Joe Morone
Chief Executive Officer
Okay. So, let's take the two, the BR 725 and A380, in the world of program accounting, when you have a fixed price contract, you have to regularly model the estimated profit of completion of the contract. So technically, these contract blocks let's say you've won a position on a program like the F35, your contract progresses in blocks of two or three years and so you do this sort of calculation over that known contract block. In the case of BR 725 that contract which we discussed in the past is really for the life of the program, so at a much longer block of time. The A380 is a relatively long block, it extends into early next decade and what you have to do basically each quarter is you have to model future estimated sales for the program, future estimated cost and cost trends and based on that modeling, you calculate your future profitability. If in that exercise, your modeling shows that the program is in a loss position for the life of the contract, so the total profits are a loss for the life of the contract, you need to take a charge associated with all those future projected losses in the current period and that's what happened with both of these programs. What's changed is that for both programs coincidentally our estimates of future sales dropped dramatically because it now looks like the BR 725 has a shorter life, significantly shorter life than we had been anticipating and A380 has been some very well-publicized reductions in projected production because the system demands are weak. So, we have to redo our models with these lower sales forecast and that pushed both programs into a loss position, which led to the charge. With BR 725, we had been absorbing and had expected to continue to absorb losses each quarter for quite a few more years before our models showed costs low enough that that program then started showing a profit and if we looked at the future profits and some of them over the shorter-term losses, that program looked up until this demand change to be a little better to breakeven. But in Q2 this year and through the rest of this year and into next year, we saw $800,000 of losses in Q2 for BR and we were expecting to continue to take those losses. A380 we were modeling as a breakeven program and then when the projection of sales dropped significantly, that really changes everything. So that's what happened with those programs and that's why we took those charges. When you look at our other programs and really, I think what's pertinent here is programs that are subject to program accounting and so LEAP is a cost-plus variable fee contract. So that isn’t really pertinent here. Programs where we're going PO to PO are pertinent, but programs where we have a fixed price contract over fixed contractual period, we do program accounting. So, F-35, Boeing fuselage frames, the Lockheed missiles, the CH53-K, the JSF the F-35 and all of those other programs, every one of our key growth programs and key legacy programs, while there are always ups and downs in the modeling, sometimes to the good, sometimes in the bad, on balance, they were all pretty much on track. There are in some cases, the outlook looks a little bit stronger, in other cases, looks marginally weaker, but they're basically all on track and we don't see any other programs that are at risk for life of program losses.