthy calendar across government sector, corporate financial institutions and so clearly the first half of '09 was a very, very favorable environment and difficult to see something like that repeated in fixed income but this remains a very positive environment for the fixed income business overall and we have a very, very strong franchise position across Europe, US and Asia.

While on the CapEx, I would just say that we are listening also in terms sovereign spreads whether it was in Dubai or more recently in Greece that's very, very good for business and clients whether their issues or investors are going to be very, very thoughtful and serious about the banks they use. And our position of being number one in sales, trading research and fixed income both in Europe and in the US is a huge advantage now. And its going to create significant volatility and significant opportunity in those markets and our market environment where every sovereign trades at the same spread from our point of view its not necessarily good for business. So, there is a lot of things going on out there as [Jerry] said from a fixed income point of view but it will be very, very different from the first half last year which is a different kind of environment but its going to be a very interesting year in fixed income and I think clients will be very thoughtful about using the banks that they know can execute.

In terms of economic capital versus core Tier 1 I can't see that you've allocated the BGI gain or the increase in core Tier 1 capital in the second half into economic capital. Is that just due to the averaging or is that something that will happen?

You are right; it's due to the averaging the economic capital only came in on in the first of December. So, the impact is much low on those tables.

So what would, say, Bar Cap's economic capital be at the end of the year? Would it have gone up from 11? Would a lot of the BGI gain gone in there?

No, the BGI gain is going into the BGI segment and what we will then do is become part of the capital supply, rather than capital demand.

Yes, it's Bruce Packard at Seymour Pierce. I just wanted to ask about the growth aspiration because if you're saying in the outlook statement about the cost of equity and struggling to make that sort of return. It doesn't feel at the moment like a huge amount of capacity has been taken out of the system, even though Lehman's has gone etc., just looking around this room. And I just wonder about this. It would just be helpful to get a little more clarity about how you think about growth adding value for shareholders.

Yes. I mean there are some markets where there has been just a genuine transformation in the competitive landscape that we would certainly make that comment on investment banking and wealth. You know just as I do how seismic have been those shifts. I think what you say is fair in some areas of the retail and commercial banking where and less capacity has gone. I would say though that the competitive dynamics, if we take United Kingdom, the competitive dynamics in the United Kingdom in retail and commercial banking have changed quite a lot and what you've seen not entirely a beneficial trend I would say is a retreating of foreign competitors to national markets. I worry about that because I think with that may go a nationalist and protectionist agenda, and so from a macro point of view, I think that's rather a troubling trend. But actually as those withdrawals have taken place, then have been good opportunities. If I look for example as how we performed in the mortgage market here in the United Kingdome over the quarter last 24 months absolutely no doubt that its benefited significantly from the change in capacity. If I look at what happened to corporate banking and commercial banking activity here in united kingdom, I mean they changes as you know in the competitive line up. So I want to be too shy about talking about the opportunities at the aggregate level presented by the crisis because the landscape has changed but certainly the areas of greatest opportunity, one we have already in the investment banking, one we are intending to grab it well, those are the two areas where we should we hope in time we're the biggest beneficiaries and our shareholders from that. We will take a question on the telephone and then I will come to the questions back

Thank you. Your question comes from the line of Arturo de Frias from Evolution. Please go ahead.

I have a couple of questions. In fact I will go one by one. First of all, the comp ratio in Bar Cap, and you have mentioned it is 38%. My question is, is this affected in any way by the accounting of deferrals? And if yes, what kind of comp ratio you could be happy with in the Investment Bank.

I will ask Chris Lucas to handle that one first of all.

The accounting is for in calculates in the comp ratio on an accounting basis. That don't includes both the terms but not £1.2 billion pounds that we are building across the group and we have to think about Bar Cap separately. So it does get impacted, there is a carried forward deferral as well and the impact on the 38% is broadly £500 million pounds go forward deferrals that are included in that calculation.

Could we have our second question.

Sure. Turning to retail, you were mentioning that your coverage of MBLs in the mortgage book is 18% and that's broadly in line with the severity you would expect. And I would, I had a feeling that that's a bit low severity expectation. In many of the countries where you operate, the housing market is falling by 20%, 30%, 40%. So can you explain why you think 18% severity will be enough? And I will have a very brief third question after that, please.

Yes certainly I will ask Robert to comment but the starting point is a very conservative loan-to-value ratio spectrum within the group. So if you look at the UK mortgage about 43% loan-to-value ratio. If you look at the Spanish about 51% loan-to-value ratio. If you look at the South African about 41% loan to value ratio that's why we formed the view that we do. And finally because the gaining in position even at this point in the crisis is a cautious one.

I will just add to that. The international portfolio to mention really will be the Spanish one which is our large international one and our Spanish book is actually even more conservative than our UK book when you look at exposure to property price decline because although the average LTV is a bit higher than here in the UK and you are recognized that we have a very conservative book here in the UK. If you look at the announcement of exposure currently involving 85% LTV in the UK that's about 14% of our exposure today is about 85 LTV and in Spain it's only half that level. It's just about 7% so but the average LTV is a bit higher but the exposure to, the expected price movement in Spain is even lower and that's why the overall reserve ratios I think are completely adequate.

Thanks Robert. You had one last question did you?

The last question was capital, particularly talking about the BlackRock stake. If the Basel proposals go through as they are now, minority stakes in financial institutions are going to become extremely capital intensive; if I understand the proposals correctly, they will carry 100% waiting. So you would have to allocate £5 billion or £6 billion to your BlackRock stake which obviously is a lot of capital. Could you share with us what's your view on that one please?

I would say two thinks and both they would want to add, first of all, in the BGI transaction, with our eyes open, we took at our consideration a stake in BlackRock and that's because we think that it has strategic opportunities for the Group and therefore for the Group's shareholders. It was a conscious decision. The second thing is, that we should bear in mind that the Basel proposals are just that, they are proposals. We will see what is implemented. Its right for us to assume a conservative approach to implementation but there is a long way to go and there is a long timetable of implementation and therefore I don't think it will be right for us to discount the view immediately that everything has been published so far will be implemented, Bob?

It's Leigh Goodwin from Citi. Actually I had a couple of quick questions. The first one actually, Robert showed a very interesting slide showing 20 year average loan impairment rate of 91 basis points. I wonder whether you are encouraging us to think of that as the normalized level to the future. If not, which direction either side of that 91 basis points might we be thinking about?

We tried to be very [mouthful] we were asked still today that's our (inaudible).

I would say if it's going to be 91, it would have to be a very long future. So I think it'll come down but I don't think we'll get down to 91 anytime very soon. That 20 year history, it doesn't really apply I think depends on market conditions.

You had a second question.

Well, the second question was actually just really following that on returns. I think there was a question earlier just; you made some comments about long-term returns. You've had a target of ROE, I think sort of high teens in the past. I wonder whether you are signaling a change in what you think the long-term ROE target will be.

Well our objectives remains the same. I think the task of getting to the objective will be harder in any event for the time because of the phenomena that I have described. I mean high levels of regulatory capital requirements, high levels of equity markets requirement and high cost of capital. So I think we should be realistic about the challenge but could we see a time in the future where the industry is able to get back to those levels. I mean we tried as you know to be in double digit return on equity. Can we see that again? Can we see that operating in the 12 to 20 range in the future? Yes we certainly can. But I emphasize short-term, these challenges are going to be significant. We understand full well that the supply of capital to banks, debt capital and equity capital will demand a proper return and we understand that entirely and that will be the reality of the industry going forward for sure. I think we got time, the chairman said we'll try and finish by that time. We've got time for two more questions if there are two more and one is here Michael. Michael Helsby - Bank of America/Merrill Lynch: It's Michael Helsby from Bank of America/Merrill Lynch. Well, you painted clearly a picture of where FICC was clearly a fantastic 2009 but clearly there are a lot of other things going on in your business. So I was just wondering if when you look at 2010 and 2011, whether you see 2009 as a base level on an underlying basis that you can actually grow from or is that's just a peak revenue that's unlikely to be met? And I've just got one follow-up question on cost side.

Well I think it probably little hard to predict. I mean we couldn't been more delighted with the speed of the integration which gives us an opportunity, John mentioned it earlier to get out of the detour of hiring for Europe and Asia and equity and the advisory business, when we look at the top line revenue mill, £9 billion higher than it has ever been before is a terrific year, but we expect that we can out achieve that of course we do, you know how to run the business. So there is nothing there that we would say certainly some market conditions were better here and there, but (inaudible) think about it. If we can continue at that level and the significance or the severity loan credit and credit market write-downs are behind us, then even at those levels and as I said, maybe fixed income comes down and other things go up. The impact on profitability is enormous and that why we have the confidence we have going in to kind of profitability and the ratios we ran this year while we do some capital, while we do some leverage and lowering the storm on the credit market write-downs and the loan credit give us a lot of confidence in the profitability of the business going forward. Michael Helsby - Bank of America/Merrill Lynch: That's what I am thinking, if a eight year old costs in that revenue range and then push it down towards the bottom where you're guiding then, it kind of implies a profit in 2010 for Bar Cap as around about £5 billion or maybe more pound, is that something that we should be, I know it's kind of a tricky question [Multiple Speakers].

We've got time for one last one at JP, you began it and you ended it, here it comes. John-Paul Crutchley – UBS: Just back on the growth question, and two for Bob maybe, related. The first is on Bar Cap. Can you just talk about, you've obviously been building out the franchise and equities in both Europe and Asia. Can you just talk about where you have got to in that process in terms of people, infrastructure? How much more cost is to come, or have you basically got the platforms in shape? And the second is just on wealth, you obviously talked about the strategic spend just coming over the next five years, and I guess the question is, is that quantum enough and given that the amount you have talked about, if you take it on an annualized basis, is about a 6% increase on the cost of the wealth business, which given that John you were talking about a clear transformational change in this business. This just doesn't feel like sort of cost investment getting to where you want to be. So maybe if you could just talk to A, in terms of Bar Cap currently and B, do you need more to spend in wealth?

You know the equity build out went extremely well last year and I think again to go back to what John said, we've got out of the gate early. So, before yield was up, we had a fully functioning, fully running sales trading research advisor business across the entire time zone which was terrific. Japan will open up very soon and we would expect, it's going to take us close to at least the mid-year to have Asia to the same position. Last year, headcount was flat doing that, so we probably had in the order of 2000 plus in terms of hiring front and back office for just what we're talking about the equity and advisory build out. But we found ways and to get other efficiencies in the business. I think it's going to be a million miles from that this year. I think as we continue to build out Asia and we've other opportunities in prime services in emerging markets. We maybe up a little, it's probably going to be broadly flat to up a little because we're going to continue to find as we do every year, other areas to become more efficient in the business, so maybe a small up in terms of headcount, but not dramatic, not the kind of things you've see in the past in Barclays.

John mentioned earlier that the examples we are using for Barclays wealth were Barclays Capital and BGI and think of hallmark of that were disciplined growth over time, so I think first thing to leave you with is that the investment will be disciplined investment. The second thing is that, over looking for five year period, lots of that will be, it would be slightly front loaded, so we certainly expect that we will have a good base to begin with and the aspirations that are a few change with scale as a business. We've done reasonable amount of investment over the core over the last four years. We've gone from the 27th of largest wealth manager in the world to about 9 or 10, so this is certainly the last push.

I'll just add one thing which is an incredible opportunity for us to have the Board approve the gamma plan which Tommy will be executing at a time where four of the top five players in global wealth are running into serious head winds and are seeing a decline in their business and a decline in their assets. So how often do you build while four of the top five participants in a market are in some form of decline. It's a very good environment for this.

Thank you all very much for taking the time to be with us.

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